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FLEDGLING POLITICAL SYSTEMS: COMMUNITIES, REGIMES,
AUTHORITIES, AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT, 1816-1992

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
in the Graduate School of the State University of
New York at Binghamton
1998

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Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
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ABSTRACT

Do change and instability in domestic political systems affect the foreign policy of nation-states? If so, what types of domestic political change and instability affect what types of foreign policy behavior? Building on a recent confluence of the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures regarding the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, I develop a framework grounded in the political systems ideas advanced by David Easton. I elaborate on two concepts, vulnerability and aggression, to link the domestic political system with foreign policy behavior. Vulnerability is a function of two phenomena, internal stress and external stress. The occurrence of interstate aggression is a function of domestic vulnerability. Vulnerable domestic political systems may lead to conditions that increase the likelihood that vulnerable states will aggress stable states and vice versa.

Based on this link between domestic politics and foreign policy, I formulate hypotheses about the relationship between Easton's triad of political system components—the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities—and interstate conflict. Political community is operationalized as the persistence and climate of a nation-state. Political regime is operationalized by the set of domestic political institutions and changes in these institutions. Lastly, political authority is operationalized by the frequency of turnover in chief executives. With respect to interstate conflict, I examine the gamut of behavior, ranging from verbal demands to participation in interstate wars. I find that the dynamics of the domestic political system, its change and instability, have a nearly uniformly positive and significant effect on the level, frequency, and probability of interstate conflict. Political systems are, by definition, dynamic. This dynamism varies across time and space. In turn, this variation moderates positively the occurrence of interstate conflict.

To my parents, David and Lynda Pattee

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH FOCUS AND FRAMEWORK

1.1. Introduction

Do change and instability in domestic political systems affect the foreign policy of nation-states? If so, what types of domestic political change and instability affect what types of foreign policy behavior? What theoretical propositions can we develop to facilitate testing the causal connections between these phenomena? How do these relationships, if any, vary across space and time? In the following dissertation, I address these questions.

Drawing on two notions, vulnerability and aggression, I formulate a set of propositions about the way in which domestic political change and instability affect different levels of foreign policy behavior. I demonstrate that the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy is dependent on the type, the severity, and the timing of different kinds of domestic political conditions drawn from a hierarchy of domestic political system components. In addition, I contend that the theoretical arguments and empirical analyses presented in this dissertation have important implications for the way in which social scientists and policymakers understand the effects of political change and instability in interstate relations. Thus, at a time in world politics when change appears ubiquitous, understanding the links between domestic political change and stability and interstate behavior is of paramount importance.

Although previous research in world politics and comparative foreign policy has addressed the general links between domestic politics and foreign policy, no inquiries develop a fully hierarchical

approach to the domestic and foreign policy components of this general linkage.¹ In particular, the emphases of the comparative foreign policy and world politics research agendas regarding this link between domestic politics and foreign policy have varied considerably since a body of primarily empirical studies emerged in the 1960s.

Although the comparative and world politics literatures each entertained the notion of a causal linkage between domestic political change and turmoil and the outbreak of interstate conflict, this early acknowledgment of a linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy inspired two very distinct research initiatives. The nascent field of comparative foreign policy formulated, in part, a series of generalizable (i.e., cross-national), often highly complex, foreign policy frameworks anchored in the national level of analysis (e.g., Rosenau, 1969). Alternatively, the field of world politics field minimized the impact of domestic factors on interstate behavior in lieu of constructing systemic, major power-based explanations for war and change in international politics (e.g., Gilpin, 1981; Waltz, 1979; see the discussion and comparison in Thompson 1988).

What explains this divergence? I suggest that the comparative foreign policy and world politics research agendas diverge on the issue of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy for several reasons. In general, comparative foreign policy, as its name implies, is borne of the more traditional, national-level inquiry associated with the comparative politics field. Comparative foreign policy blends elements of the traditional case-study approach with the scientific method to study questions regarding the foreign policy behavior of nations. Furthermore, the comparative foreign policy agenda focuses primarily on how attributes of the domestic political systems of states (e.g., political system type, the worldview of political leaders, ethnic homogeneity, etc.), affect their behavior abroad.

¹ One of the earliest quantitative inquiries of the domestic political causes of interstate behavior is carried out by Sorokin (1937), and this work was followed by Richardson (1960). These early efforts in the world politics field were followed by a flurry of empirical research in the 1960s and 1970s focusing on the relationship between civil strife and interstate conflict (e.g., see Rummel, 1963; Tanter, 1966; and Wilkenfeld, 1968. For a critique of this body of work, see Levy, 1989).

That is, the underlying theory in early comparative foreign policy research focuses on the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy behavior: causality is theorized to flow from internal sources to external actions, rather than vice versa.²

Alternatively, the early world politics research agenda was borne of the post-WWII period in international relations, the cold war. For the most part, the primary focus of the qualitative and quantitative world politics literature was super-power relations, hegemony and hegemonic decline (Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy, 1987), and the distribution of capabilities in the international system (Morgenthau, 1967; Waltz, 1979). Thus, the focus of the world politics literature during the post-WWII period was primarily a reflection of the interests of the policy-makers—understanding the causes and consequences of peace and conflict between the major power states, and preventing nuclear war between the superpowers.

Given this concern for the distribution of power in the post-WWII interstate system, the world politics literature primarily identifies the source of nation-state behavior to be a function of the interstate system and interstate politics, rather than causal sources originating in the domestic arena.³ As such, consideration of the domestic political system is subordinated in the world politics literature to secondary, or even tertiary priority, when studying the causal processes of interstate behavior.

Having said this, the comparative foreign policy and world politics' research agendas have undergone varying degrees of intellectual renovation during the past several years. Indeed, one can make the argument that considerable convergence has occurred between these two agendas during the last

² Later, this early focus was followed by elaboration of these foreign policy frameworks to include the "feedback" of extra-state factors on domestic politics. Theoretically, then, the comparative foreign policy literature posited a dynamic relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, although their empirical tests of these frameworks were primarily static.

³ I should note, however, that there is considerable divergence among realists about the role of domestic politics in foreign policy. While classical realists connect domestic support and the

decade. Evidence of this convergence appears clear with respect to the similarity in the approaches that these two literatures employ in their analysis of links between the domestic political system and interstate behavior (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Hagan 1993, 1995; Morgan and Palmer, 1997; Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995).

What are the reasons for this convergence? I offer four explanations for the confluence in the research agendas pursued by the comparative and world politics sub-fields:

1. The near absence of militarized conflict, particularly war, between democratic states, a phenomenon generally referred to in the literature as the “democratic peace”;
2. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s;
3. The emergence of intrastate conflict as the predominant source of lethal conflict behavior in the world; and
4. Efforts by political scientists to forecast political outcomes, to use these forecasts to engineer domestic political changes.

Below, I elaborate on these four explanations.

1.1.1. The Democratic Peace

I suggest that the convergence of the comparative foreign policy and world politics research agendas is, in part, attributable to the relatively recent empirical discovery that democratic states rarely wage war against one another (see the initial propositions in Rummel, 1981, 1995; see general discussions and analyses in Benoit, 1996; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bremer, 1992, 1993; Chan, 1984, 1997; Weede 1983, Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Levy, 1988; Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Ray, 1993, 1995; Rousseau, et. al 1996; and Russett, 1993). While it is not necessary to recapitulate the nuances of this literature in its entirety, it is

mobilization of resources with state power and behavior in foreign policy, neo-realists find the locus of interstate behavior in the distribution of capabilities across the set of actors in the interstate system.

important for me to identify some of its basic propositions. In its most general form, the empirical finding that democratic states rarely go to war against one another is an argument about how domestic politics—the type of domestic political regime—influences foreign policy behavior, in this case militarized interstate conflict.

Thus far, two explanations have emerged in the literature. The first argument, commonly referred to as the “structural/institutional” hypothesis, is grounded in the idea that democratic political systems, and the institutions comprising these systems, constrain their political leaders during the policymaking process, particularly war-making. The need for democratic leaders to rally support from generally large constituencies reduces the speed with which democratic leaders may mobilize their nations for war. In addition, democratic leaders are accountable to their publics and therefore averse to engaging their nations in costly foreign policy engagements (Buono de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Maoz and Russett, 1993). Institutional constraints, then, deter leaders from engaging in costly foreign policies, and slow the process of escalation to war.⁴ As such, democratic diplomats seek, and are afforded the time, to resolve disputes with other democratic states peacefully (Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993).⁵

A second argument, referred to as the “normative/cultural” hypothesis, suggests that democratic political process is one based on peaceful conflict resolution, rather than the conflict oriented, zero-sum process generally characterizing nondemocratic political systems. Democratic political systems

⁴ Some recent work (Rousseau, et al. 1996) suggests that democratic leaders are reluctant to initiate interstate militarized conflict as the result of norms and constraints, regardless of the regime type of a potential adversary (i.e., democratic or nondemocratic).

⁵ It is important to note that while some of the democratic peace literature equates the presence of policy making constraints with democratic regimes (e.g., see Rousseau, et al., 1996), arguments by Morgan and Campbell (1991), Morgan and Schwebach (1992), Maoz and Russett (1993), and Partell (1997) suggest that some autocratic leaders may be equally as constrained as their democratic counterparts. However, it is clear from the analysis presented by Gleditsch and Ward (1997) that the

produce leaders that externalize these norms of peaceful conflict resolution to the interstate arena.

Democratic leaders are more inclined to reason and negotiate when disputes emerge with other states, regardless of whether these other states are democratic or nondemocratic (Kegley and Hermann, 1996; Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993; Ray, 1995; Rousseau, et al., 1996). As such, two democratic states that find themselves engaged in a dispute are likely, on average, to locate a non-militarized solution.

However, the peace between democracies is likely to fail when one of the states in a dyad is nondemocratic.⁶ In these “mixed” dyads the norms and limited constraints associated with nondemocratic regimes prevail over constraints in the democratic regime (Maoz and Russett, 1993). Thus, in order to avoid being exploited, democratic regimes in mixed dyads behave like nondemocratic regimes (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992). As such, although democratic regimes may be unlikely to initiate disputes against other states, once initiated upon by a nondemocratic state democratic states are likely to respond in kind (see Rousseau, et al. 1996).⁷ Similarly, dyads composed of nondemocratic regimes are also argued to exhibit high levels of interstate conflict involvement, as the conflict promoting

presence of executive constraints in a political system is highly correlated with the presence of a democratic regime

⁶ An additional argument is that the democratic peace may breakdown if one or both of the democratic regimes is nascent. The idea that fledgling regimes may threaten the democratic peace flows from the notion that norms, rather than institutions, underlie the democratic peace (see Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993).

⁷ Some (e.g., Fearon, 1994) argue that democratic leaders use “domestic audience costs” as a bargaining tool in disputes. Democratic leaders may be able to parlay a characteristic that on the surface would appear to be a handicap in interstate relations—domestic political constraints, particularly public accountability—to an advantage in foreign policy. As such, democratic leaders can signal to nondemocratic leaders that the cost of backing down from a policy position, e.g., electoral defeat, is too high, thus forcing the leader of the non-democratic state to modify its policy position.

characteristics of the nondemocratic political systems stimulate the resolution of disputes through military force.⁸

Several important questions remain unresolved in the democratic peace literature. In particular, given evidence about a particular relationship at one level of analysis (e.g., national, dyadic, or systemic), how valid are generalizations about behavior across levels of analysis? For example, if we identify a reluctance to go to war between pairs of democracies, does this logically lead to the conclusion that democratization will generate this outcome at the global level?⁹

Despite the manner in which the literature addresses these questions, the notion that foreign policy behavior may be influenced by domestic politics is more general than is exhibited in the democratic peace literature. My purpose here is simply to argue that the investigation of the democratic peace hypothesis has served, in part, as a catalyst for the theoretical and substantive convergence of the comparative foreign policy and world politics research agendas. The literature, it seems, now accepts the fact that domestic politics is a relevant determinant of interstate behavior. Just how domestic processes and conditions affect interstate relations, and to what degree, remains a matter for debate.

1.1.2. Two Developments in World Politics

One can likely identify several political events and processes affecting the research foci of the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures. In the course of the next two sections I

⁸ Maoz (1996) and Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) report empirical evidence suggesting that mixed dyads are the most conflictual, followed by nondemocratic dyads, and lastly, democratic dyads.

⁹ The viability of the dyadic democratic peace hypothesis for the national and systemic levels of analysis is addressed in Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), Maoz (1996), McLaughlin (1998), and Ray (1997). Needless to say, the debate over whether one can draw inferences from a dyadic-level hypothesis—that democratic states rarely engage in military conflict with one another—to the national and systemic-levels of analysis remains unresolved.

focus on two: (1) the dissolution of the Soviet Union: and (2) the emergence of intrastate conflict as the most frequent type of conflict in the global system. I discuss each of these developments in turn.

1.1.2.1. Dissolution of the Soviet Union

The comparative foreign policy and world politics research agendas are in part a function of contemporary world politics. Scholars attempt to address puzzles that they see before them, though they often base their solutions on patterns of previous behavior. Perhaps the greatest single event (or, more accurately, chain of events) in the last decade of interstate politics is the collapse of the Soviet Empire. One of the superpower anchors of the bipolar post-WWII system, the Soviet Union disintegrated at the end of the 1980s. This momentous change has had important implications for research in the comparative foreign policy and world politics communities, particularly the elevation of the importance of domestic politics as a key source of interstate behavior.

Indeed, while the systemic properties of interstate politics are still considered by the literature to be important sources of interstate behavior, the long dominance of superpower strategic concerns, of systemic dynamics in general, has assumed a lower profile in the study of the behavior of states. As such, research focusing on other sources of interstate behavior, such as those originating in the domestic political system, receive increasing attention across these two sub-fields. Thus, while the traditional post-WWII concern with the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains important, the nuclear standoff between the superpowers does not drive the current research agenda as it did in the past.

Having said this, some of the questions emerging in the current research agenda do retain their traditional, strategic focus. In part, these questions include: What action should be taken by Western nations in terms of the nuclear capability of the former Soviet Union and the east bloc countries? Should the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dissolve, or expand to include the former east bloc nations? How will the prospects for a European Community be affected by the demise of the traditional post-WWII threat?

These more traditional queries aside, questions unrelated to the post-WWII superpower rivalry are now receiving significant attention in the literature. Are economic refugees a strategic concern? What are the interstate dimensions of civil wars? What role do religion and culture play in world politics, and, in particular, the outbreak of interstate conflict? How can the West assist former Russian satellite states in their transformation from communist political systems and centrally planned economies to democratic political systems and market economies? Have the roles of international organizations, such as the United Nations, been altered by the end of the Cold war? What relevance do international environment and resource availability have in relations between states, and how can these issues be addressed absent the bipolar world? How can democratization be stimulated, and fledgling democracies supported, in those states that are currently nondemocratic?

These are but a few of what might be termed "non-traditional" research questions that the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures have now begun to scrutinize, questions that by their very nature force a commonality in the themes explored by the two literatures. My argument, then, is that the relevance of these research questions has emerged at the forefront of these two research agendas, in part, by the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower. Having said this, the collapse of the Soviet Union is only one (if the most visible) development in the last decade of world politics. The emergence of intrastate conflict as the most frequent form of lethal behavior has also influenced the research trajectories of the world politics and comparative foreign policy research agendas. I turn to a discussion of this relationship next.

1.1.2.2. Prevalence of Intrastate Conflict

Recent scholarship (Gurr, 1994; Holsti, 1996; Rummel, 1994) suggests that the majority of the human fatalities from military conflict occur within, rather than between, states. In other words, the source of the most of the violence-related casualties in world politics are the product of civil wars, revolutions, genocide, ethnic and religious conflicts, separatist movements, etc., rather than formal.

military clashes between states. The emergence of intrastate conflict as the primary mode of global conflict also appears to correspond with a steady decline in the frequency of interstate conflicts during the post-WWII period (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1996).

This is not to say that these conflicts are devoid of interstate and systemic stimuli. Indeed, many of these domestic conflicts have their roots in interstate politics, such as colonialism and extra-national participation (e.g., attempts by states to destabilize governments by supporting insurgencies in other states.) Moreover, while the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union has disappeared, a number of states have sought to fill the regional vacuums left by the withdrawal of the superpowers from traditional Asian, Middle Eastern, and African "hot spots." Thus, many current civil wars find their origins in the earlier superpower involvement, the departure of the superpowers, and emergence and intervention-prone behavior of regional hegemonies (e.g., the cross-border support of insurgents in Africa in connection with the civil war in Rwanda-Burundi and the recent collapse of Mobutu's Zaire.) Again, in order to explain and forecast these dynamics the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures have begun tussling with the correspondence between two systems, the domestic and the international.

One of the most intriguing aspects of this problem is that policymakers and scholars alike must confront these intrastate conflicts and their interstate qualities outside of the context of the cold war dynamic. Rather than the superpower rivalry being the catalyst for policy prescriptions as in the past, the options available to policy-makers (and the explanations surveyed by scholars) may be selected from a much broader "menu for choice" (Russett and Starr, 1996). The traditional reliance on the superpower rivalry as the source of policy with respect to these types of conflict is now unavailable. The benefit of such a development is that while the perception is that there is considerable uncertainty and greater complexity in an interstate system unfettered by the superpower rivalry, this condition does allow for considerable policy and intellectual latitude in studying and addressing these problems.

Several new question areas have emerged regarding the role of intrastate conflict in the study of world politics. For example, from the standpoint of political leaders, are the dynamics of civil wars the same as those for interstate wars? Does the securing of national independence by separatist movements have an impact on the subsequent behavior of these new states (i.e., more or less violent) and stable states proximate to these new states (i.e., more or less intervention-prone)? Do civil wars destabilize regions? Does the encouragement of democratic change alter the chances for subsequent domestic conflict and instability? When democratic regimes fail how does this phenomenon affect local and regional interstate behavior?

The post-cold war period presents the political scientist and policy maker alike with not only a great deal of uncertainty, but simultaneously access to a wide range of issues previously overshadowed by the superpower rivalry. Having discussed two of the areas that I believe contribute to the refocusing of the comparative foreign policy and world politics research agendas on domestic politics–foreign policy linkages, I now turn to a discussion of the implications of these developments for the prescription of policy by political scientists.

1.1.3. Forecasting in World Politics

Political scientists are part historians, part forecasters. We often base what we think will occur in the future on what has happened in the past. Yet as political scientists we often try to change the political future. We are, in a sense, political engineers. I would argue that the current state of world politics places a premium on each dimension of the political science endeavor—forecasting the future based on previous behavior, and altering the future so as to avoid less preferable political outcomes.

That is, with the policy dominance of the Cold war now absent, political science is, as I argue above, confronted with the task of addressing many issues and problems that lay dormant, or were inaccessible. Many of the civil conflicts that previously drew attention for their ideological and strategic relevance to the superpower rivalry, now confront the policy and scholarly community with myriad of

demographic, cultural, religious, humanitarian, and economic concerns. In part, the post-cold war world is exciting because of the increased frequency and variety of opportunities for inquiry and at the same time rather daunting because of the seeming renewed complexity and interdependence of the issues one confronts.

The genesis of the following dissertation draws on two processes that are prevalent in the post-cold war interstate system, political change and political instability. One common, if simple, analysis of post-cold war interstate politics is that the end of this period had the effect of releasing forces of change and instability once dampened by the bipolar system. Thus, the current challenge to students in the comparative foreign policy and world politics fields centers around three issues. First, understanding the sources of these political developments. Second, forecasting the impact of these changes for interstate politics. Lastly, formulating policies that moderate the negative aspects of political change while simultaneously enhancing the positive aspects of this political change. My general purpose in this dissertation is to investigate whether and when domestic political system change, evolution, and instability affect interstate relations, particularly the occurrence of conflict, both militarized and non-militarized, between nation-states.

As I note above, much of the literature focuses on the relationship between regime type and the propensity toward conflict with other states. However, only recently has the literature begun treating domestic political systems as dynamic structures. Only recently has the literature begun to shift from analyzing the static relationships between domestic political regime type and war behavior, for example, toward the effects of political system change on interstate behavior (e.g., see Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Maoz, 1996; Ward and Gleditsch, 1998). Moreover, there has been no examination of the relationship between a broader conceptualization of the domestic political system and interstate behavior. I execute this type of analysis in the following dissertation.

1.2. Theoretical Focus

As I noted above, my intent in this dissertation is to examine the relationship between political change and instability on foreign policy behavior, particularly interstate conflict. My goal is to establish a framework for exploring this connection between domestic political system change and instability and interstate behavior. In the chapters that follow, I focus on the relationship between two conditions that I argue form the link between the domestic political system and the outbreak of interstate conflict: (1) vulnerability; and (2) interstate aggression.

In order to demonstrate how political system vulnerability emerges, and is subsequently linked to the occurrence of interstate aggression, I discuss two conditions to which the domestic political system hierarchy is continually exposed: (1) internal stress, and (2) external stress. In turn, I explore how the triad of domestic political system components identified by Easton (1957), the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities, are subject to different forms of stress originating domestically and from abroad. I also discuss how these forms of stress ultimately contribute to political systems' level of vulnerability, and by extension, affect the likelihood of interstate conflict.

With respect to Easton's notion of the political community, I examine two measures of system stress, and hence, potential sources of vulnerability and aggression: (1) the duration, or persistence, of the political community itself; and (2) the political climate in the political community at a given point in time. Briefly, I hypothesize that new political communities are more likely to be vulnerable, and therefore are more likely to be the sources and targets of interstate conflict. With respect to political climate, I hypothesize those political communities experiencing poor political climates (i.e., high levels of domestic instability and strife) will be more likely to be vulnerable and aggressive on the interstate level. As such, I hypothesize that states experiencing poor political climates will be more likely to be the sources, or targets, of subsequent interstate conflict.

With respect to the second component of Easton's political system, the political regime, I focus on the relationship between changes in these regimes and the vulnerability and aggression dynamic.

Specifically, I suggest the general hypothesis that the more proximate a political regime change, the greater the levels of internal and external stress in the political system, the greater the likelihood of vulnerability, and therefore the greater the likelihood of the political system being involved in subsequent interstate conflict. Previous scholarship suggests that the type of regime change—democratic or nondemocratic, for instance—is an important determinant of any subsequent impact on the occurrence of interstate conflict. I investigate these arguments as well.

Lastly, with respect to the third component of Easton's political system, the political authorities, I focus on two dimensions: (1) the frequency with which the political leaders of a political system are replaced; and (2) the proximity of these changes. I investigate the hypothesis that the greater the frequency and the closer the proximity of regime changes in a political system, the greater the opportunity of stress and vulnerability, and the greater the likelihood of the political system, or nation-state, becoming involved in subsequent interstate conflict.

In sum, I rely on the related concepts of vulnerability and aggression in order to develop hypotheses about the relationship between the political system and the occurrence of interstate conflict. The hypotheses that I develop are general, but they provide a first step in gauging the relationships between the hierarchy of domestic political system components and subsequent foreign policy behavior.

1.3. Dissertation Framework

1.3.1. Chapter Two: Political Systems, Literature Review, and Research Design

I execute five tasks in the second chapter. First, I discuss the intellectual development of the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures. As I allude to earlier in this introductory chapter, these two literatures pursue distinct approaches to studying the behavior of nations in the interstate system. However, several dynamics, principally the need to decipher linkages between the

domestic political process and foreign policy, resulted in a convergence between these two literatures. I trace these developments.

Second, to construct a framework for studying the domestic politics–foreign policy relationship, I resort to one of the earliest research agendas in behavioral political science: political systems theory as delineated by David Easton. By doing so, I demonstrate how the political systems literature establishes the causal relationships between the political system and other systems within and external to the political community.

Third, I discuss some examples of the research from the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures. Ultimately, my purpose in this section is to indicate specific areas of divergence and convergence between these two literatures. I focus my discussion on ways in which one might go about conceptualizing the components of the linkage process, and the notion of causality implied by this process.

Lastly, in order to demonstrate general trends in the literature's approach to the linkage between domestic political systems and foreign policy behavior, I sample research from comparative foreign policy and world politics. I discuss the sample's treatment of issues of space, time, and methodology as they concern the domestic politics–foreign policy relationship. In doing so, I identify the spatial and temporal limitations of many of the early research designs.

1.3.2. Chapter Three: Political Systems and Foreign Policy: Theory and Hypotheses

In the third chapter, I flesh out my earlier discussion of the theories and propositions about the relationship between the domestic political system and interstate behavior. The third chapter is intended to accomplish the following tasks. First, I recapitulate some of the central components of the theoretical links between states' domestic political system changes and the stability and involvement of political systems in interstate conflict. As I note above, I accomplish this task by introducing two ideas prevalent in the literature on the relationship between domestic political instability and change and

interstate conflict: vulnerability and aggression. I discuss how these two dynamics are affected by the occurrence of various forms of internal and external stress.

Second, I formulate a set of hypotheses about the relationship between the individual components of the domestic political system and interstate behavior grounded in these notions of vulnerability and aggression. I test the statistical support for these hypotheses across three measures of interstate conflict in chapters four, five, and six, respectively.

1.3.3. Chapter Four: Political Systems and General Interstate Conflict

In the fourth chapter, I test the set of hypotheses identified in chapter three with respect to the seven categories of interstate conflict contained in the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) (Azar, 1993) for all states for the period 1948-1978. The COPDAB interstate conflict data contain information on interstate conflict actions exhibited by nation-states ranging from verbal threats to extensive military actions. One of the primary reasons for studying the causes and effects of militarized forms of interstate conflict, such as disputes and wars, is that these events historically form the basis of some of the most catastrophic interactions between states. Yet despite their magnitude and often far-reaching impact, research indicates that these types of interstate conflict are rare. A significant percentage of the foreign policy behavior exhibited by states across time are of the non-militarized variety, and it may prove fruitful from a policy making standpoint to examine how domestic political change and instability affect these forms of interstate behavior.

I draw several conclusions from the fourth chapter. First, the empirical analysis tends to support the argument that new political communities are more aggressive in foreign policy, but not the hypothesis that new political communities are necessarily more vulnerable to aggression by other states. Second, there appears to be a significant, positive relationship between the domestic political climate and interstate conflict: unstable states are aggressive and vulnerable. Third, new political regimes initiate more conflict in foreign policy than they receive, and these actions are concentrated on the non-military.

or diplomatic, end of the COPDAB scale. Lastly, my analysis of a range of foreign policy behavior in this chapter fails to provide consistent support for the general notion that changes in political system authorities have a significant and positive impact on foreign policy. Thus, states experiencing high frequencies of leadership turnover neither send, nor receive, significantly higher subsequent levels of conflict abroad.

1.3.4. Chapter Five: Political Systems and Militarized Interstate Disputes

In the fifth chapter, I begin the process of narrowing the category of interstate conflict against which I test the set of hypotheses discussed in chapter three. Specifically, the fifth chapter explores the relationship between the hierarchy of political system components and militarized interstate disputes (see Gochman and Maoz, 1984; Jones, et al., 1996). In short, interstate disputes consist of deliberate threats, displays, or uses of force by one or more states against one or more other states. The chapter is organized as follows. First, I briefly recapitulate some of the basic theoretical ideas and related hypotheses discussed in the third chapter. Second, I discuss the implications of moving from the general class of interstate conflict analyzed in the previous chapter to the subset of militarized disputes.

I draw the following conclusions from the empirical analysis in chapter five. First, the hypothesized relationship between political community persistence and the interstate disputes is generally confirmed; that is, as political communities mature, they are less likely to be the targets of militarized interstate disputes. Second, the empirical results suggest support for the second hypothesis, that a poor political climate predicts an increase in a state's subsequent involvement in militarized interstate disputes. Third, analysis of the impact of regime change on interstate disputes indicates support for the hypothesis anticipating a positive relationship between regime changes and subsequent interstate conflict. Lastly, the empirical analysis of the relationship between political authorities and disputes indicates support for the hypothesis that a positive relationship obtains between the two.

However, the empirical relationships between leadership change and dispute involvement do exhibit some inconsistencies across time.

1.3.5. Chapter Six: Political Systems and Interstate Wars

In the sixth chapter, I examine the relationship between the set of domestic political system components and the incidence of interstate conflict, similar to my approach in chapters four and five. However, in chapter six I am primarily concerned with examining the relationship between the political system and the most severe form of interstate conflict, interstate war. The sixth chapter is organized in the following manner. First, I test the first hypothesis that political communities are less likely to become involved in interstate conflict the longer they persist. Second, I test the second hypothesis by examining the impact of three measures of political system climate on states' war involvement. Third, I examine the relationship between political regime change and the probability of a state becoming involved in a war, including both the general relationship between regime changes and interstate war, as well as disaggregated forms of democratic and autocratic regime change. Lastly, with respect to the fourth and fifth hypotheses, I test whether the frequency and proximity of changes in the political authorities results in changes in the probability of the state's involvement in war.

I draw the following conclusions from the analysis carried out in the sixth chapter. First, the relationship between political community persistence and war origination is neither statistically significant, nor in the hypothesized direction. That is, the persistence of the political community has no effect on the probability that a state will engage in war. Second, the two measures of political climate suggest a positive and significant lagged relationship with war origination. That is, the poorer the political climate in a state, the greater the probability that the state will be involved in a subsequent war. Third, states undergoing autocratic change are significantly more likely, on average, to originate wars in the pre-WWII period. States undergoing democratic changes during the post-WWII period are significantly less likely, on average, to originate wars. Lastly, the empirical analysis suggests support for

the relationship between changes in political leaders and interstate conflict. The lagged effects of leader change have a significant and positive impact on war origination.

1.3.6. Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Policy Implications and Future Research

In the dissertation's final chapter, I draw some conclusions. Specifically, I discuss some of the implications of the specific and general conclusions emerging in the theoretical discussion and empirical analyses in the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters. Second, I consider some of the implications of these findings for policymaking in world politics. Lastly, I suggest some ideas for future research.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL SYSTEMS, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I emphasized the theoretical importance and policy relevance of exploring the impact of domestic political system characteristics, and changes in these characteristics, on foreign policy behavior. An inquiry of this sort falls within a broad range of scholarship emerging primarily in the comparative and world politics literatures. In the previous chapter, I also underscore the importance of the recent confluence of these two literatures. In order to demonstrate these recent developments, as well as moving toward the goal of testing whether the propositions raised in these two fields are supported empirically, I formulate a general theoretical framework. With this goal in mind, I address five tasks in the following chapter.

First, I briefly discuss the general development of the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures, focusing primarily on the current convergence of the research programs in these two sub-fields, and the importance of this development for the study of the domestic politics–foreign policy relationship.

Second, in order to construct a parsimonious framework for analyzing the domestic politics–foreign policy relationship, I draw on one of the earliest research frameworks in political science: political systems theory. I demonstrate how the political systems literature facilitates identifying the causal relationships between the political system and other systems within and outside of a particular society or community.

Third, I survey research from the comparative foreign policy and world politics fields, in turn. Ultimately, my purpose in this section is to identify areas of divergence and convergence between these two literatures.

Fourth, I discuss a number of theoretical issues raised by the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures. In particular, I focus on ways in which one might go about conceptualizing the components of the linkage process, and the notion of causality implied by this process.

Fifth, I identify a sample of scholarly research focusing on the broad linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy, and discuss its treatment of the issues of space, time, and methodology. Finally, I outline the format that I intend to pursue in formulating the hypotheses and empirical tests carried out in subsequent chapters.

2.2. Literature Review

2.2.1. The Comparative Foreign Policy and World Politics Literatures

A review of previous research on domestic–foreign policy linkages necessitates the discussion of a large and substantively eclectic literature spanning the fields of comparative foreign policy and world politics. In this section, and in the two that follow, I show that these two sub-fields have pursued very similar, almost parallel, research agendas. Chronologically, the field of world politics precedes and overshadows the sub-field of comparative foreign policy in the study of interstate behavior. However, theoretical inroads by what is sometimes referred to as the “first generation” (Neack, et al., 1995) of comparative foreign policy scholars did succeed in challenging some aspects of the dominant, systemically-based realist theories during the late 1950s, the 1960s, and 1970s. I discuss these developments.

Although the foundation of research in international politics (e.g., see Morgenthau, 1967) centers on the relationship between the strategies of statespersons and domestic political resources, the

primary focus of this research concerns interstate dynamics. In seeking explanations for interstate behavior, the literature traditionally focused on relative interstate power, the formation of alliances, polarity, etc., rather than domestic political sources of interstate behavior. To borrow Singer's (1969) phrase, "a level of analysis problem" existed between the study of foreign policy and the study of world politics, with the former concentrating on national-level explanations, and the latter on system-level explanations for behavior in the international system. Integration of the fields' respective foci was rare during this early stage.

This said, I do not mean to assert that the early world politics research agenda is completely bereft of a domestic political component, as is evidenced by the early inquiry into the relationship between domestic political turmoil and external conflict (e.g., Rummel, 1963). In this regard, the classical realists, as they came to be known, were aware that a diplomat's ability to project its state's power in the international system was, in part, grounded in the leader's ability to mobilize the domestic resources of the nation around a specific policy (Morgenthau, 1967). However, this branch of realist theory is not to be confused with the subsequent branch of realism (i.e., "neo" realism) that explicitly minimized, and in some cases eliminated, the domestic component of the explanation of interstate behavior.

At its base, however, it is evident that much of the early research in world politics does not focus on the linkage of the domestic political process to interstate behavior. World politics scholars, then, were primarily interested in assessing the military capabilities of states, rather than the domestic political processes that might very well affect how and when these capabilities are employed by political leaders. As Gerner (1991, 134) notes, many of the early foreign policy frameworks sprang from scholars' "recognition that the traditional realpolitik analysis of foreign policy, with its assumption of a unitary state actor and its focus on national interest, power, and fully rational and efficient decision-making, was inadequate to explain foreign policy decisions." In response, Snyder (1952), Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962), and other scholars sought to counter this tendency in the world politics literature to minimize the

domestic dynamics underlying leaders' decisions and ultimately their impact on foreign policy and interstate relations.¹⁰

This "theoretical revolt" of sorts, with its emphasis on the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, formed the foundation of what is known today as the sub-field of comparative foreign policy. From the 1960s through the early 1980s, these two literatures, comparative foreign policy and world politics, pursued generally separate research agendas in their investigation of interstate behavior. The comparative foreign policy literature focused on building typologies of domestic political decision-making and foreign policy systems. Conversely, the world politics literature derived more limited assumptions about the manner in which domestic political structure affected interstate behavior, and focused on the international stimuli underlying interstate behavior.¹¹

The early to mid-1980s witnessed some convergence between these two research agendas. As Neack, et al. (1995, 7), conclude, "as the realist and developmentalist hegemonies...ended in international and comparative politics, respectively, the divisions between the two fields were often difficult to determine." Although the role of states' domestic political structure in foreign policy behavior had been present in nearly all of the comparative foreign policy frameworks since the 1960s, its relationship with interstate behavior came under increasing theoretical and empirical scrutiny during the 1980s and early 1990s (e.g., see Hagan, 1993; Hermann and Kegley, 1995).

¹⁰ It should also be noted that the nascent sub-field of comparative foreign policy also sought to change some of the traditional methods of analyzing foreign policy in its parent field of comparative politics. That is, comparative foreign policy sought to develop frameworks to analyze foreign policy decision-making and, by extension, interstate behavior scientifically.

¹¹ To some degree, though, there has been a long-standing interest in the relevance of political system type for interstate behavior. However, early research in world politics went little beyond the investigation of nation-state typologies and interstate behavior, while comparative foreign policy moved from typologies (see Rosenau, 1969; Moore, 1974a-b), to more elaborate domestic-foreign policy frameworks (see McGowan and Shapiro, 1973; Andriole, Wilkenfeld, and Hopple, 1975).

With respect to the development of the comparative foreign policy agenda, Neack (1995, 223) argues that “from the perspective of the study of foreign policy, pacific democracies research is an example of second-generation foreign policy analysis that builds upon and leaves behind first-generation work.” In short, Neack claims that the second-generation of comparative foreign policy research discards the state-typology driven research of the first generation, and embraces the theories underlying the study of the democratic peace proposition (223). Neack’s argument notwithstanding, there may some basis for arguing that the world politics literature has in many respects embraced a number of the arguments found in the “typology driven research of the first generation [of comparative foreign policy] research” (223).

I argue that it was during this more recent period of research that scholars in the fields of world politics and comparative foreign policy began refining their questions about the causal relationships between domestic political systems and external behavior. For example, scholars began to ask:

1. What characteristics of the domestic political process are necessary for understanding foreign policy behavior? Do they include institutional structure? Leadership characteristics and change? Domestic political stability? Economic stability?
2. What constitutes foreign policy behavior? Interstate conflict? Interstate cooperation? Trade? Alliances? Mail flows? Diplomatic exchanges?
3. If a domestic politics–foreign policy relationship is present, does this linkage vary across space and time? If so, what is responsible for this variation?
4. If this linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy is dynamic, how do changes in either component affect the other?

These questions, and others raised by scholars in both fields, began to drive the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures toward one another; a marriage of two compatible, yet often reluctant, partners. Moving beyond purely empirical questions concerning the likelihood of interstate conflict between different types of political systems, the world politics literature began exploring the

theoretical reasons underlying why types of political systems in nation-states moderate interstate behavior. Similarly, comparative foreign policy began to consider the full range of foreign policy behaviors engaged in by states, combined with more complex modeling of domestic and foreign policy linkages.

2.2.2. Conclusion

In general, the following dissertation is grounded in this intellectual confluence of the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures. While I am primarily interested in the substantive questions embodied in this convergence, my general claim throughout is that domestic political phenomena have significant implications for understanding interstate behavior.

It is necessary to begin by identifying some of the basic components of the domestic politics–foreign policy puzzle. I seek to accomplish this task by turning to the work of one of founders of behavioral political science, David Easton. Grounding my inquiry in Easton’s basic framework enables me to identify the core components of the domestic half of the domestic politics–foreign policy relationship. In addition, there are two more specific reasons for beginning with Easton’s framework. First, much of the comparative foreign policy and world politics research either explicitly, or implicitly, draws from propositions originally developed in the systems literature, and therefore my application of systems analysis here dovetails with the approach contained in much of the literature. Second, Easton’s model serves as a touchstone for my later discussion of examples of research in the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures.

2.3. Political Systems Analysis

2.3.1. Introduction

As will become evident from my discussion of the literature in the latter portions of this chapter, my use of the term “political system” is very broad. The benefit of using such a term is that it provides a general platform from which to consider a range of substantive research questions. Of course, the likely cost of employing such a general term is that it may hinder drawing specific hypotheses about the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. Therefore, I begin with the general framework presented by Easton, and then narrow this framework such that it provides a basis for developing a set of testable propositions about the relationship between the domestic political system and foreign policy behavior in the third chapter.

2.3.2. Easton’s Framework

2.3.2.1. Introduction

Perhaps one of the most well known efforts in this regard in the field of political science, Easton (1953, 1957, and 1965) addresses the concept of the political system at some length. Easton's approach is prescient in that it includes extra-political system “causes” and “effects.” Thus, his approach encapsulates many of the processes identified later in the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures. Easton’s identification of a political system’s basic components, their relationship to one another, and the political system’s juxtaposition with other systems in a society, is adaptable to a broad set of political behaviors. In the following section I briefly review Easton’s conceptualization of the political system. I then turn to a discussion of how such a model provides a foundation for much of the early comparative foreign policy literature.

2.3.2.2. A Model of the Political System

According to Easton, political systems can be differentiated from other systems by using theory to identify variables that “seem to have greater significance in helping us to understand the political areas of human behavior” (1965, 31-2). For Easton, politics broadly defined “can be described as a set of social interactions on the part of individuals and groups. Interactions are the basic unit of analysis” (1965, 49). Moreover, all political systems share “basic political activities and processes” in common, regardless of the type of political system (1965, 49).

At the core of Easton’s conceptualization of the political system is the notion that political systems can be distinguished from “all other kinds of social interactions...[in] that they are predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society” (1965, 50). This idea is based on Easton’s assumption that all societies, and the individuals within them, face a scarcity of objects that are valued by their members. In response to this phenomenon, a political system’s authoritative allocation of valued objects to individuals and groups within the political system transpires through three processes. First, such an allocation may “deprive a person of a valued thing already possessed” (Easton, 1965, 50). Second, authoritative allocation may prevent individuals or groups from obtaining a valued thing that would have been obtained otherwise (Easton, 1965, 50). Lastly, authoritative allocation may control access to valued goods (Easton, 1965, 50).

In addition, an allocation of values can be considered authoritative “when the persons oriented to it consider that they are bound by it” (Easton, 1965, 50). That is, authoritative allocations are, by definition, legitimate in the view of the system’s members. In short, the basis upon which political systems are capable of making authoritative allocations rests on the implicit endorsement by the members of the political system that these allocations can legitimately be made on behalf of the members of the political system.

Having identified a political system, Easton argues that the remaining “systems” within and outside of the society constitute the political system’s environment. The political system is but one of


many systems making up a society. Therefore, while political systems are analytically distinct to the theorist, they are often interdependent in that “exchanges” take place between various other systems, such as those representing the economic, religious, and cultural dynamics in a society (1965, 59).

While his primary focus may be on the political system, Easton notes that it is important to keep in mind that the political system is “part of the social and physical environment that lies outside the boundaries of a political system and yet within the same society” (1965, 71). Furthermore, societies are composed of interdependent “internal” (i.e., domestic or national) political, economic, social, cultural, religious, ethnic, etc., systems. These societal systems also exert and receive pressures from systems comprising other societies, or groups of societies (e.g., a regional or global system of states). As Easton (1965, 73) reasons,

a system is external to a political system in a second and different sense. It may lie outside the society of which the political system itself is a social subsystem: yet it may have important consequences for the persistence or change of a political system. Instances of this are societies and political systems that are different from the society and political system under consideration.

This distinction between intra- and extra-societal systems, as well as their effects on a specific political system are illustrated by Easton (1965, 75) in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1. Easton's Model of Exchanges Between the Political System and the Total Environment




Source: Adapted from Easton (1965, 75)

Figure 2.1 illustrates the broad scope of the political system. As is evident from the figure, the political system is nested in a societal environment, and this societal environment is in turn nested in an "extra-societal environment." Figure 2.1 also demonstrates that "exchanges," or the "flow of effects," are bi-directional. In these instances, dynamics in the political system may have significant ramifications on the remaining societal environment, and vice versa. Before discussing how political systems, to use Easton's phrase (1965, 77), persist "in a world of stability and change," it is important to consider the individual components of the political system itself, as well as their interrelationships.

2.3.2.2.1. Political System Components

Easton (1957) theorizes that the political system can be divided into three primary components: (1) the political authorities, or those individuals and groups charged with carrying out the authoritative allocation of values; (2) the political regime, or those rules and norms through which the authorities legitimately control the allocation of these values; and (3) the political community, or those individuals and groups whose support of the political authorities and the regime are the very basis for the existence and functioning of the political system, and, by extension, the authoritative allocation of values. Next, I turn to a discussion of each of these components in the context of Easton's simplified model of the political system, an adaptation of which appears in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2. Easton's Political System



Source: Adapted from Easton (1957, 384)

At this point, I am primarily concerned with two types of inputs occurring in the political system, demands and supports. As Easton argues, it is the inputs that "give a political system its dynamic character. They furnish it with the raw material, or information, that the system is called upon to process and with the energy to keep it going" (1957, 387). Easton further assumes that demands are always

emerging because the political society is continually faced with a scarcity of goods that are of value: that is, the political system is dynamic.

Demands may emerge either externally or internally to the political system. External, or environmental, demands may originate from other systems within the society, such as economic or religious sectors. Internal demand, on the other hand, originates from within the political system itself, and is primarily directed toward the relationships between members of the political system, particularly the allocation of values among them. Easton refers to these internal demands as “withinputs,” because “their consequences for the character of the political system are more direct than in the case of external demands” (1957, 389). External and internal demands become political issues when a significant portion of the society finds that they warrant discussion and resolution.

The second class of system inputs Easton calls supports. He argues that while input demands constitute “the raw material out of which finished products called decisions are manufactured,” they alone cannot sustain a political system (1957, 390). Rather, “energy in the form of actions or orientations promoting and resisting a political system, the demands arising in it, and the decisions issuing from it must also be put into the system to keep it running (Easton, 1957, 390). Easton identifies two types of supports. The first support consists of “actions promoting the goals, interests, and actions of another person” (Easton, 1957, 390). The second type of support “may involve not external observable acts, but those internal forms of behavior we call orientations or states of mind” (Easton, 390). Easton is referring here to behaviors such as an individual’s loyalty to a political party or political system, for example.

Supports flow into the political system via the three components, or levels, that I discuss above: the community, the regime; and the authorities. In terms of the political community, Easton offers the basic, yet essential proposition, that no political system can “continue to operate unless its members are willing to support the existence of a group that seeks to settle differences or promote decisions through peaceful action in common” (1957, 391). The presence of a political community is the basic

building block for any political system, and it is imperative that its members are dedicated to the peaceful adjudication of membership demands (Easton, 1957, 391).

The second conduit through which political system support flows is the political regime. Easton theorizes that it is support for the regime that “helps to supply the energy to keep the system running” (Easton, 1957, 392). The regime consists of the rules by which members of the political community participate in the political system; it legitimates the actions of those members responsible for the allocation of values, the political authorities. In order for a political system to survive, then, it is necessary for its members to agree on the “fundamental rules” of the political system. If such an agreement cannot be reached, the political system may change form, or, the political community may fracture into a number of new political systems.

Finally, political system supports also flow to the political authorities. If the political system is going to persist, i.e., accommodate various demands across time, Easton argues that its members cannot simply support the resolution of such demands in common with other members of the political community, and the rules by which such a resolution process should occur. Rather, political system members should also be prepared to “support a government as it undertakes the concrete tasks involved in negotiating such settlements” (Easton, 1957, 392).

In an effort to gain support, Easton argues that the political authorities may employ a number of tactics, such as “persuasion, consent, or manipulation” (1957, 393). Moreover, a government may also “impose unsupported settlements of demands through threats of force,” although Easton makes the claim that governments grounded in such a dynamic are “not long for this world” (1957, 393).¹² Even at this level of abstraction, it is apparent that Easton’s model of the political system, and the dynamic processes occurring within this system, may have relevant implications for the analysis of

¹²A similar argument about the relationship between government’s legitimate use of force against its citizens, and the relationship between this use of force and the government’s survival is discussed later by Jackman (1993).

foreign policy. This is particularly evident with respect to the manner in which political authorities use everything at their disposal, including changes in foreign policy, in order to support a particular allocation of values. This allocation is designed to maintain the political authorities' position (i.e., survival) as those individuals responsible for allocating the valued goods.

2.3.2.3. The Dynamic Political System

A central notion in systems analysis outlined by Easton is that political systems are dynamic. Even systems that appear on the surface to be experiencing no change are continually evolving, albeit at perhaps glacial rates. Political systems may be considered dynamic in two respects. First, as is clear from Easton's work, a political system is internally dynamic in that its very survival requires the flow of inputs (i.e., demands and supports) into the system proper, outputs (i.e., policies), and a feedback loop of these energies. Second, political systems exist in dynamic environments, and these environments continually exert pressure, as generated by still other systems within and outside of the political community, on the political system. Everything from global war to natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes) may exert pressure on the political system. In response to these internal and external inputs, both demands and supports, political systems, as well as their individual components, constantly seek to perpetuate themselves, and it is to this notion of political system persistence and dynamism that I turn to next.

2.3.2.3.1. Political System Dynamism and Persistence

In A Framework for Political Analysis, Easton (1965) investigates the phenomenon by which political systems persist in environments continually undergoing change. As Easton (1965, 78) queries,

what makes it possible for a system to assure the perpetuation of any means through which values may be authoritatively allocated, that is, to permit the system to persist? How is any

political system able to cope with the stresses that may threaten to destroy it so that even when critically undermined by such extraordinary events as civil wars, revolutions, or military defeat a system of some sort may manage to rise again?

Questions such as these lead Easton to investigate the processes through which political systems persist in the face of, and in response to, various forms of stress. As Easton (1965) argues, the stresses that political systems normally experience are not as dramatic as civil wars or revolutions; these forms of stress are more likely the exception than the rule. Rather political systems are faced daily with less severe sources of system stress (e.g., attempts by individuals and groups to stimulate an allocation of values consistent with their preferences, or further, replacing those authorities in charge of managing the allocation of these values.) Indeed, Easton (1965, 80) remarks that given the continual dynamic by which the political system is subject to stress, it is somewhat of a miracle that such systems are able to persist for any significant length of time.

With respect to external stress, Easton discusses the myriad sources of stress that may emerge in what he terms the "total environment." For instance, Easton argues that political systems undergoing demands associated with economic development, national security, changing social and economic strata within the political system, pluralism, and difficulties encountered in interstate relations, all place considerable strain on new political systems (1965, 81). While stress is part of a political system's existence (one could argue that stress is a necessity for political system survival), Easton asserts that conflict originating from within the intra-societal environment is primarily directed at the type of political system and its authorities, rather than the basic existence of the political system itself, although wholesale raising of a society does occur (1965, 81). This last point brings Easton to the second topic of concern, political system persistence. He raises a number of important questions:

1. Why are political systems rarely threatened with extinction?
2. How do political systems manage to persist in the face of continual adversity?

3. Why do some political systems appear more stable than others? Is the presence or absence of stability linked to persistence?
4. Do the nature of the demands and inputs change as the political system persists?

Easton reasons that stable systems might be identified under two conditions. First, he argues that some political systems may appear stable in the short-term. However, he counters this reasoning by arguing that it is particularly difficult to identify empirical examples where the environment in which the political system is situated has remained unchanged over the long-term (1965, 83). Second, Easton (1965, 83) reasons that a political system may remain unchanged only if it is capable of insulating itself from “every disturbance in its environment as well as from internally generated pressures on its structures and processes.”

Again, while some political systems appear capable of insulating themselves from some types of pressures (e.g., Switzerland and interstate conflict), these situations are rare. As Easton (1965, 84) concludes, “no system has yet succeeded in doing so permanently or fully” with respect to all types of pressures. For example, while a Switzerland may be able to insulate itself from a range of conflictual interstate behaviors, it cannot insulate itself entirely from dependence on the global financial economy. Also, one could make the argument that the ability of political systems to insulate themselves is a negative function of time. That is, the increased web of “exchanges,” or interdependence, between societies resulting in a virtual bombardment of political systems with demands and supports affects the future behavior of states and political actors.


Thus, the persistence of a political system should not be attributed to the system’s lack of dynamism. Rather, political systems may “endure” while simultaneously undergoing dramatic and significant modifications and adjustments to the remaining two components of the political system, such as the regime and the authorities (Easton, 1965, 86). Whether one identifies instances of political system persistence or change, then, depends on the level of the political system examined. For example, examining persistence at the authority level, one is likely to identify high rates of change relative to

changes occurring at the political regime, or system, levels. Similarly, if one surveys persistence at the regime level, we are likely to find rates of change that are slower than persistence at the government level, but higher than such rates at the system level. In the Eastonian framework the political system will most likely to demonstrate the slowest rate of change.

2.3.2.4. Conceptualizing Political System Dynamism

To begin thinking about persistence and interdependent change across the three levels of a political system, the political authorities, the political regime, and the political community, it may be helpful to draw on the analogy of a timepiece. As such, the interlocking gears in a timepiece form a transmission mechanism, conveying the energy stored in a spring to the hands on the timepiece's face. A simple representation of such a timepiece is illustrated in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3. Three-gear Representation of Varying Rates of Change Across the Components of a Political System



In Figure 2.3 the largest of the three gears corresponds to the political community, the middle gear corresponds to the political regime, and the smallest gear corresponds to the political authorities. The three gears correspond to each of components in Easton's model of the political system. The rates of political system persistence and change may be thought of as the distance covered along the circumference of each interlocking gear given a particular rate, or turning, of a primary gear (the gear responsible for transferring the initial amount of energy from some source, such as a spring.) Stated differently, if we begin by rotating the largest gear, the two other gears rotate as well, but at relatively faster rates resulting from their shorter circumferences. Given this simple analogy drawn from the mechanics of a timepiece, I discuss three issues. First, all three gears continually rotate: that is, none are static, although the actual speed of any specific gear may be slow or fast depending on its ratio relative to the remaining two gears.

Second, the gears are interdependent—the motion of one gear is linked to the motion of the two other gears. Lastly, Figure 2.3 does not identify what I have referred to above as the “primary gear.” as political system change may be instituted from the top down, or the bottom up (or the source of change may be external to the timepiece itself.)

One can go a step further with this analogy of a timepiece by proposing that the relative size of the gears increase the longer the political system persists. Thus, increasing political system persistence results in decreasing rates of change across the remaining two gears. Certainly, in a democratic political system authorities are replaced at regular intervals. Thus, the gears representing the political community and regime may increase in circumference while the authority gear may change, or fluctuate, only slightly (e.g., political leaders are replaced regularly, yet some leaders are reelected, and still others die while in office.)

However, in nondemocratic political systems, a single leader, or group of leaders, may remain in power for a considerable length of time (e.g., Suharto's 30-year rule in Indonesia), or perhaps even from the creation of the political system itself (e.g., post-colonial political leaders in Africa and

Southeast Asia).¹³ In these situations, all three gears in the timepiece may be of nearly identical diameter (i.e., authorities, regimes, and communities may change equally but slowly.)

Furthermore, as Easton argues, change may serve as the handmaiden of political system persistence: that is, change means survival. But it seems reasonable to argue that some changes, perhaps resulting from a civil war, may not mean persistence of the members in the original political community, but rather persistence in two or more new political communities, each with their own separate political systems. Whatever the case may be, change is an integral part of political system existence.

As Easton (1965, 87) states, "the [system] members must be capable of modifying their political system, as circumstances dictate, with respect to its scope, membership, structure and processes, goals, or rules of behavior; or they must be able to manipulate their environment so as to relieve the stress." Easton assigns the term "disturbance" to those forms of stress that may be expected to stimulate changes in the functions of the political system at one level of analysis or another (1965, 90-1). While some forms of "activity" have negligible effects on the functioning of a political system, it is those disturbances that "threaten" or "endanger" the essential functions of the political system that constitute forms of stress. I discuss political system stress next.

2.3.2.5. Political System Stress

What is the capacity of a political system to endure stress? What are we to make of transformations in political systems experiencing stress? It depends on the level at which the transformation occurs. Modifications to the political regime, such as movement from an authoritarian to a democratic system, or even more subtle alterations to the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches in a democracy, for example, do not necessarily imperil the existence of the political

¹³The idea that individual leaders, such as Cuba's Fidel Castro for example, comprise the leadership and the regime (i.e., they formulate domestic and foreign policies and virtually embody the rules and norms upon which these policies are based) is discussed by Andriole and Hopple (1986).

system itself. However, according to Easton (1965, 95-6) it is conceivable that at some point all options available to a political community may prove inadequate. The members of the community may simply prove unable to agree on an acceptable agent and rules for allocating values, and this may result in the dissolution of the political community itself.

A political system, then, transforms when disturbances cause essential variables to pass their "critical points," or thresholds, and impair the ability of the system to perform its basic functions (Easton, 1965, 96). For example, a democratic political system may become authoritarian when the essential variables in the democracy, such as free speech and elections, are unable to alleviate stress (e.g., a failing economy) occurring within the system.

In another example, the various branches of government comprising a democratic regime may refuse to respect each other's prerogatives in the policymaking process, thereby presenting the political system with a constitutional crisis. In turn, a constitutional crisis translates into an inability on the part of a regime to allocate values, and this means that there must be some transformation of the political system such that these values can be allocated, perhaps in the form of an authoritarian regime (Easton, 1965, 99).

Easton argues that a considerable amount of stress also originates from the intra- and extra-societal environments, and Easton terms these influences "exchanges or transactions" (1965, 109). As Easton reasons, while we as political scientists may go about isolating a political system for analytic purposes, it is important to remember that other systems influence the political system: that "complex inter-penetration occurs" (1965, 109). Moreover, if one extrapolates from Easton's simplified model of the political system diagrammed above, it is clear that the outputs of one system may act as inputs for another system (1965, 109). For example, a system comprising interstate economic relations may generate outcomes that in turn act as inputs into a particular political system.

The question that remains, and one that has direct implications for the investigation of questions about domestic politics-foreign policy linkages, concerns how political systems respond to

stress. Recall that there are two types of inputs into a political system, demands and supports. Easton argues that political systems handle, or “regulate,” each of these inputs in different ways. I discuss each in turn.

First, Easton identifies the sources of demand stress. The first source of demand stress arises from what he terms “output failure,” where the political system’s authorities are “unable or unwilling to meet the demands of the members in some determinable proportions (at least of those members who are politically potent)” (Easton, 1965, 119-20). As a result, we would expect that such system would experience an increase in discontent. Moreover, continued output failure may result in widespread membership “disaffection,” and may have an impact on the regime, or even the solidarity of the political community (Easton, 1965, 120).

However, stress may also occur when the political system is overloaded with demands, a phenomenon that Easton calls “demand-input overload” (1965, 120). The existence of both of these types of demands, and their potential impact on the system, raises the question of how political systems cope, or regulate, demands without collapsing (which we know happens very rarely empirically.) In short, how do systems “regulate demand stress” (Easton, 1965, 122)?

For Easton, the regulation of a demand is a multi-stage process. First, some individuals and groups within a society act as “structural regulators of the volume of demands” (Easton, 1965, 122). These “gatekeepers” have an effect on the “volume and variety of demands that initially get into a system” (Easton, 1965, 122). Second, there are a number of “cultural restraints...[that]...serve to modify the number of desires that members will even presume to convert to demands” (Easton, 1965, 122).

Yet stress can also emerge in the support component of the input dynamic. In general, Easton (1965, 124) argues,

support for various aspects of the system, as for some kinds of authorities, the regime, or constitutional order, or for the political community itself represents the second major index of stress. Where such support threatens to fall below a minimal level, regardless of the cause, the

system must either provide mechanisms to revive the flagging support or its days will be numbered.

Easton argues that systems regulate stress generated by fluctuations in support in three ways. First, in a radical step, systems may attempt to change the structure and processes that identify the system with a particular type (Easton, 1965, 124). Second, the system may continually attempt to instill "diffuse support" in the system's membership by encouraging "sentiments of legitimacy and compliance" (Easton, 1965, 125). The final mechanism by which a system may regulate support stress is through changes in policies, or outputs.

2.3.3. Conclusion

I discuss Easton's model of the political system for three primary reasons. First, it is a simple, hierarchically organized model that identifies the basic components of the political system and this system's relationships with other systems within the societal, and non-societal, environments. In short, it furnishes a parsimonious framework. Second, Easton's conceptualization of the political system underscores the dynamic qualities of political systems. Although rates of change may vary across system components, the components are dynamically related. Indeed, the continual flow of demands and supports is a necessity for any political system's survival. Third, while Easton certainly did not construct his model for the specific purpose of examining domestic politics-foreign policy linkages, a great deal of the "linkage literature" builds either explicitly, or implicitly, on the basic components contained in his framework. Lastly, to discuss issues regarding the research employed in previous research.

Having outlined the basic ideas of the Easton's framework for the analysis of political systems, I turn now to a review of the two literatures I identified earlier in this, and the previous, chapter. In doing so, I have three goals in mind. First, to demonstrate the confluence of these two literatures during the past three decades of scholarship. Second, to highlight the substantive breadth of the literature

falling within the rubric of the domestic politics–foreign policy dynamic. Lastly, to identify some of domestic–foreign policy linkages discussed in these two literatures.

2.4. Comparative Foreign Policy

2.4.1. Introduction

While Easton’s conceptualization of the political system provides a starting point from which to begin thinking about the hierarchy of interdependence and change within states, he also identifies some important dynamics beyond the political system itself. Specifically, Easton discusses the relationships existing between the political system and its total environment, the latter of which comprises other systems within, and outside of, the society. As I noted above, Easton’s general inquiry is congruent with a number of more specific research questions in comparative foreign policy and world politics research. Below, I refer to Easton’s framework when discussing the comparative and world politics literatures.

The focus on domestic–foreign policy relationships emerging in the early work by Snyder (1952, 1957) and later Snyder, et al. (1964) are partially a function of the heavy concentration by the classical realists on the interstate and systemic stimuli of foreign policy behavior. As Farrell (1966, 169) notes, the growing sentiment among those who studied foreign policy was “that the line between foreign and domestic affairs is a very blurred one if it exists at all. Certainly there are very few foreign policies that do not have domestic effects, and conversely domestic affairs may profoundly influence foreign policies.” In the next section I trace the development of the notion in the comparative foreign policy literature that domestic politics is relevant for an understanding of interstate behavior.

2.4.2. Early Comparative Foreign Policy Research

Perhaps the most well known early effort to inject domestic politics into models of interstate behavior, and toward linking national and international processes, may be found in the research agenda of Rosenau (1964, 1966, 1969, and 1976). In a precursor to more explicit inquiries into domestic politics–foreign policy linkages, Rosenau and others scholars (e.g., see the compilation in Eckstein, 1963), examine the implications of civil strife, or what they also refer to as “internal war,” for the study of interstate behavior. They draw two general conclusions about domestic–international linkages: (1) they are frequent, if not continual, processes, and (2) they have significant implications for interstate behavior.

In his analysis of the international aspects of internal war, Modelski (1964, 14) argues that “in internal war the structure of at least one party to the conflict already have, and the others acquire, international components.” And while not every case of domestic strife has strong, direct international connections, “no concrete study of internal war can...omit...questions about external structures of internal war” (Modelski, 1964, 18).

Rosenau (1964, 45) also explores questions pertaining to the international implications of what he terms “political violence, by which is meant the use of force, legitimately (by incumbents) or otherwise (by insurgents), to control political behavior and accomplish political objectives.” Rosenau’s primary concern is to determine whether political violence differs from other modes of political system change that “have intersocietal consequences,” and he concludes that “many of the widest and most lasting changes in the international system can be traced back to internal wars” (1964, 48-9).

Rosenau (1964, 81-91) argues that internal war not only has important implications for the behavior of states external to the state undergoing the civil conflict, but also for the global system and regional sub-systems. Rosenau’s discussion of the domestic and international linkages originating from civil wars is a precursor to his better-known argument, or “pre-theory.” I turn to a discussion of this notion next.

2.4.3. Rosenau's Pre-theory

Perhaps Rosenau's most well known work on the general domestic politics–foreign policy linkage appears in his essay on “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy” (1966). In this paper, Rosenau assesses the state of the foreign policy field. He concludes that this sub-field “is devoid of general theory” (Farrell, 1966, 32). According to Rosenau, “the field has an abundance of frameworks and approaches which cut across societies and conceptualize the ends, means, capabilities, or sources of foreign policy, but no schemes which link up these components of external behavior in causal sequences” (Rosenau, 1966, 32). Moreover, he argues that up until that time foreign policy analysis offered little in the way of generalization and weak identification of causality (Rosenau, 1966, 40-1).

In response to these deficiencies, Rosenau (1966) formulates the aforementioned “pre-theory” of foreign policy predicated on the notion that “all foreign policy analysts either explain the external behavior of societies in terms of five sets of variables...” (Rosenau, 1966, 42). These five sets of variables include idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic (Rosenau, 1966, 43). Briefly, Rosenau defines these five variable clusters in the following manner. Idiosyncratic variables contain information regarding the characteristics of the decision-maker, such as its “values, talents, and prior experiences,” which differentiate decision-makers from one another (Rosenau, 1966, 43). The role variables identify the capacity in which a decision-maker operates. The governmental variables “refer to those aspects of a government’s structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by the decision-makers” (Rosenau, 1966, 43). Societal variables measure remaining aspects of a society that might have an impact on a state’s foreign policy. Finally, the systemic cluster of indicators “include any non-human aspects of a society’s external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials” (Rosenau, 1966, 43).

Having identified these classes of variables, Rosenau argues that in order to understand how they jointly affect a country’s foreign policy behavior, one needs to determine their “relative potencies” (Rosenau, 1966, 44), or what he terms “causal priorities” (Rosenau, 1966, 45). Rosenau proceeds to

formulate rough estimates of these potencies across the eight different country types generated by the three country criteria, geography and natural resources, state of the economy, and state of the polity (Rosenau, 1966, 48).

Rosenau argues that in order to understand how domestic politics affects foreign policy, it is necessary to recognize that "events abroad are not only absorbed by a national system's accommodative capabilities but might also penetrate its processes of attaining integration, its methods of mobilizing and distributing resources, and its modes of conducting public affairs" (Rosenau, 1966, 59). The thrust of Rosenau's argument is that (1) the boundaries of political systems are permeable, and (2) the "scope" of different issue-areas could conceivably extend across all three of Rosenau's "vertical" levels of analysis: local, national, and international (Rosenau, 1966, 84).

Rosenau develops his notion of foreign policy further in "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages" (1969). In this piece, Rosenau makes an initial attempt to delineate the points of "overlap" between the domestic and international political arenas. In doing so, Rosenau relies on ideas of the systems approach introduced by Easton and others. For Rosenau, the linkage between national and international arenas essentially becomes the unit of analysis. The familiar Eastonian inputs and outputs may originate in either the polity or the international system, the latter of which Rosenau refers to as the environment. Again, the relationship between these two spheres, domestic and international, is dynamic: polity outputs may stimulate resulting inputs from the international system back into the polity in a feedback process.

Rosenau's framework resembles Easton's model. However, Rosenau's notion explicitly focuses on the intuitive, yet often overlooked, linkage between polity and international system phenomenon. Rosenau also argues that formulating such a linkage framework reveals a number of "unfamiliar and latent linkages" (1969, 53). He also makes the claim that such a framework "should greatly inhibit the tendency to treat national governments as having undifferentiated internal environments and thus to rely on the national interest as an explanation of international behavior" (1969,

53). In the following section, I review some of Rosenau's ideas and the hypotheses of other "linkage" theorists. I discuss how the current comparative foreign policy literature moves beyond these early efforts.

2.4.4. Testing and Moving beyond Rosenau's "Pre-theory" Framework

2.4.3.1. Introduction

While it is convenient to sub-divide the literature along theoretical and chronological lines, doing so fails to reveal a neat, linear progression. Ideas that are introduced quite early in a literature's development may disappear, only to resurface in the guise of new terminology.¹⁴ Moreover, research does not always clearly associate itself with a particular branch of the literature. Such is the case with the pre-Rosenau empirical research of the early 1960s and its analysis of the reciprocal relationship between domestic turmoil and interstate conflict, commonly referred in the recent literature as "diversionary theory of war."

In this part of the chapter is not to devote considerable space to discussing the diversionary theory of conflict literature, as this has been amply discussed elsewhere (see Levy 1989). Rather, my goal is to investigate how this extensive empirical investigation of the linkage between domestic turmoil and interstate conflict served as a starting point for much of the early work in comparative foreign policy's study of linkage dynamics.¹⁵ Initially, I discuss some of the research that generally sought to

¹⁴This appears to be the case with Rosenau's edited volume, The International Aspects of Civil Strife (1964). To this day, Rosenau's discussion is novel in its approach to the linkage between civil conflict and international politics, particularly his notions of the scope, duration, and the timing of external involvement.

¹⁵Although I do not review the diversionary literature in this chapter, I do discuss a sample of this literature in my exploration of the literature's treatment of space, time, and methodology in the final section of this chapter.

incorporate the debate surrounding the diversionary dynamic into the foreign policy framework proposed by Rosenau.

2.4.3.2. Testing Rosenau's Pre-theory and Other Foreign Policy Frameworks

Drawing on the analyses of Rummel (1963) and Tanter (1966) concerning the relationship between domestic turmoil and foreign conflict, Wilkenfeld (1973) reevaluates the propositions raised in this early research by introducing two innovations. First, Wilkenfeld argues that the hypothesized relationships between domestic politics and foreign policy may be obscured by nation-type (i.e., personalist, centrist, and polyarchic.) Second, Wilkenfeld proposes that the domestic turmoil–foreign conflict relationship is not necessarily simultaneous (i.e., domestic turmoil may precede foreign policy conflict, and vice versa) (1973, 108-9).

In order to test these propositions, Wilkenfeld employs the nation “typing” method introduced by Banks and Gregg (1965). Due to limitations in available data, Wilkenfeld collapses the Banks and Gregg typology into three nation types: personalist, centrist, and polyarchic (1973, 115). In turn, he confirms that patterns between domestic turmoil and foreign conflict are revealed when the sample is subdivided by nation type.

Empirical analyses of nation type based on Rosenau's pre-theory notion of open and closed political systems continue in research by Moore (1974a-b) and East and Hermann (1974). Moore (1974b) examines the explanatory power of Rosenau's (1966) triad of state types, consisting of nation size, economic development, and political accountability. Moore employs a set of 64 governmental and social variables and seven measures of foreign policy behavior to examine the relative explanatory power of Rosenau's typology, as opposed to other typologies. Moore finds that the dimensions representing level of development, size, and political accountability are more important with respect to foreign policy behavior than the remaining six dimensions (1974b, 258).

East and Hermann (1974) also investigate the empirical strength of Rosenau's nation-types on foreign policy behavior, weighing the additive and interactive effects of nation's size, level of development, and political accountability. The authors estimate the impact of the three nation-type dimensions on nine measures of foreign policy behavior and draw three primary conclusions. First, that a nation's size appears to have a greater effect than level of development and political accountability (East and Hermann, 1974, 299). Second, political accountability also has a significant effect on foreign policy behavior (East and Hermann, 1974, 299). Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, East and Hermann conclude that Rosenau's notion of "nation-types based upon the interaction of the three dichotomized attributes appears unjustified as a means of explaining foreign policy behavior" (East and Hermann, 1974, 300).

Research during the mid-1970s produced several foreign policy frameworks, some of which were derived from both theoretical and empirical evaluations of Rosenau's pre-theory, and many of which borrowed from the dynamics of the basic structure of a political system discussed by Easton (1957, 1965). Working from critiques of alternative foreign policy frameworks, and from innovations by Wilkenfeld (1973), Andriole, et al. (1975, 181) propose a "component framework for the comparative analysis of foreign policy behavior." Andriole, et al. (1975, 188) argue that while Rosenau-like typologies are integral to their framework, they propose that "states differ from each other along certain major dimensions, and that these dimensions modify the relationship between the variable components of foreign policy and the behavior exhibited." In terms of the framework's components, the authors argue that the effects of independent variable clusters, such as psychological, political, societal, inter-state, and global, flow through three intervening state dimensions (i.e., structural economic, structural governmental, and power.) In turn, these processes affect five dimensions of foreign policy events (i.e., spatial, relational, behavioral, situational, and substantial.)

The framework set out in Andriole, et al. (1975) is subsequently expanded and tested empirically in Wilkenfeld, et al. (1980). This latter study is important both for the relationships it reveals

empirically, as well as those that the authors leave unexplored. In this work, the authors attempt to improve on the partial frameworks and empirical investigations introduced by McGowan and Shapiro (1973) and Wilkenfeld (1973). Wilkenfeld, et al. draw two conclusions of interest from the first phase of the analysis. First, the interstate component is a more potent predictor of foreign policy behavior than are societal factors (Wilkenfeld, et al., 1980, 172). Second, the stratification of states is not helpful in understanding foreign policy behavior.

Salmore and Salmore (1978) introduce one of the most innovative comparative foreign policy frameworks. Salmore and Salmore begin with the simple proposition that the "internal political structure of a country is a major determinant of its foreign policy" (1978, 103). According to the authors, a political regime consists of the national leadership responsible for the allocation of values. The regime constantly seeks to maximize its power vis-à-vis public support, and regime policy is intimately connected to regime survival. Presaging arguments in the world politics literature, the Salmores make the claim that "the leaders... opt for war or peace, trade relations, détente, and other actions not so much because of their intrinsic worth, but largely in terms of how they will affect the regime's political fortunes" (1978, 103). Additionally, the authors argue that "changes in the internal structure of the regime, such as shifts in support, can notably affect foreign policy. It would therefore follow that policy is likely to be stable when there is no change in regime, other things being equal" (1978, 110).

Similarly, Geller (1985) investigates the relationship between internal stress and external conflict, as well as the moderating effects of political regime characteristics. Geller draws four general conclusions (1985, 183). First, a positive relationship obtains between high levels of societal instability and foreign conflict. Second, there is an inverse relationship between level of regime constraints and cooperation and conflict. As constraint increases, cooperation increases and conflict decreases. Third, the more extensive the military influence in the government, the greater the conflict foreign policy behavior and the lower the cooperative foreign policy behavior. Lastly, Geller identifies a significant

interaction effect between domestic political violence, military influence on policy selection, and foreign policy conflict.

Building on the work of Wilkenfeld, et al. (1980) and Salmore and Salmore (1978),

Andriole and Hopple (1986) explore the relationship between Third World regime change and changes in foreign economic policy. The authors base their notion of political regime on two concepts: political authority and political structure (Andriole and Hopple, 1986, 364-5). Andriole and Hopple (1986) propose that changes in political authority result in changes in political structure, and one might therefore conclude that changes in political leaders might correspond quite readily with changes in political authority. However, the authors argue that in many cases, particularly in the Third World, leadership changes do not signal changes in political authority patterns, which in turns means little alteration of the political structure (this is commonly the process in mature political systems with established patterns of leadership succession). As Andriole and Hopple argue, "the key to impact probably lies more in the nature of the leadership of a country than its identifiable political structure (390, emphasis removed).

Mingst (1995) proposes one of the more recent foreign policy frameworks to emerge in the comparative foreign policy literature. Having reviewed much of the early literature investigating the link between domestic politics and the international environment, and keying in on the notion of "two-level games" and "win sets" proposed by Putnam (1988), Mingst introduces a "typology of linkage actors," including both governmental and non-governmental entities (1995, 233).

Hagan (1993, 1994, 1995) formulates a theoretical framework based on the notion that the key to understanding the domestic politics-foreign policy relationship is in the way in which domestic political "opposition" fits into the foreign policymaking calculus. Hagan's theory rests on three arguments (1993, 3). First, he argues that foreign policy decision-making is an inherently political process. As such, domestic political leaders seek to remain in power, and to do so they must construct coalitions with other power centers in the political system. Second, domestic politics has significant

effects on foreign policy. Lastly, political opposition is present in all political systems, regardless of type.

For Hagan, the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy is manifested in three strategies employed by decision-makers: (1) bargaining and controversy avoidance; (2) legitimization of the regime and its policies; or (3) insulation of foreign policy from domestic political pressures (1993, 6). Leaders who resort to bargaining and controversy avoidance seek to “respond to opposition by attempting to accommodate it with some form of restraint in foreign policy” (Hagan, 1993, 6). Leaders who resort to political legitimization “confront the opposition and attempt to mobilize support for the regime and its policies (or prevent the loss of that support), all in a manner resulting in amplified foreign policy activity” (Hagan, 1993, 7). Finally, in instances where leaders seek to insulate the foreign policy from domestic politics there should be little relationship between variations in domestic opposition and foreign policy behavior (Hagan, 1993, 7).

Hagan (1993, 201) concludes that the extent of political institutionalization and regime vulnerability significantly moderate the hypothesized relationship between political opposition and foreign policy behavior. The effects of opposition are most pronounced in political regimes that are “highly vulnerable and moderately fragmented regimes, as well as [regimes] in moderately institutionalized political systems.” Moreover, Hagan finds that accountability has very limited effects on foreign policy.

In an effort to introduce a more elaborate framework for studying the relationship between domestic political systems and war-proneness, Hagan (1993, 1995) develops a four-category leadership typology containing orientation ideal-types: (1) moderate or acquiescent orientation; (2) pragmatic orientation; (3) militant orientation; and (4) radical orientation. Hermann and Kegley (1996) adopt a similar approach in their alternative explanation of the democratic peace. Hermann and Kegley propose that “if we examine what happens within the decision-making process in democracies—particularly, how leaders’ cognition and leadership style can shape this process—the nexus between democracy and peace

may become more complex and nuanced” (1996, 5). Specifically, Hermann and Kegley discuss the relevance of the characteristics of the individual leader for interstate conflict, particularly during crisis situations. In these situations, the authors (Hermann and Kegley, 1996, 7) argue, “the perceptions and characteristics of the leaders can become decisive in determining if armed force will be employed as well as the nature of the force...and its target (democratic or non-democratic).”

2.4.4. Conclusions

Above, I trace some of the theoretical and empirical developments in the comparative foreign policy field, specifically the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. I draw two general conclusions regarding the scholarship in comparative foreign policy. First, the comparative foreign policy literature demonstrates that domestic political processes (among other domestic factors) have significant effects on foreign policy behavior, although their importance relative to other extra-national explanatory variables (e.g., measures of relative interstate power, polarity, alliances, etc.) may vary. Second, research in the comparative foreign policy field has moved from explaining foreign policy behavior using national-level typologies to introducing more parsimonious models of the relationship between political institutions, regimes, leaders, and their impact on the foreign policy process.

Although the comparative foreign policy literature remains concerned with understanding the more finite aspects of political regimes and the implications of these for foreign policy, the world politics literature has, ironically, primarily resorted to nation-attribute inquiries long associated with the “first-generation” of comparative foreign policy research and Rosenau’s pre-theory. However, as with the emergence of the “second-generation” of comparative foreign policy scholarship, world politics research has begun moving beyond static, attribute-oriented analysis of the domestic-foreign policy linkage. Thus, the research questions that each literature investigates are quite similar. In the next section of this chapter, I discuss the world politics literature.

2.5. Research in World Politics

2.5.1. Introduction

The world politics literature rarely explicitly associates itself with linkage frameworks emerging in comparative foreign policy field. In part, this is a function of intellectual tradition. My intention in this section of the second chapter is to explore the points of theoretical and substantive common ground between the world politics and comparative foreign policy literatures.

2.5.2. Political System Change and Foreign Policy

My earlier discussion of the comparative foreign policy literature is arranged more or less chronologically. However, the relevant research in the sub-field of world politics does not lend itself easily to such a linear progression. Therefore, I address the world politics literature according to the aspect of the political system from which the scholar approaches the link between domestic politics and foreign policy.

Perhaps one of the most innovative research agendas exemplifying what might be termed the “macro-approach” to the relationship between national political change and interstate conflict, may be identified in the work of Maoz (1989, 1996a-b). Maoz argues that due to the fact that decisions to engage in interstate conflict are made at the national level, development of an explanation of “the spread of international conflicts over time and space requires a specification of the ways in which processes operating at the state level affect systemic outcomes” (1989, 202). To accomplish this task, Maoz introduces what he terms the “political development” model of national-level phenomena and investigates the relationship of this dynamic to the occurrence of interstate conflict.

According to Maoz, the political development model incorporates two types of “state formation processes,” that is, processes by which national entities become sovereign states (1989, 203). Maoz identifies the first of these formation processes as evolutionary and the second as revolutionary.

States that emerge via an evolutionary process do so as the result of “a gradual process wherein society assumes greater degrees of control and self-government over time and in which the formation of a state apparatus is the natural extension of existing processes” (Maoz, 1989, 203). Conversely, the revolutionary state formation process involves a “violent struggle between an indigenous population and a colonial power, or between factions or sub-state entities, leading to the establishment of one or more states” (Maoz, 1989, 204).

Essentially, Maoz argues that state and regime formation processes have relevant implications on the interstate level for two reasons: (1) “the perceptions of the external environment by the elites of the new states”; and (2) “the perceptions of the nature, orientation, and goals of the new state by elites in older states” (1989, 204). In short, evolutionary political development, a process wherein violence is minimal and the duration longer, leads to the “gradual incorporation” of these states into the “club of nations” (Maoz, 1989, 204). As a result of this process, the incentives for the evolutionary state, as well as the other states in the interstate system, to engage in interstate conflict is low. On the other hand, revolutionary political development, where violence is an integral part of the transformation process, and the duration of the process itself is relatively short, increases the likelihood of the occurrence of interstate conflict.

What are the dynamics underlying the emergence of this two-way conflict linkage? Maoz argues that revolutionary changes involve very fluid, high stakes interactions between the leaders of domestic political coalitions. Leaders of the newly changed state face the constant threat of domestic political backlash to the status quo ante, and therefore are inclined to seek to legitimize themselves internationally by engaging in interstate conflict. Moreover, this incentive to engage in interstate conflict also emerges for those stable states confronted by revolutionary transformation in nearby, or strategically important, states. Maoz (1989, 227) attributes this dynamic to what he considers virtually a self-fulfilling prophecy: stable states in the system view the revolutionary state as a threat to their own, as well as the

interstate system's stability. As a result, stable states are inclined to intervene in the new revolutionary state in order to reverse or control its potential threat to national security and system stability.

Regarding the empirical tests of his proposition, Maoz finds that "states that emerge out of a violent struggle for independence tend to be involved in a considerably larger number of interstate disputes than states that become independent as a result of an evolutionary process" (Maoz, 1989, 226). He identifies very similar results for revolutionary versus evolutionary regimes (Maoz, 1989, 226-7).

Walt (1992) develops further the notion that revolutionary changes in one state have significant effects on interstate relations. Walt argues that studying the relationship between revolutions and interstate conflict is important because it provides an excellent context within which to test the impact of unit-level changes (i.e., revolutions) and systemic-level behavior (i.e., changes in interstate commitments, interstate conflict, etc.) (1992, 321-2). Following the lead of Maoz (1989), Walt's (1992) linkage of national revolution and interstate aggression is grounded in the notion that revolutions increase the level of threat perception between revolutionary and stable states. As a result, this threat misperception dynamic increases the likelihood of post-revolution interstate war.

Walt's focus on the relationship between revolutions and shifts in the balance of power between states is similar to the "death-watch war" discussed by Blainey (1988[1973], 68-70). For Blainey, the "...death of a king obviously affected the distribution of power between nations" (1988[1973], 69). From Blainey's perspective, it is not solely the succession of kings, but the replacement of strong by weak monarchs, which in turn strain the interstate alliance systems based on agreements amongst strong monarchs (1988[1973], 69). In sum, a weak monarch's succession results in a perceived breakdown of alliance commitment, and an increased likelihood of war, as states test the bonds of commitment and/or initiate conflicts for fear of any further diminution of commitment on the part of the new monarch.

Aggression born of uncertainty is precisely the type of dynamic examined empirically by Pearson (1974). Pearson's (1974, 260) analysis suggests that the "co-occurrence" of domestic political

disputes or transformations and the initiation of interstate conflict by other states in the system.

Empirically, Pearson finds that “the most organized and violent forms of domestic conflict, associated with attempted forceful changes of governmental systems, relate most consistently with foreign military interventions” (1974, 279). Pearson’s conclusions reinforce the link between political system transformation and interstate intervention, particularly identifying the state most likely to initiate an interstate dispute.

While testing the validity of propositions drawn from the democratic peace literature, Maoz and Abdolali (1989) explore the impact of changes in national-level regime-type on a large set of interstate conflict measures. Given Rummel’s proposition, Maoz and Abdolali hypothesize that autocratization (a change in a state’s regime type from democracy to autocracy or to anocracy) “should yield an increase in the conflict involvement rate of the new polity, compared with the conflict involvement of the previous polity” (1989, 19). Conversely, democratization (a change in regime from autocracy or anocracy to democracy) should decrease the rate of conflict involvement of the new polity compared with that of the previous polity.

In general, Maoz and Abdolali (1989) find empirical evidence suggesting that changes in regime type from democracy to autocracy do significantly increase a state’s total involvement as a target in an interstate dispute, total dispute involvement, and total war involvement (19). Conversely, regime changes from autocracy to democracy decrease the state’s total dispute involvement as a target, total war involvement as a target, and total involvement in disputes (19). Finally, regime changes from anocracy to democracy result in a decrease in a state’s involvement in wars and disputes.

Another issue of long-standing interest in the world politics literature concerns the relationship between domestic turmoil and external conflict (see Bar-Siman-Tov, 1983; Blainey, 1988[1973]; Hazelwood, 1973; Kegley, et al. 1978; Mitchell, 1970; Pearson, 1974; Rasler, 1983; Rummel, 1963; Sorokin, 1937; Tanter, 1966; and Ward and Widmaier, 1982). Yet these early inquiries were primarily empirical, often spatially and temporally restricted, yielded weak and often conflicting

results, and generally contributed sparingly to development of generalizable theory. Many of the theoretical and empirical weaknesses in this literature are enumerated in a series of subsequent critiques (see James, 1987; Levy, 1989; Mack, 1975; and Stohl, 1980).

Deficiencies raised by these critiques were subsequently addressed, at least in part, in two relatively recent research agendas. The first agenda explores the domestic–foreign conflict nexus in the context of American foreign policy, and formulates models incorporating domestic political and economic pressures, presidential decision making, rally-‘round-the-flag dynamics, and the use of force abroad (see DeRouen, 1995; James and Oneal, 1991; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Lindsay, et al., 1992; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Oneal, et al., 1996; Russett, 1990; and Wang, 1996).

The second inquiry offers greater theoretical elaboration on domestic constraints and forms of economic and political stress, leadership goals and decision making, institutional constraints, and a range of foreign policy behaviors (see Davis and Ward, 1990; DeHaven, 1991; Friedman and Starr, 1995; Levy and Vakili, 1992; Miller, 1995; Moore, 1995; Norpoth, 1991; and Starr, 1994).

This long-standing investigation into linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy also manifests itself more generally in research exploring the democratic peace proposition (see, for example, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Oneal and Ray, 1996; Ray, 1995; Russett, 1993; and Thompson, 1996). Lastly, scholars also examine the domestic political costs of conflictual foreign policies (see Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Friedman and Starr, 1995; Regens, et al., 1995; Starr, 1994; Vasquez, 1993; and for early work, see Stein and Russett, 1980).

Recent work on the diversionary hypothesis, particularly research by Miller (1995), blends components from the different branches of the literature, and deserves closer examination. Miller makes the argument that leaders with access to greater resources will be less inclined to use “diversionary tactics to manipulate domestic audiences” (1995, 766). In addition to the resources available to the leader, Miller also reasons that domestic political structure “conditions the willingness of leaders to use

diversionary tactics..." (1995, 767). Further, he argues that domestic political structure affects the extent to which leaders are likely to "use conflict involvement to manipulate domestic audiences" (1995, 767). As such, if autocratic leaders anticipate lower audience costs for the use of force abroad than their democratic counterparts, they should be more likely to use diversionary strategies.

In sum, Miller finds general support for his "conditioning hypotheses": "the lower the ability of society to remove a leader from power, the more likely the leader will be to abuse that power for personal gain; and the fewer the resources available to leaders to influence their domestic environment, the more likely they are to use foreign policy to pursue their political ambitions" (779). Finally, perhaps Miller's most intriguing finding is that "the results suggest that the responses of leaders to military threats from abroad are relatively unaffected by the popularity levels if they face high domestic political costs for using force or if they possess an abundance of policy resources" (779, emphasis present).

Miller's findings are relevant to the study of regime changes and the occurrence of interstate conflict. First, Miller underscores the importance of domestic audience costs for understanding foreign policy behavior (on audience costs see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Evans, et al. 1992; Fearon, 1994; Partell, 1997; and Putnam, 1988). When political regimes change, are audience costs affected? Second, Miller stresses the relevance of the relationship between policy resources and leaders' decisions to involve themselves in interstate conflict, and builds on the opportunity and willingness framework formulated by Most and Starr (1989) within the context of the diversionary theory of interstate conflict.

Turning to the effects of political change on foreign policy behavior, Mansfield and Snyder (1995a-b, 1996) argue in a series of articles that the political dynamics generated by democratic regime change make it more likely that leaders in these states will become involved in war. Why are new democratic regimes more war-prone? Mansfield and Snyder (1995b: 26) argue that democratization often results in a period of "political impasse," whereby it is difficult for new leaders not only to build

policy coalitions, but also to retain power. Under these circumstances the likelihood of new democracies initiating war with other states increases (1995b, 33).

Testing their hypotheses on data for the 1816-1986 period, Mansfield and Snyder find that states making the most significant move toward democratization, “from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy, are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies” (1995b, 6).¹⁶ In addition, states that are autocratizing are more likely to participate in wars than are those states not experiencing regime change (6). How do Mansfield and Snyder explain this finding that regime changes toward democracy and autocracy increase the probability that a state will participate in a war? They do so simply by broadening the applicability of their theory, arguing that regime changes in general “may lead to some of the same war-causing pathologies that are present in democratizing states” (35).

Morgan and Palmer introduce a general theory of domestic politics and foreign policy and examine the impact of “institutional procedures” and “leadership selection” affect environmental variables (i.e., state power) and foreign policy behavior (1997, 3). The authors outline two variants of their general theory of foreign policy. The first variant, termed the unitary actor, is grounded in two assumptions. The first assumption is that “states pursue two general types of goals through their foreign policies—security and proaction” (3). The second assumption of the unitary variant concerns environmental constraints on a state’s ability to obtain these security and proaction goods (4-5). The unitary variant predicts that “the strong will be more active in foreign policy than will the weak and that the strong should devote relatively more of their resources to proaction seeking behavior than the weak” (8). Moreover, Morgan and Palmer also anticipate that increases in state power should result in increases in security- and proaction-seeking foreign policies (8-9).

¹⁶ Although I do not discuss them in detail here, Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995a-b, 1996) research design, empirical analyses, and conclusions have recently been challenged by Thompson and Tucker (1997) and Ward and Gleditsch (1998).

The domestic politics variant of the general theory is grounded in the notion that states are composed of individuals and groups with “with their own preferences regarding the appropriate mix of the two goods that should be pursued” (10). Similar to the notion of regime discussed by Easton, Morgan and Palmer argue that domestic institutions are sets of rules by which “individual preferences are aggregated into societal choices” (10). Depending on the set of institutions, the authors reason, the domestic variant may resemble the unitary variant when a small group of individual(s) control policymaking (i.e., junta or dictatorship), or the other extreme where all individuals in a state have a say in the policy (i.e., a pure democracy).

Morgan and Palmer expect that pure democracies and dictatorships will collapse into the unitary actor variant with respect to changes in their environment (13). However, Morgan and Palmer anticipate that the foreign policy of dictatorships will be volatile when leadership changes occur (14). With respect to their empirical results, Morgan and Palmer find that changes in leadership do not have a significant effect on states’ militarized dispute initiation (27).

Lastly, Hermann and Kegley (1996) claim that democratization can serve as a “security shield” for states. The reasoning underlying this shield is as follows. First, Hermann and Kegley (3-48) postulate that democratic regimes are more likely to seek negotiated and mediated outcomes to disputes with other states. Second, because political leaders in all types of regimes recognize that democracies are more likely prefer reason to conflict, states that engage in disputes with democracies are more “inclined to meet them at the bargaining table than on the battlefield” (438). Lastly, if democratic states have a greater level of security as a result of this propensity toward negotiated outcomes, the presence of democratic regimes may “serve as an antidote to aggression” (438). Therefore, Hermann and Kegley hypothesize that the presence of a democratic regime will reduce the propensity of states to use force in disputes with other states.

Hermann and Kegley’s empirical analysis suggest the following. First, democratic regimes were the infrequent targets of interventions, whereas autocratic regimes were significantly more likely to

be the targets interventions (444-5). Third, in their dyadic analysis of regime types and the frequency of initiator and target, Hermann and Kegley (446) find that “nondemocracies intervened into democracies close to three times less than we would have expected.” Given these findings, the authors make the preliminary conclusion that “democratization may be a viable path to national and international security” (446).

2.5.3. Conclusion

From the discussion of the literature in the two previous sections of this chapter, it is clear that the world politics and comparative foreign policy literatures are quite similar in their approaches to the study the domestic–foreign policy nexus. However, it is also apparent that research in world politics focuses primarily on the foreign policy half of this equation, and this is due, in part, to the traditional focus of this literature on war and interstate conflict. This said, it is also evident that the two literatures are moving toward one another in terms of their incorporation and treatment of the domestic political system in developing explanations of foreign policy behavior. Each literature makes a concerted effort to move away from explanations of foreign policy based simply on national-level typologies.

Specifically, in keeping with the basic relationships emerging in Easton’s political system, the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures examine the relationship between, and changes between, various political community, regime, and authority dimensions. In turn, scholars examine the impact of these dimensions on a number of foreign policy behaviors, including voting patterns in the United Nations (UN), the adjustment of alliance portfolios, great power overexpansion, and dyadic interstate conflict and cooperation, for example.

This said, there has been little comparative assessment of the relationship between Easton’s political system components—community, regime, and authority—across a range of foreign policy behavior. As such, several important questions remain regarding (1) the relative magnitude of these

Eastonian political system dimensions on foreign policy, (2) their interrelated, or interactive, impact on foreign policy; and (3) the impact of changes in these political system components on foreign policy.

I have two goals in the following section. First, I clarify the basic causal linkages discussed in the two main literatures, comparative foreign policy and world politics. Second, I discuss the research designs employed in earlier research, identifying strengths, weaknesses, and recent developments.

2.6. Research Designs In Previous Research

2.6.1. Research Design Issues

Since their initial efforts to test domestic–foreign policy relationships empirically, the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures have generally improved their measurement of domestic and foreign policy phenomena across time and space. These developments parallel general improvements in research designs in the field of political science. Although the more traditional case-study approach still remains, much of the recent literature blends qualitative and quantitative approaches to questions concerning these relationships. Below, I discuss three aspects of previous research: (1) spatial and temporal domain; (2) the methodological approach; and (3) operationalization of dependent and independent variables.

Early studies in the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures typically employ data from a limited set of countries for a relatively short temporal range (e.g., Rummel, 1963; Burrowes and DeMaio, 1975; East and Hermann, 1974; Moore, 1974; Pearson, 1974; Wilkenfeld, 1973). In virtually every instance, spatial units far outnumber temporal units in these analyses, as upwards of 100 countries are analyzed for a limited number of time points. As such, these spatial and temporal limitations handicap the generalizability of the empirical findings.

However, during the past 15-years, research designs have improved immensely. To demonstrate these developments in the literature, Table 2.1 reports these characteristics for a sample of comparative foreign policy and world politics articles.

Table 2.1. Spatial and Temporal Dimensions of Comparative Foreign Policy and World Politics Literature

Author(s)	Year	Spatial	Temporal
Rummel	1963	77 states	1955-7
Tanter	1966	83 states	1958-60
Wilkenfeld	1968	74 states	1955-60
Wilkenfeld	1969	74 states	1955-60
Babst	1972	Interstate wars	1789-1941
Hazelwood	1973	74 states	1958-60
Wilkenfeld	1973	74 states	1957-60
Wilkenfeld and Zinnes	1973	74 states	1957-60
East and Hermann	1974	33 states	1959-68 (sample)
Moore, D.	1974	109 states	1963
Moore, D.	1974	109 states	1963
Pearson	1974	130 states	1948-67
Burrowes and DeMaio	1975	Syria	1961-67
Kegley, et al.	1978	73 states	1961-9
Eberwein, et al.	1979	125 states	1966-7
Wilkenfeld, et al.	1980	56 states	1966-70
Ward and Widmaier	1982	96 states	1948-76
Bar-Siman-Tov	1983	Syria	1961-70
Rasler	1983	Syria/Lebanon	1975-77
Rummel	1983	State system	1976-80
Chan	1984	176 states	1816-1980
Weede	1984	101 states	1960-80
Geller	1985	35 states	1959-66
Moon	1985	88 3rd world states	1946-74
Andriole and Hopple	1986	Third world regimes	1959-81
Ostrom and Job	1986	United States	1949-76
Blainey	1988	Major power states.	various years
James	1988	State system	1948-82
Hagan	1989	87 third world states	1946-84
Levy and Vakili	1989	Argentina/United Kingdom/Falklands War	1982
Maoz	1989	177 states	1816-1976
Maoz and Abdolali	1989	475 polities, 960 militarized disputes; 161 states	1816-1976
Palmer	1990	Western Europe	1950-84
Russett	1990	United states	various years
Barnett and Levy	1991	Egypt	1962-73
David	1991	Egypt and the Sudan	various years
Dehaven	1991	United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany	1979-83
James and Oneal	1991	United States	1949-76

Morgan and Campbell	1991	Militarized interstate disputes	1816-1976
Norpoth	1991	United Kingdom	1979-88
Risse-Kappen	1991	United States, Japan, Germany, France	1980-90
Snyder	1991	United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Soviet Union	various years
Volgy and Schwartz	1991	United Kingdom, France, West Germany	1960-80
Bremer	1992	State system	1816-1965
Bueno de Mesquita, et al.	1992	State system	1816-1975
Davis and Ward	1990	Chile	1966-86
Ember, et al.	1992	37 pre-industrial societies	various years
Lake	1992	all wars	1816-1988
Lindsay, et al.	1992	United States-Soviet Union	1949-78
Morgan and Bickers	1992	United States	1953-76
Morgan and Schwebach	1992	Militarized interstate disputes	1816-1976
Schweller	1992	Major power preventive wars	1665-1990
Walt	1992	Revolutions	various years
Bremer	1993	State system	1816-1965
Dixon	1993	718 conflict phases	1949-79
Hagan	1993	33 states	1959-68
Huth and Russett	1993	Enduring rivals	1948-82
Lian and O Neal	1993	United States	1950-84
Maoz and Russett	1993	110 states; 36,162 rival dyad- years	1946-86
Ray	1993	Democratic wars	various years
Russett	1993	36,162 relevant dyad-years	1946-86
Vasquez	1993	Major powers	various years.
Dixon	1994	718 conflict phases	1949-79
Siverson and Starr	1994	Major powers.	1816-1965
Weart	1994	Various	Various years.
Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson	1995	Correlates of War (COW) war participants	1823-1974
DeRouen	1995	United States	1949-84
Friedman and Starr	1995	246 states	1823-1985
Hristoulas	1995	United States, United Kingdom	1948-82
Kegley and Hermann	1995	190 states	1974-88
Mansfield and Snyder	1995	State system	1816-1980
Miller	1995	294 disputes	1955-76
Moore, W.	1995	Zimbabwe	1957-79
Ray	1995	State system	1825-1993
Morgan and Palmer	1997	State system	1816-1985

Note: Year refers to publication date.

Table 2.1 indicates the range of spatial and temporal characteristics of the data used in the literature. For example, scholars examine linkage dynamics in specific states (e.g., Barnett and Levy, 1991; Bar-Siman-Tov, 1983; Burrowes and DeMaio, 1975; Davis and Ward, 1991; DeRouen, 1995; James and O Neal,

1991: Lian and Oneal. 1993: Levy and Vakili. 1992: Moore. 1995: Morgan and Bickers. 1992: Norpoth. 1991: Ostrom and Job. 1986: and Russett. 1991), specific classes of states, such as the Third world (e.g., Andriole and Hopple, 1986; Hagan, 1989; and Moon, 1985), major powers (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995a-b; Schweller, 1991; Siverson and Starr, 1994; Snyder, 1991; and Vasquez, 1993), specific dyads (e.g., Huth and Russett, 1992; and Lindsay, et al., 1992)), allies (Palmer, 1990) and all states in the interstate system (e.g., Bremer 1992, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 1992; Kegley and Hermann, 1996; Maoz and Russett, 1993; and Morgan and Palmer, 1997).

In terms of the temporal aspects of the literature, more recent empirical research investigates varied linkage dynamics across longer periods of time. For example, the early work on the relationship between domestic turmoil and foreign conflict (e.g., East and Hermann, 1974; Hazelwood, 1973; Moore, 1974a-b; Rummel 1993; Tanter 1966; Wilkenfeld 1968, 1969, 1973) analyzes empirical relationships across relatively few time points. As the information contained in Table 2.1 indicates, the practice of examining information-rich data sets over short spans of time continues through the 1970s. However, the early 1980s signal a shift toward analyses of longer time frames. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, empirical analyses generally examine relationships across no less than 20-years, and in some instances analyze data sets containing upwards of 176 time-points.

In addition to research design, there have also been some substantial developments in the methodologies employed to test hypotheses drawn from various linkage frameworks. Again, I report a sample of some of the methods from the literature in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2. Analytic Approach and Methods of Comparative Foreign Policy and World Politics Research

Author(s)	Year	Approach	Method
Rummel	1963	Empirical	Factor analysis; correlation; regression
Tanter	1966	Empirical	Factor analysis
Wilkenfeld	1968	Empirical	Factor analysis
Wilkenfeld	1969	Empirical	Factor analysis
Babst	1972	Theoretical/ empirical	Aggregates; probabilities
Hazelwood	1973	Empirical	Factor analysis; discriminatory factor analysis; canonical correlation; simultaneous equations

Wilkenfeld	1973	Empirical	Factor analysis: correlation
Wilkenfeld and Zinnes	1973	Empirical	Factor analysis: Markov analysis w/ transition matrices
East and Hermann	1974	Empirical	Regression
Moore, D.	1974	Empirical	Factor analysis: partial regression coefficient
Moore, D.	1974	Empirical	Factor analysis: correlation
Pearson	1974	Empirical	Difference of means; aggregate statistics
Burrowes & DeMaio	1975	Empirical	O- and P-factor analysis: correlation
Small & Singer	1976	Empirical	Difference of means
Kegley, et al.	1978	Empirical	Correlation
Eberwein, et al.	1979	Empirical	Explanatory/confirmatory factor analysis: correlation
Wilkenfeld, et al.	1980	Empirical	R- and Q-factor analysis; regression: probit
Ward & Widmaier	1982	Empirical	Aggregate statistics
Bar-Siman-Tov	1983	Qualitative	Aggregate statistics
Rasler	1983	Empirical	Time series; ARIMA
Rummel	1983	Empirical	Aggregate; regression
Chan	1984	Empirical	Aggregate; tests of independence
Weede	1984	Empirical	Correlation; tests of independence: Yule's Q
Geller	1985	Empirical	Bivariate, multivariate, and canonical. Correlation
Moon	1985	Theoretical/ empirical	One-way ANOVA; regression, correlation, aggregate statistics
Andriole and Hopple	1986	Empirical	Aggregate statistics
Ostrom and Job	1986	Empirical	Maximum likelihood regression
Blainey	1988	Qualitative	Case studies
James	1988	Empirical	Correlation; tests of independence
Hagan	1989	Empirical	ANOVA
Levy and Vakili	1989	Qualitative	Case studies
Maoz	1989	Empirical	Correlations; tests of independence; probit. ANOVA
Maoz and Abdolali	1989	Empirical	Difference of means tests; ANOVA
Palmer	1990	Empirical	Regression
Russett	1990	Empirical	Aggregate statistics
Barnett & Levy	1991	Qualitative	Case studies
David	1991	Qualitative	Case studies
Dehaven	1991	Empirical	Structural equations
James & Oneal	1991	Empirical	Regression
Morgan and Campbell	1991	Empirical	Logit; tests of independence
Norpoth	1991	Empirical	Time-series
Risse-Kappen	1991	Qualitative	Aggregate statistics; case studies
Snyder	1991	Qualitative	Case studies
Volgy and Schwartz	1991	Empirical	Tests of independence
Bremer	1992	Empirical	Conditional probabilities: Poisson
Bueno de Mesquita, et al.	1992	Empirical	Probit
Davis and Ward	1990	Empirical	Vector auto-regression (VAR)
Ember, et al.	1992	Empirical	Regression
Lake	1992	Theoretical/ empirical	Tests of independence; logit
Lindsay, et al.	1992	Empirical	Ordinary least squares
Morgan and Bickers	1992	Empirical	Probit/Tobit

Morgan and Schwebach	1992	Empirical	Tests of independence/reduction in error: Logit
Schweller	1992	Qualitative	Aggregate statistics; case studies
Walt	1992	Qualitative	Case studies
Bremer	1993	Empirical	Poisson.: Negative Binomial
Dixon	1993	Empirical	Probit
Hagan	1993	Empirical	Correlation
Huth & Russett	1993	Empirical	Probit
Lian and Oneal	1993	Empirical	Difference of means; ordinary least squares.
Maoz & Russett	1993	Empirical	Logit; log-linear regression; difference of proportions
Ray	1993	Theoretical/ qualitative	Case studies
Russett	1993	Empirical	Logit
Vasquez	1993	Qualitative	Case studies
Dixon	1994	Empirical	Probit regression
Siverson and Starr	1994	Empirical	Regression
Weart	1994	Theoretical	Aggregate statistics
Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson	1995	Empirical	Event history analysis
DeRouen	1995	Empirical	Simultaneous equations
Friedman and Starr	1995	Empirical	Logit
Hristoulas	1995	Empirical	Probit
Kegley & Hermann	1995	Empirical	Aggregate statistics: tests of independence
Mansfield and Snyder	1995	Empirical/ qualitative	Tests of independence: aggregate statistics
Miller	1995	Empirical	Probit regression
Moore, W.	1995	Empirical	Vector auto-regression (VAR)
Ray	1995	Empirical	Partitioning variance
Morgan and Palmer	1997	Formal and empirical	Tests of independence; reduction in error: Logit; generalized least squares

Note: Year refers to publication date.

As is evident from the table, research was initially exploratory in nature, and primarily atheoretical. As such, this approach encouraged the use of commensurate empirical techniques, such as correlation analysis and descriptive statistics (e.g., see Rummel, 1963; Tanter, 1966; Wilkenfeld, 1968, 1969; Babst, 1972; Moore, 1974a-b; Kegley, et al., 1978; and Eberwein, et al., 1979). These approaches suffered from two primary deficiencies. First, most analyses were of the cross-sectional variety, and there was little explicit incorporation of variation across time. Second, and more importantly, an absence of theoretically driven propositions made general interpretation of the results difficult.

Recent research tends toward more refined research questions, theories, and hypotheses. In turn, scholars apply more sophisticated statistical techniques to better quality data. For example, factor

and correlation analyses have given way to ordinary least squares estimation procedures (e.g., James and Oneal, 1991; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Lindsay, et al., 1992; Moon, 1985; Morgan and Palmer, 1996; Palmer, 1990; Siverson and Starr, 1994; and Wilkenfeld, et al., 1980), time-series analysis (e.g., Norpoth, 1991; Rasler, 1983), maximum likelihood estimation (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 1992; Dixon, 1993; Huth and Russett, 1993; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Ostrom and Job, 1986), vector auto-regression (e.g., Davis and Ward, 1991; Moore, 1995), and simultaneous equations (e.g., DeRouen, 1995)

This said, an increase in overall sophistication of research techniques in the literature should not be interpreted to mean that each and every one of the research puzzles raised in earlier research has simply fallen by the wayside. On the contrary, as my review of the literature above suggests, many of the research questions formulated during the 1960s remain under study today; the respective fields are simply better equipped to carry out the appropriate statistical analyses.

2.6.2. Issues of Variable Operationalization

Since the 1960s, the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures sought to explain relationships across a number of domestic politics and foreign policy phenomena. Commensurate with this broad set of phenomena, the literature has operationalized these variables in several ways. In Table 2.3, I identify the dependent variables (primarily foreign policy oriented) used by the literature sample from Tables 2.1 and 2.2.

Table 2.3. Dependent Variables in Comparative Foreign Policy and World Politics Research

Author(s)	Year	Dependent Variable
Rummel	1963	Foreign conflict dimensions/domestic conflict dimensions
Tanter	1966	Domestic-foreign conflict dimensions
Wilkenfeld	1968	Correlation of domestic-foreign conflict dimensions for lagged and lead periods
Wilkenfeld	1969	Correlation of domestic-foreign conflict dimensions for lagged and lead periods
Babst	1972	War
Hazelwood	1973	Measures of foreign conflict, domestic stress, and development.
Wilkenfeld	1973	Lagged and contemporaneous correlation of domestic and foreign conflict by s. type
Wilkenfeld and	1973	Domestic conflict

Zinnes		
East and Hermann	1974	Number of foreign policy events, bureaucratic involvement, head-of-state part., verbal, military, coop and con events
Moore, D.	1974	7 foreign policy measures
Moore, D.	1974	7 foreign policy measures
Pearson	1974	Military interventions
Burrowes & DeMaio	1975	External conflict and cooperation
Kegley, et al.	1978	Composite scale of foreign conflict
Eberwein, et al.	1979	Foreign conflict dimensions/domestic conflict dimension
Wilkenfeld, et al.	1980	Foreign policy dimensions
Ward & Widmaier	1982	Number of ongoing serious interstate disputes (SID): SID actor, target
Bar-Siman-Tov	1983	Foreign conflict events
Rasler	1983	Aggregate dyadic conflict
Rummel	1983	Dyadic conflict
Chan	1984	International and extra-systemic wars
Weede	1984	Interstate wars
Geller	1985	Measures of foreign conflict and domestic stress
Moon	1985	Mean agreement level with the USA
Andriole and Hopple	1986	Regime change based on 4 authority dimensions
Ostrom and Job	1986	Uses of force
Blainey	1988	Wars
James	1988	War and other crisis characteristics
Hagan	1989	United Nations' voting alignment
Levy and Vakili	1989	War initiation
Maoz	1989	Dispute (MID) permutations
Maoz and Abdolali	1989	Dispute (MID) permutations
Palmer	1990	Defense Expenditures
Russett	1990	Militarized conflict
Barnett & Levy	1991	Formal and informal relationships of security cooperation
David	1991	Alignment and realignment
Dehaven	1991	Incumbent party support
James & Oneal	1991	Use of major or nuclear capable forces; use of force in crisis
Morgan and Campbell	1991	Dispute outcome (war/no war)
Norpoth	1991	PM Thatcher's popularity
Risse-Kappen	1991	Threat perception of USR: support for defense spending; policy toward USR
Snyder	1991	Major Power Overexpansion
Volgy and Schwartz	1991	Foreign policy restructuring; fundamental change in economic, legal, or socio-cultural dimensions
Bremer	1992	War onset
Bueno de Mesquita, et al.	1992	Violent regime changes
Davis and Ward	1990	Balance of trade, unemployment, rebellion, government sanctions, deaths domestic violence, international conflict sent and received.
Ember, et al.	1992	Frequency of internal warfare
Lake	1992	War outcome
Lindsay, et al.	1992	Dyadic cooperation and conflict
Morgan and Bickers	1992	Three levels of dispute action; number of days from survey to

		military action
Morgan and Schwebach	1992	Dispute escalation
Schweller	1992	Foreign policy behavior: accommodation, defense alliance, previous war
Walt	1992	Post-revolutionary war
Bremer	1993	War and dispute occurrence
Dixon	1993	Conflict management
Hagan	1993	Foreign policy commitment, independence of action, affect direction, affect intensity
Huth & Russett	1993	Dispute initiation
Lian and O Neal	1993	Political rally effect
Maoz & Russett	1993	Dispute involvement, escalation: crisis
Ray	1993	War
Russett	1993	Militarized disputes (MID) and crises (ICBP) involvement and escalation
Vasquez	1993	Interstate conflict: rivalry
Dixon	1994	Peaceful settlement
Siverson and Starr	1994	Changes in alliance portfolio
Weart	1994	War
Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson	1995	Leader survival time
DeRouen	1995	Presidential approval; use of force
Friedman and Starr	1995	Interstate war/civil war
Hristoulas	1995	Dichotomous measure of crisis involvement
Kegley & Hermann	1995	Interventions
Mansfield and Snyder	1995	Interstate wars
Miller	1995	Leader response
Moore, W.	1995	Domestic and international conflict
Ray	1995	Regime changes
Morgan and Palmer	1997	Dispute initiation/reciprocation

Note: Year refers to date of publication.

During the 1960s and 1970s, research sought to examine ranges, or dimensions, of domestic and foreign policy behavior, such as foreign and domestic conflict and cooperation dimensions (e.g., Rummel, 1963; Tanter, 1966; Wilkenfeld, 1968, 1969; Babst, 1972; Moore, 1974a-b; Kegley, et al., 1978; and Eberwein, et al., 1979). However, as the literature has evolved, the phenomena the literature has sought to explain have grown more specific and the selection of dependent variables increasingly varied. This increased specificity is in part a product of the world politics literature, a field that was accustomed to studying discrete events, such as wars, rather than the gamut of foreign policy behaviors. As reported in the table, research began to include the study of interstate war (e.g., Babst, 1972; Bremer, 1992; James, 1988; Levy and Vakili, 1989; Small and Singer, 1976; Weart, 1994; Weede, 1984), dyadic

conflict (e.g., Lindsay, et al., 1992; Rummel, 1983), UN voting patterns (e.g., Hagan, 1989; Moon, 1985), uses of force (e.g., James and Oneal, 1991, Ostrom and Job, 1986), militarized disputes (e.g., Maoz, 1989; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; and Ward and Widmaier, 1982), alignment and realignment (David, 1991; Siverson and Starr, 1994), domestic political party/leader popularity (e.g., DeHaven, 1991; DeRouen, 1995; Norpoth, 1991,), defense expenditures (Palmer 1990), regime changes (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; and Ray, 1995), internal war (e.g., Friedman and Starr, 1995), balance of trade (e.g., Davis and Ward, 1991), post-revolutionary war (e.g., Walt, 1992), and peaceful settlement (e.g., Dixon, 1993, 1994), for example.

This trend in the specificity of indicator operationalization extends to the inclusion of independent variables, as well. Table 2.4 reports independent variable operationalization for the literature sample.

Table 2.4. Independent Variables in Comparative Foreign Policy and World Politics Research

Author(s)	Year	Independent Variable
Rummel	1963	Foreign conflict dimension/dom. conflict dimension
Tanter	1966	Domestic-foreign conflict dimension
Wilkenfeld	1968	Correlation of domestic-foreign conflict dimension for lagged and lead periods
Wilkenfeld	1969	Correlation of domestic-foreign conflict dimension for lagged and lead periods
Babst	1972	Regime type
Hazelwood	1973	Measures of foreign conflict, domestic stress, and development
Wilkenfeld	1973	Lagged and contemporaneous correlation of domestic and foreign conflict by nation type
Wilkenfeld and Zinnes	1973	Foreign Conflict
East and Hermann	1974	National size, level of development, and account.
Moore, D.	1974	10 government and societal dimension
Moore, D.	1974	9 Rosenau genotype dimension
Pearson	1974	Elite instability, mass protest, structural conflict
Burrowes & DeMaio	1975	Domestic Conflict and cooperation
Kegley, et al.	1978	Civil strife
Eberwein, et al.	1979	Foreign conflict dimension/dom. conflict dimension
Wilkenfeld, et al.	1980	Psychological, political, societal, interstate, and global dimension
Ward & Widmaier	1982	Protest and civil war z-scores
Bar-Siman-Tov	1983	Internal unrest
Rasler	1983	Aggregate dyadic conflict (conflict-cooperation)
Rummel	1983	Freedom of state

Chan	1984	Freedom of state
Weede	1984	Democracy
Geller	1985	Foreign conflict and domestic stress
Moon	1985	Correction for agenda change. American foreign aid. regime type dummy
Andriole and Hopple	1986	Pre- and post-regime change domestic and international conflict and non-conflict
Ostrom and Job	1986	USA-USR tension relative nuclear capability. USA battledeaths. public perceptions, war average, misery index. presidential support, presidential success election cycle
Blainey	1988	Leadership change; dom. instability
James	1988	Latent (economic) and manifest (domestic turmoil) conflict
Hagan	1989	Types of regime changes; regime orientation
Levy and Vakili	1989	Bureaucratic-authoritarian regime
Maoz	1989	Revolutionary and evolutionary polity changes
Maoz and Abdolali	1989	Changes in regime type according to Maoz-Russett trichotomy
Palmer	1990	Expenditure on health and education as a proportion of total government expenditure
Russett	1990	Public opinion; elections; economic conflict: growth
Barnett & Levy	1991	Domestic political and economic conflict; constraints on resource mobilization; internal and external threats
David	1991	Alliance omnibalancing
Dehaven	1991	Unemployment. consumer price index. Soviet Union conflictual and cooperative behavior
James & Oneal	1991	United States-Soviet Union tension. relative nuclear capability. USA battledeaths.. public perception. war average. misery index. presidential support. presidential success. election cycle. crisis severity
Morgan and Campbell	1991	Executive selection. decisional constraints. political participation: major or minor power
Norpoth	1991	Unemployment. inflation. growth. Falklands war. election cycle
Risse-Kappen	1991	Dom. structures; coalition-building processes
Snyder	1991	Industrialization: cartelized political system; myth-making
Volgy and Schwartz	1991	Electoral margin. legislative majority. economic conflict difficulties
Bremer	1992	Proximity. power parity. major power. alliance. democracy. development. militarized
Bueno de Mesquita. et al.	1992	Target and initiator win/loss. log battledeaths/population
Davis and Ward	1990	Balance of trade. changes in unemployment. rebellion. government sanctions. deaths from political violence. international conflict sent and received.
Ember. et al.	1992	Population. geography. leadership constraints. participation. fission. multi-local participation
Lake	1992	Democracy. military personnel. iron and steel prod.. conflict initiator
Lindsay. et al.	1992	Presidential approval. health of economy. legacy of war. presidential Honeymoon
Morgan and Bickers	1992	Level of partisan presidential support. aggregate pres. support
Morgan and Schwebach	1992	Democracy. dom. political structures
Schweller	1992	Power transitions: regime type
Walt	1992	Revolutions

Bremer	1993	Democracy, proximity, relative power, alliance, power status, development, militarization, hegemony
Dixon	1993	Democracy, composite index of national capabilities score, costs, prior management activity
Hagan	1993	Political system accountability and instability; regime vulnerability and fragmentation
Huth & Russett	1993	Deterrence model, rat. choice model, cognitive model
Lian and Oneal	1993	Uses of force, severity of crisis, approval, New York Times, war/postwar, administration efforts to boost popularity
Maoz & Russett	1993	Joint democracy, degree of institutional constraints, democratic norms, wealth, economic growth, alliance, contiguity, military cap. Ratio
Ray	1993	Regime type
Russett	1993	Dyadic measures of democracy, wealth, growth, alliance, contiguity, CINC ratio
Vasquez	1993	Dom. accommodationist/hard-liner dimension
Dixon	1994	Democracy, alliance, mediation, previous military confrontation, sequential phase
Siverson and Starr	1994	External conflict, internal violence or crisis: duration of test period; power status of states; changes in distribution of power.
Weart	1994	Republican governments
Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson	1995	Leader tenure, interaction w/ democracy, battledeaths, war outcome, non-conflictual overthrow
DeRouen	1995	Interstate and domestic economic conditions
Friedman and Starr	1995	Magnitude, severity, intensity of interstate and civil wars
Hristoulas	1995	Changes in domestic economic and turmoil indicators
Kegley & Hermann	1995	Freedom of state
Mansfield and Snyder	1995	Democratization, autocratization
Miller	1995	Initiator hostility levels, relative capability, leader popularity, levels of political resources, level of autocracy
Moore, W.	1995	Domestic and international conflict
Ray	1995	State specific and systemic level effects
Morgan and Palmer	1997	Power; regime type (i.e., pure democracy, mixed democracy, dictatorship); leadership change

Note: Year refers to date of publication.

Similar to the evolution of the dependent variable, the world politics and comparative foreign policy literatures have also moved beyond the factor analysis techniques of the early research to incorporate more specific measures of domestic and foreign phenomena. Similar to the operationalization of the dependent variables, early research relied heavily on domestic political dimensions, primarily domestic stress and turmoil. This was the case, although a number of the foreign policy frameworks appearing in the 1970s conceptualized variables that were immeasurable on a large scale at that time (e.g., indicators of the psychological disposition of a leader or a political system.)

Commensurate with developments on the left-hand side of the causal equation, so to speak, recent research has also developed more specific indicators of domestic political phenomena.

For example, research incorporates measures of political system type (e.g., Rummel, 1983; Chan, 1984; Weede, 1984; Morgan and Palmer, 1996; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Lake, 1992; Bremer, 1993; Dixon, 1993; Kegley and Hermann, 1995), leadership change and tenure (e.g., Andriole and Hopple, 1986; Blainey, 1988; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995), social expenditure (Palmer, 1990), regime changes (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a-b, 1996; Maoz, 1996a-b; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Hagan, 1989; Moon, 1985), revolutions (e.g., Walt, 1992; Maoz, 1989; Hagan, 1989), public opinion (e.g., Russett, 1990; Lindsay, et al., 1992; Lian and Oneal, 1993), domestic instability (e.g., Blainey, 1987; Davis and Ward, 1991; Hagan, 1993; Friedman and Starr, 1995; Moore, 1995).

2.7. Domestic Political Systems and Foreign Policy

2.7.1. Theoretical Issues

The research discussed throughout this chapter raises a number of important questions pertaining to the study of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, particularly the manner in which scholarship goes about conceptualizing the various components of the linkage process. I do so by using Easton's model of the political system as a framework for assessing some of the basic theoretical assumptions emerging in the literature.

2.7.2. Basic Components

As many scholars argue, domestic politics–foreign policy linkages are quite complex. In part, this is due to the seemingly infinite number of causal relationships one can identify across different levels within this context. Indeed, while to some degree there is a consensus among comparative foreign policy and world politics scholars that domestic politics is an important piece of the foreign policy and


interstate behavior puzzle, just how this linkage functions, and to what extent, remains to be determined. As Morgan and Palmer (1997, 1) remark, “there is little to indicate...that we are moving closer to a consensus regarding why, when, and how domestic politics influences foreign policy.”

Given the breadth of the general domestic politics–foreign policy inquiry, I intend to explore only a portion of this debate in the following chapters. As with any investigation of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy there are basically two-halves of a general equation that require identification: (1) the domestic components; and (2) the foreign policy components. Critical to this task involves indicating why and how these two-halves are connected. Next, I discuss the two halves of the domestic politics–foreign policy equation relative to previous research in the comparative foreign policy and world politics.

Previous research in both fields only examines fragments of the general domestic politics–foreign policy relationship. While such a substantively disparate research agenda does not lend itself to development of broadly applicable theory, it has certainly succeeded in confirming that domestic–foreign policy linkages do obtain, to varying degrees, across a range of substantive areas. This “patchwork” of domestic-international research explores, to greater and lesser degrees, the hypothesized causal flows between the three primary arenas of interest: domestic politics, foreign policy, and interstate behavior.

Figure 2.4 illustrates these relationships schematically.

Figure 2.4. Domestic Politics/Foreign Policy/Interstate Politics Linkages



Source: author

Note that the causal arrows in the Figure 2.4 connecting the three arenas are bi-directional: domestic politics affects international politics, domestic politics affects foreign policy, and foreign policy affects international politics, and vice versa for the causal relations among the three arenas. The novelty in this dissertation lies in its comparative analysis of the relationships between three primary domestic political components and foreign policy.

The literature presents, at least implicitly, some important theoretical and empirical analogs of Easton's framework. For example, portions of the literature examine the impact of the political community's climate on foreign policy behavior, something akin to the long-standing examination of the relationship between domestic political turmoil and foreign conflict (e.g., Friedman and Starr, 1995; Maoz 1989, Starr 1994, Walt 1992), political regime changes (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995a-b, 1996; Maoz, 1989, 1996; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; and Miller 1995), and changes in the political system's authorities (e.g., Andriole and Hopple, 1986; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Hagan, 1987, 1993, 1995; Moon 1985, Morgan and Palmer 1996).

However, there has been little in the way of an integrated, comparative approach to the relationship between the three political system components and a range of foreign policy behaviors. Such an approach would address some of the questions raised in earlier sections of this chapter regarding, for instance, the relationship between changes in authority and political community persistence and foreign policy. There remains, then, room for further exploration of these kinds of relationships. Next, I discuss the domestic components in Easton's political system model, and their relationship to foreign policy.

2.7.3. The Political Community

All domestic political phenomena are not readily identified within the Eastonian framework. This is particularly evident when we begin considering Easton's broadly defined concept of the political community. Perhaps we might think about the political community in two ways. First, we might think

about the duration of the political community, regardless of changes in the political regime and authorities. How long has the political community endured in the political system? What sort of effect does simple community duration have, if any, on foreign policy?

Second, in addition to a notion of duration, we might also desire some barometer of the political climate within the political community at any given point in time. Political community duration is a broad concept, as political systems may be considered enduring when they are smoothly running entities, and when they are on the verge of collapse. Therefore, it would be helpful to introduce a concept that indicates the stability of the political community. In the terminology of Easton, we might begin to conceptualize climate as demands or supports internal to the political system itself. It is clear that demands and supports encompass a broad range of behavior on the part of individuals and groups within the polity. On the one hand, demands or supports may be as innocuous as voting in an election or writing a letter to a member of a legislature. On the other hand demands and supports may be as severe as actively seeking the overthrow of the political regime.

However, while political climate would appear to be an important ingredient in understanding political system dynamism, some empirical obstacles remain. Perhaps part of the problem stems from the fact that domestic political conflict is typically measured with a broad range of events. Employing events of this sort risks representing only half of the demand/support dynamic, biasing any empirical results against lower profile (i.e., less newsworthy) events. One question, then, is whether we can assume that demands and supports covary, such that the absence of one indicates the presence of the other. An assumption of this sort is rather like the approach taken by Maoz and Russett (1993) in their measurement of democratic norms. Perhaps the presence or absence of domestic conflict is a good approximation of the demand/support balance, in that one would expect that democratic or autocratic

regimes. for instance would prefer lower to higher levels of demands (i.e., conflict), as the energy required to respond to these demands is costly.¹⁷

2.7.4. The Political Regime

Easton's notion of the political regime is perhaps more readily identifiable empirically. The literature suggests that a rough approximation of the rules and norms operating in a political system are likely embodied in the type of political regime. The notion of identifying regime types is certainly not new to political science, particularly comparative politics. Indeed, as the earlier discussion of the literature stresses, the comparative foreign policy literature is traditionally grounded in "nation-state typing," of which political regimes were certainly part. However, it is only recently that regime-type figures prominently in explanations of foreign policy and interstate behavior. Let me elaborate on this point.

In the general literature, there are basically two branches of discussion concerning the relationship between regime-type and foreign policy. First, there is the long-standing proposition that regime-type conditions foreign policy behavior. However, a closer examination of political system type reveals that while regime-type is a relatively stable attribute as far as nation-state typologies are concerned, regimes are nonetheless dynamic across time.¹⁸ Therefore, recent literature focuses on the impact of changes in domestic political regimes on foreign policy behavior. Several of these inquiries base their propositions about regime changes on traditional notions of vulnerability and aggression often associated, particularly in the world politics literature, on change. In short, new political regimes are

¹⁷Indeed, Jackman (1993) argues that a regime's use of force against its own citizens demonstrates a loss of legitimacy, and by extension, political capacity.

¹⁸This notion is similar to the argument offered by Maoz and Russett (1993) regarding norms in democratic states and the presence of domestic conflict. The bottom line is that there is a significant

fledgling, and this condition is hypothesized to increase the likelihood that the states containing these regimes will either initiate or be the targets of interstate conflict. As discussed earlier, the world politics literature has also sought to measure the impact of interstate behavior on political regimes (for example, see Stein and Russett, 1980; Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller, 1992).

2.7.5. The Political Authorities

As in the case of political regimes, empirical analogs for Easton's notions of political authorities are not difficult to identify. The relevance of political leaders is not new to the study of foreign policy and world politics. However, the manner in which leaders are incorporated into the study of state behavior has changed considerably. Briefly, some early work, primarily pre-behavioral, focuses on the relationship between individual political leaders and foreign policy. Akin to the "great man" theories of politics, the behavior of nations in war and peace was intertwined with the psychological background and personality of specific political leader(s). Therefore, the outbreak of war could be attributed to an aggressive or handicapped monarch, for example.

Incorporation of political leaders into studies of foreign policy in political science has changed significantly since the advent of the "great man" theories. There are basically two developments of relevance. First, the formal modeling approach in the world politics literature generally assumes that all policy decisions are made by a single individual, so that the preference ordering of states can be considered single-peaked (for example, see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Morgan and Palmer, 1996). Second, an outgrowth of both the formal modeling and empirical approaches in the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures is the argument that different leaders can represent different policy preferences in foreign policy (for example, see Hagan, 1989, 1993; Moon, 1985; Morgan and Palmer, 1997). By extension, leadership changes may have significant effects on foreign policy. In

relationship between regime duration and regime behavior, a proposition that parallels a point made earlier about the relationship between the duration of political communities and domestic conflict.

addition, the world politics literature has also sought to estimate the effects of interstate politics on political leaders (for example, see Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). In general, the basic propositions concerning political leaders and foreign policy parallel, in part, those discussed above with respect to political climate and political regimes.

2.8. Conclusions

This chapter addressed five tasks. First, I discuss the recent convergence of the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures regarding the study of domestic politics–foreign policy linkages. Second, I delineate the political system framework proposed by David Easton in order to establish a basic framework for further study of the domestic politics–foreign policy relationship. Third, to survey research in comparative foreign policy and world politics. Fourth, I discuss a number of the theoretical issues raised by the literature. Lastly, I survey and discuss the previous research designs contained in the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures. In the following chapter, I develop specific hypotheses about the relationship between the domestic political system and interstate conflict.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter I broaden my discussion of the theories and propositions associated with the relationship between the domestic political system and interstate behavior I identified in the previous chapter. I organize the chapter in the following manner. First, I recapitulate some of the central components of the theory linking states' domestic political system changes and stability to their involvement in interstate conflict by way of discussing two ideas prevalent throughout the literature. vulnerability and aggression. Second, I develop a set of hypotheses about the relationship between the domestic political system and interstate conflict grounded in the notions of vulnerability and aggression.

3.2. Theory and Hypotheses

In the second chapter, I discuss some of the general theoretical propositions in the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures regarding the relationship between domestic political systems and interstate behavior. My purpose in the current chapter is to draw on these literatures in order to identify a set of theoretical propositions, and to formulate a set of empirically testable hypotheses from these propositions. I am interested in analyzing the effects of three domestic political system characteristics on foreign policy: (1) the political community; (2) the political regime; and (3) the political authorities.

As I noted earlier, the theories in the extant literature concerning the relationship between the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities and foreign policy behavior parallel one another in general. In particular, the thrust of the general arguments in the literature is that changes or instability, in any of these aforementioned three political system components, is hypothesized to produce generally the same results on the interstate level: a change in the level or probability of interstate conflict.

In an effort to explicate this linkage between domestic political system phenomena and interstate behavior, the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures focus on the linkage between two conditions, each of which obtain on the domestic and interstate levels: (1) vulnerability; and (2) aggression. In the following chapter, I discuss the conditions of vulnerability and aggression separately, and then integrate these two conditions into a unified approach to the study of the linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy.

3.2.1. Political System Vulnerability

A traditional theme in the study of nation-states and foreign policy is the idea that certain domestic conditions weaken the political system. This process whereby the domestic political structure weakens, in turn increases the vulnerability of the political system to pressure from sources internal and external to the state. For example, the initial period in the political community's existence comprises what might be referred to as the "fledgling" stage. During this fledgling period in a political community's existence, the social, religious, cultural, etc., cleavages upon which the political community is founded are fragile, and untested by internal and external pressures.

During this initial phase, a political community is likely to endure internal and external stresses and the possibility of dissolution. Moreover, the literature suggests that the dynamics commonly associated with this stage in a political community's existence have important implications for interstate relations. Therefore, the maturity of the political system components may be relevant for the study of

interstate politics. Similarly, many of the dynamics associated with new political communities are also identified by the literature as being applicable to nascent political regimes and leaders. Next, I discuss the idea of political system vulnerability as it pertains to the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities. Specifically, I focus on two sub-dimensions of vulnerability, internal and external stress.

3.2.1.1. Internal Stress

Fledgling political conditions are often associated with vulnerability. In the literature, these conditions are generally hypothesized to increase perceptions of vulnerability among members of the political system. In particular, just as fledgling political communities face the task of surviving the stresses and strains associated with the early phases of their existence, domestic political regimes and authorities face a similar dynamic, albeit on perhaps slightly different scales.

New regimes are fledglings in the sense that the rules and norms that they represent are untested. The distribution of power between the political institutions embodying these rules requires time to manifest itself and function smoothly. The development of political norms that are essential to the preservation of the political rules, as well as their concomitant institutions, are likely functions of time. One could argue that the longer a set of rules and norms remains in place, the greater the likelihood that these rules and norms will persist. In Easton's terminology, time is essential to the fostering of the political legitimacy of a political system embodied in the regime. It is a process whereby the members of a political system accept the manner in which the political system is organized to distribute scarce goods.

The literature suggests that a parallel dynamic also applies to political authorities. Although the time frame, or life cycle, for individual political leaders, or authorities, may be considerably shorter than is likely for the political regime or the political community, these two political system components are similar. Specifically, the primary interest of political authorities is the preservation of their power—

their survival—over policymaking in the domestic and foreign policy arenas. In perpetually achieving this goal, political authorities must contend with domestic and interstate threats to their survival.

Moreover, as in the case of threats to nascent political communities, new political leaders are subject to the strains emerging domestically and internationally. In other words, the level of vulnerability that an average political authority may experience may resemble the “bathtub-shaped” survival curve associated with the life-spans of humans, where the probability of any given individual dying is high at young and old ages, and lower during middle-age. Similarly, political authorities may be at greater risk of losing political power during the early stage of their tenures, the least at risk during the middle of their tenure, and again highly at risk at the end of their tenure. Likewise, one could also argue that the survival patterns of political authorities depend on the political system in which they exist. That is, the probability of leaders losing power as a function of time in a democracy is quite different from that of political leaders in autocratic political systems. Suffice it to say that the literature presents several arguments regarding the variable impact of internal stress on political authorities.

Yet, internal stress is not solely a product of the fledgling period of political development that occurs in political communities, regimes, and authorities. Indeed, internal stress may occur throughout the existence of these three political system components for a number of reasons. For example, failed policies implemented by a political authority may increase domestic dissatisfaction. If this dissatisfaction is not addressed, the members of the political system may attempt to remove the political authority from its position as arbiter of the political system’s scarce goods. Similarly, the repeated selection of poorly performing political authorities (i.e., poor policy-makers, repressive, corrupt, etc.) may encourage members of the political system to seek the replacement of the political regime, and the installation of the new system of rules. Lastly, pressures internal and external to the political system may weaken the bonds that make the existence of a political community beneficial to its members. In turn, these pressures may translate into direct challenges to a political community’s existence, perhaps manifest in the outbreak of civil war and the dissolution of the political community altogether.

There might be some reason to argue that the impact of internal political system stress cascades from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy of political system components. Therefore, the longer the duration across which the political system is afflicted with stress the greater the ramifications of this stress for more the components of the political system. Further, the impact of stress on this hierarchy of political system components may interact with the duration and severity of the stress. As such, the greater the duration of political system stress, the greater the likelihood that the political authorities, political regime, and political community will be affected. As a result, changes in policy or the system itself may follow.

While internal, or domestic, forms of political system stress may be the commonplace sources of political system vulnerability, myriad external sources of vulnerability exist as well. I turn to a discussion of these sources next.

3.2.1.2. External Stress

Similar to the case of internal stress, the sources of external stress for a domestic political system are many and their impact variable. My intent here is to discuss the general connection between variations in political system vulnerability and sources of such vulnerability external to the political system, with a particular emphasis on interstate conflict. To date, the literature generally draws broad parallels between foreign and domestic sources of political system vulnerability. For example, it is often argued that just as a political authority's errant domestic policies may increase its vulnerability domestically, so too can failed policies abroad threaten the political authority's survival. As such, failure to implement effective policies in either arena is assumed to generate costs for political authorities.

Despite these similarities, some unique aspects of the vulnerability dimension emerge when one begins to consider the external sources of domestic vulnerability. Perhaps the most obvious form of external stress occurs when one state in the interstate system threatens another state, in turn forcing the threatened state to devise policies to counter this threat, ranging from outright capitulation to demands by

the other state, to full scale war. At the same time, there is validity to the argument that existence of external threats may bolster the legitimacy of the political authorities and the regime, and these threats may facilitate the survival of these entities.

However, a counter-argument would be that while the presence of an external threat may bolster political authorities' ability to remain in power, their inability to demonstrate to the political community that they can deal with this threat effectively does have an impact on the leaders' vulnerability, and hence, survival. For example, one could argue that the political regime and its authorities in the Soviet Union (and the democratic regime and its authorities in the United States, for that matter) employed the presence of an external enemy dynamic as a way to mobilize public support, and to perpetuate their survival. Yet, in retrospect one could also make the claim, at least in terms of the Soviet political system, that pursuing the external enemy dynamic can also have costly internal consequences. For instance, devoting tremendous amounts of the political community's available energy to fighting an external enemy may result in the domestic political system's chronic inability to meet political community members' domestic policy expectations. Henceforth, this may result in a decline in the legitimacy of political authorities and, eventually, the political regime.

The sources of internal and external stress can also be linked in a number of indirect ways. For example, political authorities in other states may covertly, or overtly, support unrest in another state, ultimately increasing the stress on the political leaders in the externally stimulated unstable state. Also, systemic forces, such as regional or global economic downturns, wars, etc., may lead to increases in the dissatisfaction of the members of a political system, and in turn this may vary the level of vulnerability experienced by the political authorities.

Therefore, the sources of domestic political system stress may not be the product of the domestic political system itself, but this system must be able to adapt to these changes in order to ensure its continued survival. As such, policy failures in the domestic political system may have ramifications beyond simply the survival of the political authorities. These external sources of vulnerability may also

represent costs for the political regime and community as well. While external intervention by another state is perhaps the clearest example of the impact of an external force on a domestic political system, many others exist, although they are less direct, and the causal linkages more complex. As noted above, global economic depressions may place pressure on relevant segments of a political system (e.g., the middle class), who in turn pressure the military, for example, to replace the democratic regime with a more authoritarian form of government. Also, discrimination by a political regime or authorities toward a segment of society (e.g., ethnic, religious minorities, etc.) may eventually threaten the integrity of the political community itself. Paradoxically, in some instances this dynamic (i.e., the dissolution of the political community) may be the intention of the group doing the discriminating (e.g., the former Yugoslavia.)

My purpose in this section has been to discuss the sources of vulnerability for the components of the domestic political system. Yet, just as this vulnerability may originate from many internal and external sources, the domestic political system components may respond to this vulnerability in a number of ways. I turn to a discussion of these responses in the next.

3.2.2. Interstate Aggression

One of the most frequently cited linkages between the presence of domestic political system vulnerability and stress and interstate interaction centers on the role of aggression. Specifically, the literature focuses on two aspects of the problem. First, the literature focuses on the foreign policy behavior of states experiencing the high levels of domestic vulnerability. Second, the literature focuses on the foreign policy behavior of states in the international system relative to any state with a political system that is encountering high levels of vulnerability. Below, I discuss how aggression fits within the context of the behavior these two categories of states given the two dynamics generated by the presence of political vulnerability.

3.2.2.1. Dynamic #1: Domestic Vulnerability and Aggression Abroad

In the first dynamic, the presence of vulnerability affects some, or all, parts of the political system (i.e., the community, regime, or authorities). In turn, the presence of vulnerability stimulates the political system to resort to force abroad as a policy prescription. The crux of this dynamic is the much studied diversionary process, sometimes referred to as the rally-'round-the-flag phenomenon (e.g., Levy 1989; Miller 1995; Mueller 1973, Ostrom and Job 1986). In general, the diversionary theory proposes that the political authorities in states afflicted with some form of domestic political instability will be more likely to seek conflict abroad to accomplish two objectives. First, to rally the members of the political community with an appeal to patriotic ideals and goals, which are often intertwined with threats external to the political system itself, thereby diverting public attention away from the domestic sources of dissatisfaction. Second, to use force abroad as vehicle for mobilizing resources and consolidating domestic power.

Therefore, domestic political vulnerability is hypothesized to increase the probability of the challenged political regime or authority seeking out conflict abroad. Yet, the use of force abroad is a relatively risky strategy, particularly when the source of the instability, such as poor management of the economy, may be primarily domestic in nature. Other strategies, ranging from domestic repression to policy reformulation, may prove far easier to manage, and perhaps have a longer lasting effect on the original source of the political vulnerability.

3.2.2.2. Dynamic #2: Aggression toward Vulnerable States

In the second dynamic, states act aggressively in response to the domestic conditions in other states. In comparison to the literature on the diversionary dynamic, this second dynamic has been under-explored (for examples, see Pearson, 1974; Hermann and Kegley, 1996). From a theoretical standpoint the notion that strong states are likely to attack weak states is not new to the literature. In fact, while incorporation of a domestic politics component into the study of interstate behavior is often

trumpeted as a response to the general exclusion of domestic politics by structural realist explanations. the idea that stable states prey on unstable states is commensurate with some realist propositions. This is particularly the case if we view domestic political conditions in terms of political capacity. That is, the ability, or inability, of political authorities or regimes to generate and use resources effectively, has an effect on their own perceptions of vulnerability, as well as conditioning the perceptions of statespersons in other political systems. For example, nascent political communities, regimes, or authorities may be unable to initially maintain, or wield, national capabilities effectively. Stable states may view this condition as a "window of opportunity," ripe for some form of interstate pressure, if not outright military conflict.

3.2.2.3. Conclusions

Given the general relationship between these two traditional concepts, domestic political vulnerability and interstate aggression, it is necessary for me to begin formulating a specific set of hypotheses incorporating the nuances of these general arguments with respect to the three components of the domestic political system. I discuss the implications of each of these components separately.

3.2.3. The Political Community and Interstate Conflict

I introduce two assumptions associated with the general notion of the political community as discussed by Easton (1956.) First, I assume that nation-states as we understand them in world politics are roughly analogous to political communities. I do not incorporate any assumptions regarding the manner in which the nation-state, or political community, emerges, or is "borne" (see Maoz 1989, 1996), whether by peaceful agreement or full-scale warfare. Rather, I am primarily interested in the fact that an aggregation of individuals associated with a unique geographic and demographic entity emerges at a certain point in time.

Second, political communities endure, or survive, across a specific time frame, and then, for a number of reasons, cease to exist. Again, I am not directly interested in the manner by which the political community terminates, be it by external invasion or internal revolution, for example. However, as I discussed earlier, I am interested in how the relationships between the political community, the vulnerability may arise in this political community, and the external, or interstate, behavior of the political community may change when confronted with conditions of vulnerability. Next, I discuss these relationships in greater detail.

3.2.3.1. Political Community Persistence

My focus, then, is the interrelationship between the political community, vulnerability, and interstate behavior. Drawing on the concepts of vulnerability and aggression discussed earlier, some important questions need to be addressed. What relationship might I anticipate between political community duration and interstate conflict? Are fledgling political communities more vulnerable to aggression from abroad?

My primary assumption is that one of the key ingredients in determining the level of vulnerability in a political community is the maturity, or age, of this entity. I argue that, on average, political community vulnerability is a negative function of that community's age. Therefore, new political communities will be more likely to be involved in interstate conflict than will more mature political communities. A resource-based argument might suggest that new political communities are resource poor, disorganized, and focused internally. Moreover, at an early stage in a political community's development, political authorities may find that it is wiser to devote their resources domestically, and the ability to seek relief from domestic policy woes via aggressive foreign policy action may be completely unavailable. As such, many of the benefits associated with seeking conflict abroad, such as bolstering prestige and rallying the public, are politically very risky, and perhaps,

completely unavailable to leaders as a strategy for combating domestic political vulnerability.¹⁹

Therefore, these new political communities may not only be unable to project their power abroad, but they may also be vulnerable to aggression from other states.

3.2.3.1.1. Hypotheses

At this point, it is necessary for me to present this argument regarding the moderating effects of political community and interstate conflict relationship more formally. The logic is as follows:

Assumption 1: The younger (older) a political community, the weaker (stronger) the political bonds underlying the community:

Assumption 2: The weaker (stronger) the political bonds underlying the political community, the higher (lower) the level of domestic and interstate vulnerability:

Assumption 3: The higher (lower) level of political community vulnerability results the higher (lower) the probability that a state will be the target of interstate conflict; and

∴ Hypothesis 1 (Political Community–Interstate Conflict): The younger (older) the political community, the higher (lower) the probability of that political community being the target of conflict by other states.

In the following section, I turn to a discussion of a second aspect of the political community–vulnerability relationship, political community climate.

3.2.3.2. Political Community Climate

In the previous section, I base my hypothesis on the assumption that political community vulnerability is a negative function of time. That is, as a political community matures, its level of

¹⁹This conclusion also builds on the idea that the assumption that “rally ‘round the flag” dynamic takes time to germinate in a political community, and thus become available to political authorities as a tool for enhancing survival.

vulnerability, on average, declines. Yet there may be another way of approaching the relationship of interest. Specifically, one could argue that rather than assuming that vulnerability is a characteristic of political communities, one might be able to measure the level of this vulnerability at a given point in time.

The relationship between political system climate and interstate conflict embodies the vulnerability/aggression proposition in perhaps its most straightforward form. As discussed in the review of the literature in the second chapter, the basic argument is that nation-states with political climates characterized by conflict, or turmoil, are more likely to be involved in interstate conflicts. With respect to political community persistence, I argue earlier that nascent political communities are more likely to be the targets of aggression by other states. However, with respect to political community climate, the literature suggests that political systems experiencing a poor climate (i.e., high levels of turmoil) will likely be the targets, and/or initiators, of conflict with other states. Stated simply, variation in a political community's political climate has important implications for how the state experiencing the domestic turmoil behaves toward other states, and vice versa.

Perhaps most importantly, these variations in the impact of political climate do not necessarily dovetail with the hypothesis derived purely on the basis of political community persistence. With respect to political community climate, old communities experiencing poor political climates may be more aggressive abroad, rather than less.

3.2.3.2.1. Hypotheses

I state these arguments formally as follows:

Assumption 1: The higher (lower) the level of domestic conflict, or turmoil, in a political community, the higher (lower) the: (a) pressure on political system authorities to

alleviate the causes of this turmoil.²⁰ and (b) interstate perceptions of the turmoil-afflicted state's vulnerability to pressure from abroad.

Assumption 2: The higher (lower) the level of domestic conflict, or turmoil, in a political community, the higher (lower) the: (a) pressure on the authorities to resort to foreign conflict, and/or (b) the perceived opportunity by other states to resort to interstate conflict against the state experiencing domestic conflict.

∴ Hypothesis 2 (Political Climate–Interstate Conflict): The higher (lower) the level of domestic conflict in a political community, the higher (lower) probability of interstate conflict.

3.2.3.3. Conclusion

In this section, I have identified two hypotheses. The first hypothesis builds off an assumption about the relationship between the political community and political vulnerability. Specifically, I state that the level of political community vulnerability is a negative function of time. Having done so, I then formulate a hypothesis stating that involvement of political communities in interstate conflicts should be a negative function of time. Older political communities should exhibit rates of interstate conflict involvement lower than nascent political communities. The second hypothesis rests on the assumption that the vulnerability present in a political community can be measured using indicators of political climate. Specifically, the second hypothesis expects that a positive relationship will obtain between poor political climate and vulnerability, and this condition will increase the likelihood that the political community will become involved in interstate conflict. Having identified the hypotheses about the linkage between the political community and interstate conflict, I turn next to a similar exercise for the political regime.

²⁰This part of the assumption stems from a prior, and implicit, assumption that domestic political authorities do not prefer domestic political climate characterized by conflict, because such an environment is costly to maintain, regardless of the type of regime in power.

3.2.4. The Political Regime and Interstate Conflict

In this section, I again refer to the twin concepts of vulnerability and aggression in identifying hypotheses about the relationship between the second component of the political system, the regime, and interstate conflict. As with my discussion of the political community, I am chiefly interested in the relationship between political regimes and interstate conflict with regard to a specific dynamic: the post-regime change interstate behavior of political systems. Specifically, I am interested in examining the impact of nascent political regimes on interstate conflict, rather than mature, long-standing, political regimes. Next, I turn to a discussion of the specific assumptions and hypotheses concerning the relationship between nascent political regimes and interstate conflict.

Initially, there are two assumptions. First, I assume that the political regime is, as Easton (1957) argues, the rules and norms present in a political system. Second, I assume that these rules and norms are embodied in the political institutions established in the political system. I note two subsidiary assumptions. First, the presence of specific political institutions in a political system does not mean that: (a) the rules and norms associated with any of the institutions (e.g., legislative branch) are working effectively throughout the political system (i.e., the effectiveness of a democratic regime is a variable, not a constant); and (b) the development of the norms of behavior associated with a type of regime are, in part, a function of time. It is precisely the combination of these assumptions that lead, in part, to a set of hypotheses about the relationship between political regimes and interstate conflict.

3.2.4.1. Regime Change and Interstate Conflict

Next, I present some of the arguments, or scenarios, identified in the literature concerning the relationship between regime change and interstate conflict. This first set of arguments focuses on the effect a regime change has on a state's subsequent involvement in interstate conflict. There are four general scenarios. The first scenario is anchored in the notion that the constraints on available resources resulting from a regime change prevent action in foreign policy. These constraints obtain regardless of

the type of regime resulting from the transition process. The core idea here is that regime changes are often exhausting processes for the winners and losers in the domestic political system. Therefore, new political leaders, be they democratic or autocratic, focus the limited resources they have at their disposal on domestic policies, and they are less capable of pursuing initiatives in foreign policy. As such, political leaders are more inclined to respond to domestic policy problems with domestic instruments—ranging from food subsidization to repression—rather than engaging in generally costly, and often risky, gambles by engaging in interstate conflict as a method by which to address domestic policy problems. Given this argument, the occurrence of a regime change should be followed by a decrease in foreign policy activity.²¹

In a second scenario leader behavior in foreign policy is predicated on the type of political system emerging from the regime change. Leaders in new democracies are argued to be more inclined to use domestic levers at their disposal to ease a state through the stresses and strains accompanying (and perhaps preceding) the regime change. This is not to argue that the domestic policies of new democratic leaders will necessarily be benign. Initially, these political leaders may introduce policies that are quite severe in order to further the survival of their position in the new democratic regime. In this scenario, new democratic leaders are hard pressed to exploit the well known “rally-around-the-flag” dynamic in such a new political system. Therefore, the option of engaging in risky gambles abroad is not likely to be available, and again we should find a decrease in such activity.²²

The second scenario predicts a very different outcome for the leaders of new autocratic regimes. Here leaders in new autocratic regimes often have close ties to, or are part of, the military

²¹ There is also reason to believe that regime changes should have some measurable impact on a state’s level of cooperation, as well. One can certainly conceive of alternative reasons why a state’s level of cooperation should increase or decrease following a regime change.

²² A further argument is that new democracies may receive greater external assistance in the form of financial or military support than their autocratic counterparts, for example.

apparatus. The regime change itself is violent, or the demise of the previous regime carried out with the support by the military branches of the government. New autocratic regimes, then, are often borne of force, and force is often a primary ingredient in autocratic leaders' policymaking, as well as the primary instrument for establishing legitimacy domestically and internationally (Maoz 1989, 1996a). As a result, leaders of new autocratic regimes are more likely to view the use of force abroad as a viable response to problems arising domestically, as well as to establish themselves in the community of nations. As such, an autocratic regime change should be followed by increases in the interstate conflict involvement of the state.

A third scenario is rooted in the notion that the presence of democratic institutions lowers the likelihood that states will engage in conflict abroad. Citizens in democracies are less likely to sanction their leaders' engagement in costly interstate conflicts, such as war, and are therefore likely to punish those that do (Rummel 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). Democratic leaders, then, pursue less conflictual avenues for settling interstate disputes. By extension, states that undergo a regime change toward a more democratic form of government should be less inclined to engage in interstate conflict. In general, this scenario suggests that a democratic regime change should have a negative effect on a state's subsequent conflict involvement, while a positive effect should obtain following an autocratic regime change.

A fourth, and final, scenario suggests that the political dynamics generated by democratic regime change make it more likely that leaders in these states will become involved in war, an argument introduced by Mansfield and Snyder (1995a-b, 1996). Why are new democratic regimes more war-prone? Mansfield and Snyder (26) argue that democratization often results in a period of "political impasse," whereby it is difficult for new leaders not only to build policy coalitions, but also to retain power. Under these circumstances the likelihood of new democracies initiating war with other states increases (33).

The four scenarios that I have outlined above suggest that regime changes may have several distinct effects on states' subsequent involvement in interstate conflict. Obviously, the boundary between the national-level and interstate-level of analysis is crossed when a regime change causes the state undergoing such a change to initiate conflict abroad. Yet the literature also presents arguments about the interstate behavior of stable states toward those states undergoing regime changes. Next, I discuss briefly some of these arguments.

Maoz (1989, 1996a-b) proposes a set of models linking state development processes with the occurrence of interstate conflict at the national, interstate, and systemic levels. Likewise, leaders in stable states may use force against the revolutionary state in an attempt to restrain the latter from projecting its revolutionary fervor abroad, or in an effort to retransform the fledgling regime. Central to Maoz's first interstate-level scenario is the notion that the occurrence of a regime change is a signal of interstate weakness. This argument is basically a derivative of the earlier national-level scenario linking regime changes and policy resources. The basic idea here is that stable states perceive that the occurrence of a domestic political regime change in another state provides stable states the opportunity to pressure the new regime, possibly militarily. Regime changes may weaken both the ability of changing states to respond to such pressure in kind, as well as their resolve in costly disputes.

A second scenario centers on the notion that domestic political regime changes increase interstate uncertainty about the balance of power in the interstate system. Walt (1992) claims that the causal linkage between national revolution and interstate aggression emerges from a dynamic whereby revolutions increase the level of threat perception between revolutionary and stable states. In turn, Walt (1992) reasons that this threat dynamic magnifies interstate uncertainties about possible shifts in the distribution of power, heightens revolutionary state and stable states' perceptions of vulnerability, and increases the likelihood of interstate war.

3.2.4.2. Hypotheses

With reference to aforementioned arguments, I can now construct a basic framework of assumptions and hypotheses about the relationship between political regime change and interstate conflict.

Assumption 1: The newer (older) a political regime, the higher (lower) level of perceived uncertainty and vulnerability for domestic political actors.

Assumption 2: The newer (older) a political regime, the higher (lower) level of perceived uncertainty and vulnerability for other interstate actors.

Assumption 3: The higher (lower) level of domestic uncertainty and vulnerability, the higher (lower) probability policy-makers within the regime will respond to this condition by resorting to some form of interstate conflict.

∴ Hypothesis 3 (Political Regime Change–Interstate Conflict): The greater (lesser) proximity of a political regime change, the higher (lower) probability of interstate conflict between the new regime and other states.

Given the discussion above, I also introduce two corollaries to the third hypothesis about the expected effects of types of regime change, democratic or autocratic, on the likelihood of subsequent interstate conflict. As I discussed earlier, the literature suggests that democratizing states are both more, and less, conflict-prone in the short term. The literature also advances arguments suggesting that autocratizing states are also more conflict prone. Therefore, it is important to begin plumbing this variation in interstate behavior as a function of the type of regime change, and I do so by formulating two corollaries to Hypothesis 3 linking types of regime change with interstate conflict:

∴ Hypothesis 3.1 (Democratic Regime Change–Interstate Conflict): The greater (lesser) proximity of a democratic political regime change, the higher (lower) probability of interstate conflict.

∴ Hypothesis 3.2 (Autocratic Regime Change–Interstate Conflict): The greater (lesser) proximity of a democratic political regime change, the higher (lower) probability of interstate conflict.

3.2.4.3. Conclusions

The hypotheses I present in this section are straightforward. They build off the long-standing notion in the literature that political change results in uncertainty and vulnerability and these conditions in turn set the stage for some form of interstate conflict.

3.2.5. The Political Authorities and Interstate Conflict

In this final section, I discuss the relationship between political authorities and interstate conflict.²³ The assumptions and hypotheses regarding this relationship also draw on the common threads of vulnerability and aggression using a logic similar to the treatment of political regime change. However, the generalizable connection between leaders, and leadership change, and foreign policy is rather recent, and this requires some elaboration. As I have noted above, I begin by identifying some prior assumptions about the relationship between leaders and foreign policy, and then move to state the logic of the arguments more specifically.

The idea that individual leaders, or groups of leaders, significantly affect states' foreign policies does not appear, *prima facie*, to be implausible. As I made reference to earlier, consideration of the role of leaders in foreign policy has, in part, been minimized by neo-realism's emphasis on the nation-state and the distribution of capabilities, and the unattractive aspects of foreign policy explanations based solely on individual, or unique, leader behavior. Recently, literature considers the

²³ Hereafter, I use the term "leaders" interchangeably with Easton's term "political authorities."

possible generalizable impact of leaders, their preferences (e.g., survival), and leadership changes, on foreign policy behavior.

The primary assumption is that foreign policy behavior is in larger part a product of domestic political leaders' preferences, with the primary preference being survival in power. As Salmore and Salmore (1978) argue, decisions to cooperate or fight with other nation-states, for example, are a function of the political authorities' domestic political capacity. As such, leadership change may correspond with variations in preferences over foreign policy, and, by extension, subsequent changes in foreign policy behavior.

However, an additional dimension of the relationship between political leaders and foreign policy emerges when I move to include the familiar notions of vulnerability and aggression discussed in the previous sections. Doing so adds a temporal component to the conceptualization of the leadership–foreign policy relationship. New leaders are often vulnerable and uncertain. Similar to leaders in new regimes, leaders in other states are uncertain about a new leader's (a) resolve, and (b) commitment to previous agreements (see Blainey, 1988 [1973]). For these reasons, then, leaders in stable states are hypothesized to be more willing to exert pressure on new leaders through various forms of confrontation and cooperation.

3.2.5.1. Hypotheses

Having sketched some of the underlying rationale of the political authority–foreign policy relationship, I now identify it more formally.

Assumption 1: Leaders' policy preferences affect interstate behavior.

Assumption 2: Leadership turnover increases the probability of different preferences arising over foreign and domestic policies.

Assumption 3: Greater (lesser) frequencies of leadership change results in higher (lower) levels of uncertainty for unchanging states regarding the intentions of those states experiencing leadership change.

Assumption 4: Higher (lower) levels of uncertainty result in a higher (lower) probability of the occurrence of interstate aggression.

∴ Hypothesis 4 (Leadership Turnover–Interstate Conflict): The greater (lesser) the frequency of leadership turnover in a state, the higher (lower) probability that this state will become involved in some form of subsequent interstate conflict.

∴ Hypothesis 5 (Proximity of Leadership Change–Interstate Conflict): The greater (lesser) the proximity of a leadership change for a state, the higher (lower) probability of that state becoming involved in an interstate conflict.

3.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, I identify some of the basic assumptions and hypotheses in the literature regarding the relationship between domestic political systems and foreign policy. Addressing the components of Easton's political system—the community, the regime, and the authorities—I outline how conditions associated with these components affect interstate behavior. In general, the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures hypothesize linkages between state vulnerability and interstate aggression.

In the next three chapters, I test the validity of these hypotheses across several operationalizations of the general dependent variable, interstate conflict. First, I test the aforementioned hypotheses on a measure of general interstate conflict capturing a range of interstate behavior from verbal exchanges to extensive war acts. Second, I test the hypotheses on a specific form of interstate conflict, militarized interstate disputes. Lastly, I examine the impact of these political system components on the occurrence of the most extreme form of interstate conflict, war.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND GENERAL INTERSTATE CONFLICT

4.1. Introduction

A number of scholars have acknowledged, at least implicitly, the following ideas. First, that interstate conflict is a process, not a series of interactions occurring in a vacuum. Therefore, in many cases the act of war can be considered the result of a complex chain of conflictual events. Second, political leaders have a range, or menu, of actions available to them in foreign policy. That is, political leaders are not limited to the dichotomous choice of starting, or not starting, a full-scale war with another state. Rather, these leaders may resort to varying levels of conflict-related pressure in order to achieve their goals. In the following chapter I investigate whether the set of hypotheses identified in chapter three are supported across a range of conflictual foreign policy behavior.

This chapter is structured in the following manner. First, I recapitulate some of the theory and hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter. Second, I present a series of empirical tests of the hypotheses, as well as some initial conclusions. Finally, I draw some conclusions about the individual and collective implications of the empirical results for the propositions of interest.

4.2. Theory and Hypotheses

One of the primary reasons for studying the causes and effects of militarized forms of interstate conflict, such as disputes and wars, is that these events form the basis of some of the most catastrophic interactions between states, often with the long-term local, regional, and global

consequences. Yet despite their magnitude and generally far-reaching impact, these events are, probabilistically speaking, spatially and temporally infrequent. One might go so far as to surmise that these militarized foreign policy actions, as policy goals, do not constitute the primary course of day-to-day interaction between the average pair(s) of states. Rather, the majority of the interactions between states across time are non-military in nature.

Therefore, my argument is that even within the context of the vulnerability and aggression dynamic, it is a reasonable contention that policy makers, as Maoz (1996) argues, may do two things. First, while policy makers are faced with the dichotomous choice of deciding to use force, or not, using force does not require solely the choice of starting a war, or not: a "menu for choice" (Russett and Starr, 1996) is likely available. Second, the linkage between the escalation and severity of interstate conflict is precisely the type of dynamic leaders would prefer if they plan, for instance, to engage in interstate conflict in order to consolidate their position of power domestically (perhaps following a regime change.) As such, leaders may be capable of countering a vulnerable domestic situation by employing verbally conflictual actions (e.g., threats, ambassadorial recall, etc.), rather than military force, for example.

Given that only a small percentage of the foreign policy actions by states involve the use of military force, it is important to explore how characteristics of the domestic political system affect the day-to-day use of conflict by political leaders in foreign policy. With this general goal in mind, the remainder of this chapter is intended to explore these non-militarized dimensions of foreign policy in addition to conflictual behavior and the implications for the hypotheses identified in the third chapter.

4.3. Analyses

4.3.1. The Political Community and General Conflict

4.3.1.1. Polity Persistence

The first hypothesis posits a negative relationship between political community persistence and interstate conflict. In this section of the paper, I test the empirical relationship between the persistence of the political community and patterns of interstate conflict sent and received by that political community.

With respect to the interstate conflict data used for the dependent variable, I employ the actor and target conflict data available in the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948-78 (Azar, 1993: see Appendix A for a complete discussion of the descriptive characteristics of these data.) The seven actor and target conflict types, in addition to their respective abbreviations, are as follows: Mild Verbal Demands (MV), Strong Verbal Demands (SV), Diplomatic-Economic Hostility (DEH), Political Military Hostility (PMH), Small Scale Military Acts (SSM), Limited War Acts (LW), and Extensive War Acts (EW). In its raw form, the COPDAB data are event counts of conflictual behavior sent and received by nations are represented by these seven categories.

In the analysis that follows, I sum the frequency of actor and target conflict events per country per year, and then multiply these aggregate figures by the appropriate COPDAB international weighting scale value (see discussion of this scale in Appendix A.) Having done so, I then sum these weighted aggregated values per country per year to arrive at two measures: total actor conflict and total target conflict. With respect to the independent variable, political community persistence, I use the log of the number of years identified by Gurr, et al. (1989) as the length of time a polity has persisted since the last abrupt polity change.

Below, the data are organized in a time-series–ross-sectional (TSCS) arrangement, with state-year serving as the unit of analysis. In order to estimate the statistical relationship between these two variables, I regress the natural log of the respective totals of actor and target conflict per country-year on the natural log of polity persistence in two separate ordinary least squares (OLS) models. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Political Community Persistence and
COPDAB Total Conflict, 1948-78.

Variable		Total Actor Conflict ^a	Total Target Conflict ^a
Polity Persistence ^b	coef.	-.039	-.019
	s.e.	.022	.026
	p	.080	.462
Constant		1.595	1.472
		.095	.093
		.000	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1} ^c		.667	.643
		.014	.013
		.000	.000
Adj. R ²		0.453	0.413
B-P χ^2 (df=2) ^d		.000	.000
p of B-P χ^2		192.325	93.98
N		3,201	3,201

Note: Probabilities are two-tailed. OLS models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aLog(total weighted events per nation-year).

^bPolity persistence is from Gurr, et al. (1989).

^cOne-year lag of respective COPDAB total target and actor variable.

^dBreusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) correction for heteroskedasticity.

In the first model, where the dependent variable is total actor conflict, the ratio of the coefficient and the standard error for the log of polity persistence indicates that there is a statistically significant (one-tailed) and negative relationship between the two variables. Therefore, the longer a polity persists, the lower the level of conflict that the polity sends to other states, a finding that jibes with


the finding reported by Oneal, et al. (1996). Conversely, the shorter the polity's persistence the greater the level of conflict it sends to other states.

Turning to the right-hand panel of Table 4.1, where the dependent variable is total target conflict, there appears to be no statistically significance relationship between the two variables. That is, the log of polity persistence of the political system has no statistically significant impact on the level of conflict received (although the sign of the coefficient is negative, which is consistent with the dependent variable in the previous panel.) Therefore, I can conclude that older political systems do not receive significantly greater levels of interstate conflict compared to new political systems.

Given the results reported in Table 4.1, it is clear that a statistical relationship obtains between polity persistence and total actor conflict. However, an important question concerns not solely the statistical significance of the relationship between the polity persistence and total actor and target conflict, but the substantive impact of the former on the latter. That is, if I am to translate the effect of polity persistence on these to measures of interstate conflict, what sort of change is predicted to occur?

Figure 4.1 illustrates the estimated impact of a hypothetical range of values for the log of polity persistence on the log total actor conflict using the significant coefficient reported in the left-hand panel of Table 4.1.

Figure 4.1. Predicted Impact of Polity Persistence on Total Actor Conflict, 1948-78



From the shape of the line plotted in Figure 4.1, it is evident that the overall relationship between the two variables is negative, as suggested by the sign of the coefficient for the log of polity persistence in Table 4.1. However, judging from the changes in the level values on the y-axis across the range of values for the log of polity persistence on the x-axis, it is evident that the actual impact of the latter on the former is not terribly large. In the next section of this chapter, I expand my empirical analysis of the relationship between the political system interstate conflict to include political climate.

4.3.1.2. Political Climate

4.3.1.2.1. Protest and Rebellion and Government Instability

In the third chapter, I also introduced hypotheses about the relationship between a second aspect of the political community, political climate, and foreign policy behavior. Grounded in the two notions of vulnerability and aggression, the second hypothesis identifies a positive relationship between

poor political climate and the occurrence of interstate conflict. Specifically, I propose that political systems experiencing high levels of domestic turmoil (i.e., a poor political community climate) should experience higher levels of subsequent interstate conflict.

In this section I test whether this hypothesis is supported empirically using two strategies. First, I examine the relationship between two dimensions of domestic conflict, protest and rebellion and government instability and the measures of interstate conflict derived from the COPDAB data set. Second, I examine the relationship between the most severe form of turmoil in political system, civil war, and the same set of interstate conflict measures.

In order to generate the first two domestic political climate dimensions, I use the domestic conflict data contained in Banks' (1996a-b) Cross-Polity-Time-Series Data Archive. These data record event count information for eight domestic conflict categories, including riots, revolutions, strikes, anti-government demonstrations, assassinations, guerrilla warfare, major government crises, and cabinet changes for the period 1919-92. I use factor analysis to derive two dimensions of domestic conflict from these eight event counts.²⁴ I refer to these dimensions as (1) protest, and (2) rebellion and government instability. Generating these two factors allows me to assign factor scores to each observation in the pooled, cross-sectional data set (I discuss the factor analysis procedures at length in Appendix A.)

Having generated these two measures of domestic political climate, I then regress the COPDAB measures of total actor conflict and total target conflict on one-year lags of the measures of protest and rebellion and government instability. The results of these OLS estimates are reported in Table 4.2.

²⁴ See Appendix A for a lengthier discussion of this procedure.

Table 4.2. Impact of Domestic Conflict on COPDAB
Total Conflict, 1948-78.

Variable	Total Actor ^a				Total Target ^a			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Protest _{t-1} ^b	.119	.019	6.32	.000	.157	.023	6.73	.000
Rev. and								
Gov. Inst. _{t-1} ^c	.078	.021	3.72	.000	.066	.023	2.85	.004
Constant	1.464	.075	19.43	.000	1.413	.067	20.96	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1} ^c	.665	.014	47.24	.000	.631	.014	45.64	.000
Adj. R ²	.472				.425			
B-P χ^2 (df=2) ^d	190				90			
p of B-P χ^2	.000				.000			
N	3,139				3,139			

Note: OLS models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aLog(total weighted events per nation-year).

^bFactor scores (principle components, varimax normalized) of weighted Banks (1993, 1996) domestic conflict events.


^cOne-year lag of COPDAB Actor and Target, respectively, to reduce autocorrelation.

^dBreusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) correction for heteroskedasticity.

The left-hand panel of Table 4.2 reports the estimated impact of one-year lags of protest and rebellion and government instability on total actor conflict. The t-ratios indicate that one-year lags of each dimension of domestic political climate have a significant and positive relationship with the log of the weighted value for total actor conflict. That is, political communities experiencing high levels in the two dimensions of domestic conflict last year send, or initiate, significantly greater levels of interstate conflict during the current year. Reviewing the results in the right-hand panel of Table 4.2, where the dependent variable is total target conflict, similar results obtain. Specifically, statistically significant and positive coefficients are estimated for the protest and rebellion and government instability. Thus, states with poor political climates receive greater levels of conflict.

In keeping with the earlier analysis, it is important not only to establish the statistical significance of the relationship between the variables of interest, but also to assess the magnitude of the effect. In Figure 4.2, I illustrate the change in the log of total actor conflict across a hypothetical range of the two domestic conflict dimensions, protest and rebellion and government instability.

Figure 4.2. Impact of Domestic Conflict on Total Actor Conflict, 1948-78



It is evident from the slope of each line in Figure 4.2 that higher values for the domestic conflict dimensions (arrayed along the x-axis) correspond with higher values for the log of total actor conflict (arrayed along the y-axis.) However, as with the earlier illustrate in Figure 4.1, while the domestic political conflict coefficients are statistically significantly related to subsequent to interstate, the magnitude of this impact is marginal. Having said this, the statistical evidence supports the hypothesis that those political systems experiencing political instability exhibit higher levels of interstate conflict, both sent and received.

4.3.1.2.2. Civil Wars

To examine the impact of the most severe form of unrest in a political system I use two measures of the impact of civil war on interstate conflict, each from the Correlates of War (COW) project's list of civil wars for the period 1816-1992 (see Singer and Small, 1994). To do so, first I generate a dichotomous measure of ongoing civil wars by coding the years including, and between, the

start and end years of civil wars with a value of 1, and 0 otherwise, across the TSCS data set. Second, I create a variable measuring the impact of the post-civil war period on levels of interstate conflict. I do so by creating a second dichotomous variable coded a 1 for the ten-year period following the terminal year of a civil war, and 0 otherwise, across the TSCS data set. In the following statistical analysis, then, I regress the aggregate measures of interstate conflict used in the previous models (the logs of total actor and target conflict), on the measures of ongoing civil wars and the post-civil war periods.

The results of the OLS estimation of the impact of the two civil war measures are reported in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3. Impact of Civil War on the Log of COPDAB Total Actor and Target Conflict, 1948-78.

Variable	Total Actor ^a				Total Target ^a			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Ongoing Civil War ^b	.462	.160	2.89	.004	.352	.175	2.01	.044
Post-civil War _{t-10} ^b	.149	.126	1.19	.236	.018	.127	0.14	.888
Constant	1.343	.070	19.08	.000	1.327	.065	20.54	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1} ^c	.688	.013	52.64	.000	.655	.013	51.71	.000
Adj. R ²	.483				.429			
B-P χ^2 (df=3) ^d	180.9				87.3			
p of B-P χ^2	<.000				<.000			
N	3,345				3,345			

Note: OLS models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aLog(total weighted events per nation-year).

^bCivil war duration and post period are dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 during a civil war and following, respectively, and 0 otherwise.

^cOne-year lag of COPDAB Actor and Target, respectively, to reduce autocorrelation.


^dBreusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) correction for heteroskedasticity.

The t-ratios for the two independent variables in the left-hand panel of Table 4.3 indicate that only the measure of ongoing civil wars is statistically significantly related to the log of actor and target total conflict. This means that political systems experiencing civil war are estimated to exhibit significantly higher levels of interstate conflict, both sent and received, than are those political systems not experiencing this form of domestic upheaval.

Given the statistical insignificance of the coefficients for the variable measuring the post-civil war period, it is evident that these events do not exhibit significant residual effects on this aspect of states' foreign policies. That is, the level of interstate conflict sent and received during the post-civil war period is not significantly greater than the average level of the log of total actor and target conflict across TSCS data.

As with the earlier sets of analyses, in addition to the importance of determining the statistical significance of the relationships between the variables of interest, it is also important to calculate the magnitude of the effect of, for example, ongoing civil wars, on levels of interstate conflict. In order to do so, in Table 4.3 I plot the estimated change in the log of total actor conflict given the absence and presence of an ongoing civil war.

Figure 4.3. Impact of Ongoing Civil War on Total Actor Conflict, 1948-78



As is evident from histogram reported in Figure 4.3, the presence of an ongoing civil war increases the level of contemporaneous total actor conflict (and, although I do not illustrate it here, total target conflict). The occurrence of a civil war in a particular country (a change in a value of 0 to 1 along the x-

axis) raises the value of the log of total actor conflict from approximately 346.85 to approximately 347.3, a marginal increase.

4.3.1.3. Conclusions

My interim conclusions with respect to the relationship between domestic political climate and interstate conflict are as follows:

- The longer a political community persists, the lower the level of total conflict sent by that political community to other states:
- No statistically significant relationship obtains between political community persistence and total target conflict:
- There is a positive relationship between the two dimensions of domestic political conflict, protest and rebellion and government instability, and subsequent interstate conflict sent and received:
- Political systems experiencing civil war are likely to send and to receive significantly greater levels of interstate conflict than are states not undergoing these types of domestic political upheaval: and
- Civil wars appear to have no significant residual impact on the levels of interstate conflict.

Next, I turn to the analysis of the impact of regime changes on the level of interstate conflict.

4.3.2. The Political Regime and COPDAB Conflictual Events

In this section, I shift to a discussion of the relationship between domestic political regime change and interstate conflict. Recall that the hypotheses regarding regime changes and foreign policy advanced by the literature are grounded in the twin concepts I discuss at length in the second chapter: vulnerability and aggression. In short, states undergoing autocratic and democratic regime changes are hypothesized to be more or less conflict prone following such changes.

4.3.2.1. Measuring Regime Change

To measure changes in political regimes, I use the institutional democracy score from the recently updated Gurr, et al. (1989) data set on polity attributes (see Gurr, et al. 1996; Jagers and Gurr 1995), Polity III.²⁵ I construct a set of variables incorporating three dimensions of regime change: (1) location; (2) magnitude; and (3) direction. By location I mean the regime-type (or value on the democracy scale) that a state's regime changes from. Magnitude measures the extent (or distance) of the change along the democracy scale. Lastly, direction measures whether the regime change constitutes a positive (more democratic) or negative (less democratic) change relative to the highest democracy value on the scale (i.e., +10).

Creating a regime change measure incorporating location, magnitude, and direction criteria necessitates identifying a threshold value between democratic and autocratic regimes. Generally, the quantitative world politics literature (e.g., see Bremer 1992; Gleditsch 1995) resorts to the convention whereby a value of ≥ 6 on the eleven-point (0 to +10) polity institutional democracy scale indicates a democratic regime, while a value of ≤ 5 on the same scale indicates an autocratic regime.

I use this threshold, in addition to the aforementioned concepts of location, magnitude, and direction, to identify eight types of regime changes, two general categories and six disaggregated categories. These variables are defined in Table 4.4.²⁶

²⁵ This version of the data set contains the eleven-point (0-10) democracy variable defined in Gurr, et al. (1989: 37). Temporally, the Polity III data include the years 1800-1993, although I apply empirical tests to the overlapping temporal domains of the Polity III and COW data sets, 1816-1992. I use the COW interstate system membership list as the determining criterion for inclusion in the final data matrix.

²⁶ Mansfield and Snyder are primarily interested in the effects of general democratic and autocratic regime transitions on interstate war. However, their use of the Maoz and Russett (1993) continuous regime-type scale requires the consideration of transitions to and from anocratic, regime types. Maoz and Russett introduce this category as way to capture those unconsolidated, mixed regimes containing democratic and autocratic attributes. By extension, as Maoz and Russett (1993) and Maoz (1996) suggest, all regime changes do not result in stable polities, but may represent the breakdown of

Table 4.4. Regime Change Definitions

Variables	Direction of Regime Change ^a	Regime Location & Magnitude ^a	
		from	to
Democratization	+	any	any
Autocratization	-	any	any
Major Democratization	+	≤5	≥6
Consolidating Democracy	+	≥6	≥6
Retreating Democracy	-	≥6	≥6
Major Autocratization	-	≥6	≤5
Liberalizing Autocracy	+	≤5	≤5
Consolidating Autocracy	-	≤5	≤5

^aPolity II and III institutional democracy measure (see Gurr, et al. 1989, 1996; Jagers and Gurr 1995).

The first two variables in the table, democratization and autocratization reflect positive or negative changes in a state's democracy score, regardless of location or magnitude. The next six categories in Table 2 identify specific types of regime changes based on the three dimensions of direction, location, and magnitude. Major democratization identifies those positive changes that cross the regime-type threshold of ≥6. Consolidating democracy measures those positive changes ≥6 that fortify an existing democratic regime. Retreating democracy measures those negative changes ≥6 that restrict or eliminate some attributes of the democratic regime, but the regime still retains the basic institutional components of a democracy. Major autocratization measures a significant, negative change in the composition of the regime crossing the ≥6 threshold to a score of ≤5. Liberalizing autocracy measures an autocratic regime that has lifted some restrictions on democratic behavior, but still remains below the ≥6 threshold. Finally, consolidating autocracy indicates negative changes ≥6 that fortify the existing autocratic regime. To demonstrate how regimes may transform from one category to another, Table 4.5 contains a regime change matrix.

previously consolidated regimes. Therefore, in order to differentiate between transitions resulting in consolidated and unconsolidated regimes, as well as different types of democratic and autocratic regimes, I introduce regime change schema adapted from Jagers and Gurr (1995) and discussed below.

Table 4.5. Regime Change Matrix

		TO										
		10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
FROM	10		ED	ED	ED	ED	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA
	9	CD		ED	ED	ED	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA
	8	CD	CD		ED	ED	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA
	7	CD	CD	CD		ED	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA
	6	CD	CD	CD	CD		MA	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA
	5	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD		CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
	4	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD	LA		CA	CA	CA	CA
	3	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD	LA	LA		CA	CA	CA
	2	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD	LA	LA	LA		CA	CA
	1	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD	LA	LA	LA	LA		CA
	0	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD	LA	LA	LA	LA	LA	

Note: Scale values are the Gurr, et al. (1989, 1996)

measure of institutional democracy.

Key: MD=Major Democratization
 CD=Consolidating Democracy
 ED=Eroding Democracy
 MA=Major Autocratization
 LA=Liberalizing Autocracy
 CA=Consolidating Autocracy

All eight regime change variables are measured in the data set with a dichotomous variable assuming a value of 1 for time $t_0 \dots t_0+9$ years following the regime change (where t_0 is the first year of the new regime value) and 0 otherwise.²⁷ The frequency distribution for the eight measures of regime changes is reported in Table 4.6.

²⁷In instances where the length of a country series is less than 10 years (due to missing data observations, the duration of the state in the system, another regime change, etc.), I construct the dichotomous variable for the maximum number of years allowed by the series. I do not directly interpret the interregnum transition regimes contained in the *Polity III* set (i.e., codes of -66, -77, -88, and -99). However, if a comparison of a state's democracy score prior to and following a transition period reveals a difference in the democracy scores between time t and time $t-n$, then the appropriate regime change was coded. It has become common practice when using the *Polity* data series to remove from any analysis those observations containing the four interregnum codes. Yet doing so is troubling in that it eliminates a significant number of observations on the dependent variable. As a result, the baseline for the dependent variable across the data series may be altered significantly, and this in turn may have an effect on the significance level of various relationships. Therefore, I include these interregnum observations in the empirical analysis that follows.

Table 4.6. Regime Change
Frequencies, 1948-78

Regime Change Type	freq.	%
Democratization	74	41%
Autocratization	108	59%
Total	182	
Major Democratization	24	13%
Consolidating Democracy	11	6%
Retreating Democracy	10	5%
Major Autocratization	30	16%
Liberalizing Autocracy	39	21%
Consolidating Autocracy	68	37%
Total	182	

Note: frequency counts are derived from the Gurr, et al. (1989, 1996) measure of institutional democracy, and updates in Jagers and Gurr (1995).

Table 4.6 reports some interesting information about the distribution of regime changes across the two general disaggregated categories. In particular, the inferences one might draw from the general regime change measures change considerably when one considers the six disaggregated measures of regime change. For example, of the 182 total regime changes during 1948-78 interval, 41% (74/182) are in the democratic direction, while 59% (108/182) are in the autocratic direction.

However, about 58% (107/182) of the regime changes take place on the autocratic "end" of the democracy scale continuum (i.e., between institutional democracy values ≤ 5), as indicated by the measures of liberalizing autocracy and consolidated autocracy. As such, most regime changes during this period involve autocratic regimes that are either liberalizing or consolidating. Furthermore, including the frequency for major autocratic transitions in this total, the percentage increases too roughly 74% (137/182) of the total number of transitions in the sample. The frequency counts reported in Table 4.5 suggest that the period 1948-78 is one that reflects high autocratization and low democratization. To use Huntington's (1991) phrasing, this period represents a "trough" between the second and third waves of

democracy. In fact, this period captures of the erosion of democracies and the autocratization of many former colonies.

4.3.2.2. Regime Changes and Total Conflict

Next, I carry out a set of empirical analyses that are similar to those I executed above. First, I examine the impact of democratic and autocratic regime changes, as well as their respective subtypes, on the two aggregate indicators of conflict, the natural logs of total actor conflict and target total conflict. The results of the four models where actor and target total conflict are regressed on the various regime changes are reported in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7. Regime Change and COPDAB Actor and Target Conflict, 1948-78.

Variable	Total Actor ^a				Total Target ^a			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Democratization ^b	.236	.096	2.46	.014	.014	.108	0.13	.894
Autocratization ^b	.078	.075	1.04	.298	.016	.082	0.20	.844
Constant	1.440	.078	18.45	.000	1.406	.073	19.26	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1} ^c	.669	.014	47.57	.000	.645	.013	48.02	.000
Adj. R ²	.458				.417			
B-P χ^2 (df=3) ^d	180				93			
p of B-P χ^2	<.000				<.000			
N	3,123				3,123			
Major Democratization ^b	.317	.136	2.33	.020	.167	.161	1.04	.298
Consolidating Democracy ^b	.161	.196	0.82	.413	-.013	.199	-0.07	.947
Retreating Democracy ^b	.378	.184	2.06	.040	.574	.170	3.38	.001
Major Autocratization ^b	.253	.126	2.01	.045	.168	.147	1.14	.254
Liberalizing Autocracy ^b	.210	.149	1.42	.157	-.092	.171	-0.54	.588
Consolidating Autocracy ^b	-.018	.091	-0.20	.841	-.110	.099	-1.11	.267
Constant	1.453	.078	18.56	.000	1.424	.073	19.43	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1}	.666	.014	47.12	.000	.640	.014	47.30	.000
Adj. R ²	0.46				0.42			
B-P χ^2 (df=7)	189				107			
p of B-P χ^2	<.000				<.000			
N	3,123				3,123			

Note: OLS models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aLog(total weighted events per nation-year).

^bRegime change variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for ten-years following, and including, the year of change, and 0 otherwise.

^cOne-year lag of COPDAB Actor and Target, respectively, to reduce autocorrelation.

^dBreusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) correction for heteroskedasticity.

First, I consider the analysis of the general regime change variables in the upper-half of the table. Upon regressing the measure of total actor conflict on the two measures of general regime change, democratization and autocratization, it is evident that only the former achieves conventional levels of statistical significance. Specifically, the results here suggest that political systems that undergo democratic regime changes, on average, send significantly more total conflict to other states. Although the coefficient for autocratization is positively signed, it is not statistically significant from zero. Shifting attention to the top, right-hand panel of Table 4.7, it is apparent that neither democratic, nor autocratic,


regime changes have any statistically significant impact on the level conflict the state undergoing the regime change receives.

Given the empirical findings I have identified with the general indicators of regime change, it is necessary to disaggregate these general variables into their component parts, and I do so on the lower half of Table 4.7. Examining the results in the lower, left-hand panel of the table, it is evident that subdividing the regime change categories provides further insight into just which types of regime change are responsible for the general empirical findings. For instance, the variable measuring major democratization is statistically significant and positively signed; this relationship jibes with the statistical strength and sign of the general indicator in the upper half of the table. However, the coefficients for major autocratization and retreating democracy are also positively signed and statistically significant, relationships that are apparently attenuated by the negatively signed coefficient for consolidating autocracy.

Turning now to the OLS estimates in the lower, right-hand panel of the table, some interesting results emerge. Most importantly, the coefficient for retreating democracy is statistically significant and positively signed a relationship that evidently washes out in the aggregate results. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient for retreating democracy (0.57) is greater than the remaining coefficients for regime changes in the table. As such, it appears that of the six different types of regime changes I have identified for this analysis, only democracies that are in the process of breaking down (retreating democracy) are, on average, are likely to receive, or be the targets of, greater conflict sent by other states.

As in the earlier analyses, it is important not only to determine the strength of the statistical relationships between the variables of interest, but also the estimated magnitude of the change in one variable given another variable. Figure 4.4. maps the statistically significant coefficients from the aggregated and disaggregated analyses from Table 4.7 where the dependent variable is the natural log of total actor conflict.

Figure 4.4. Impact of Various Regime Changes on Subsequent Total Actor Conflict, 1948-78



Again, it is evident that the general relationship between regime change and total actor conflict is positive: different regime change types vary only in the magnitude to which they affect changes in the dependent variable.

4.3.2.3. Regime Change and Disaggregated Total Conflict

Having examined the impact of types of regime change on actor and target total conflict, I turn now to an analysis of the disaggregated COPDAB conflict actions. Table 4.8 reports the results of the OLS models where the natural logs of the seven types of COPDAB actor conflict are regressed on the eight measures of regime change.

Table 4.8. Regime Change and Disaggregated Actor Conflict, 1948-78.

Variable		Disaggregated Actor Conflict Events ^a						
		MV	SV	DEH	PMH	SSM	LW	EW
Democratization ^b	coef.	.173	.102	.254	.254	.183	.064	-.107
	s.e.	.090	.101	.119	.130	.112	.092	.063
	p	.055	.314	.033	.050	.103	.489	.091
Autocratization ^b		.014	.030	.208	.348	.137	.045	.040
		.064	.081	.088	.093	.080	.069	.060
		.822	.710	.017	.000	.087	.513	.510
Constant		.956	1.268	1.127	.475	.475	.291	.186
		.045	.061	.053	.035	.035	.030	.025
		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1} ^c		.568	.602	.498	.497	.497	.572	.491
		.014	.014	.015	.020	.020	.025	.039
		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Adj. R ²		.325	.368	.253	.250	.250	.328	.241
B-P χ^2 (df=3) ^d		4.60	39.41	4.28	394.23	394.23	1050.04	2754.93
p of B-P χ^2		<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000
N		3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123
Major Democratization ^b	coef.	.236	.312	.455	.078	.225	-.140	-.087
	s.e.	.146	.158	.186	.219	.181	.123	.113
	p	.105	.047	.014	.723	.215	.256	.442
Consolidating Democracy ^b		.181	-.001	.195	.461	.060	.135	-.187
		.180	.200	.242	.244	.266	.201	.025
		.316	.998	.421	.059	.820	.502	.000
Retreating Democracy ^b		.321	.575	.551	.857	.597	.441	.427
		.210	.178	.255	.268	.272	.235	.252
		.126	.001	.031	.001	.029	.060	.090
Major Autocratization ^b		.134	.201	.402	.518	.197	.055	.089
		.117	.150	.167	.193	.174	.149	.138
		.251	.180	.016	.007	.256	.712	.517
Liberalizing Autocracy ^b		.123	-.012	.127	.300	.208	.189	-.087
		.133	.149	.177	.190	.155	.145	.098
		.354	.934	.474	.114	.180	.192	.376
Consolidating Autocracy ^b		-.066	-.100	.100	.225	.055	-.011	-.030
		.072	.096	.101	.105	.088	.075	.061
		.360	.301	.322	.032	.528	.879	.625
Constant		.964	1.285	1.133	.974	.479	.294	.187
		.045	.062	.053	.047	.035	.029	.025
		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1}		.565	.596	.496	.397	.493	.567	.487
		.015	.014	.015	.017	.020	.025	.039
		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Adj. R ²		.325	.369	.253	.172	.250	.329	.242
B-P χ^2 (df=7)		9.99	43.86	5.44	61.07	396.25	1047.20	2780.29
p of B-P χ^2		<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000
N		3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123

Note: Probabilities are two-tailed. OLS models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aLog(total weighted events per nation-year).

^bRegime change variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for ten-years following, and including, the year of change, and 0 otherwise.

^cOne-year lag of COPDAB Actor and Target, respectively, to reduce autocorrelation.

^dBreusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) correction for heteroskedasticity.

In the upper half of the table the results for democratization and autocratization are displayed for the seven categories of actor conflict behaviors. Corresponding to the significant coefficient for democratization in Table 4.7, several of the coefficients are statistically significant from zero (one-tailed.) Specifically, mild verbal demands, diplomatic-economic hostility, and political-military hostility are each statistically significant and positively related to democratic change. Interestingly, the coefficient for extensive war acts is statistically significant and negative, a finding that jibes with the analysis of the impact of democratization on war origination during the post-WWII period, although this relationship attenuates considerably in the aggregate analysis.

With respect to autocratization, some interesting results emerge as well. Recall that in Table 4.8, the coefficient for autocratization and actor total conflict is statistically insignificant. However, the disaggregation of total actor conflict variable reveals that autocratic regime change also has a positive impact on actor conflict. Specifically, autocratization significantly increases the subsequent levels of diplomatic-economic hostility, political-military hostility, and small scale military acts. Again, these results indicate the necessity of disaggregating the dependent and independent variables to facilitate identifying any significant relationships that may not obtain in the aggregate analysis.

Lastly, I turn to the disaggregated measure of target conflict. Table 4.9 reports the OLS estimates where the seven target conflict types have been regressed separately on the two general and six disaggregated regime change measures.

Table 4.9. Regime Change and Total Target Conflict, 1948-78.

Variable	Disaggregated Target Conflict Events ^a							
	MV	SV	DEH	PMH	SSM	LW	EW	
Democratization ^b	coef.	.014	-.056	-.048	-.304	.115	.015	-.002
	s.e.	.093	.097	.114	.108	.108	.090	.066
	p	.883	.564	.674	.005	.285	.865	.973
Autocratization ^b		-.008	.009	.003	-.009	.091	.046	-.005
		.063	.077	.087	.087	.079	.067	.053
		.903	.904	.968	.916	.249	.489	.925
Constant		.747	.943	1.060	.844	.464	.279	.163
		.040	.053	.050	.044	.034	.029	.023
		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1} ^c		.593	.660	.505	.438	.499	.567	.436
		.015	.012	.015	.019	.020	.025	.042
		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Adj. R ²		.349	.438	.253	.193	.250	.323	.197
B-P χ^2 (df=3) ^d		16.61	16.99	21.72	164.14	441.05	1068.78	3117.73
p of B-P χ^2		<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000
N		3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123
Major Democratization ^b	coef.	.067	.229	.102	-.293	.095	-.072	-.076
	s.e.	.153	.148	.181	.188	.164	.118	.085
	p	.663	.122	.574	.120	.561	.540	.373
Consolidating Democracy ^b		.038	-.202	.073	-.080	-.035	.051	.003
		.151	.172	.248	.228	.228	.221	.156
		.801	.241	.767	.726	.879	.818	.984
Retreating Democracy ^b		.506	.654	.558	.817	.785	.482	.110
		.167	.168	.227	.266	.272	.233	.221
		.003	.000	.014	.002	.004	.038	.620
Major Autocratization ^b		.152	.189	.110	.014	-.026	.003	.024
		.111	.147	.173	.181	.151	.132	.114
		.173	.198	.526	.938	.861	.979	.833
Liberalizing Autocracy ^b		-.039	-.213	-.222	-.421	.201	.066	.052
		.145	.150	.162	.143	.163	.134	.101
		.787	.155	.171	.003	.218	.623	.604
Consolidating Autocracy ^b		-.131	-.138	-.108	-.133	.034	.000	-.030
		.075	.090	.101	.098	.090	.075	.054
		.082	.126	.284	.173	.702	.998	.578
Constant		.759	.962	1.069	.854	.470	.282	.164
		.040	.054	.050	.044	.034	.029	.023
		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1}		.587	.653	.501	.431	.492	.562	.435
		.015	.013	.015	.018	.020	.025	.042
		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Adj. R ²		.351	.440	.254	.196	.252	.324	.197
B-P χ^2 (df=7)		33.66	26.12	22.56	157.01	424.69	1065.44	3183.66
p of B-P χ^2		<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000	<.000
N		3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123	3,123

Note: Probabilities are two-tailed. OLS models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aLog(total weighted events per nation-year).

^bRegime change variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for ten-years following, and including, the year of change, and 0 otherwise.

^cOne-year lag of COPDAB Actor and Target, respectively, to reduce autocorrelation.

^dBreusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) correction for heteroskedasticity.

With respect to the general indicators of regime change, the results from Table 4.6 are reflected across the disaggregated conflict measures. Specifically, only one of the coefficients for democratization, political-military hostility, is statistically significant from zero, and this is negatively signed. None of the coefficients for autocratization approach conventional levels of statistical significance. Turning to the lower panel of Table 4.9, it is clear that the sparse results from the Table 4.7 are repeated here. Only the variable retreating democracy exhibits any statistically significant coefficients, save the insignificant coefficient for extensive war acts.

4.3.2.4. Conclusions

In sum, the analyses of the relationship between regime change and actor and target conflict suggest several interesting findings. I summarize these as follows:

- Surprisingly, only the measure of democratization is statistically significant from zero when the dependent variable is total actor conflict. This suggests that new democratic regimes send significantly greater subsequent interstate conflict than non-changing states and those states that are autocratizing:
- Disaggregating the general regime change indicators reveals that the variable measuring major democratization is statistically significant and positively signed. The coefficients for major autocratization and retreating democracy are also positively-signed and statistically significant from zero, relationships that are apparently attenuated by the negatively-signed coefficient for consolidating autocracy: and
- A disaggregation of the two dependent variables, total actor and target conflict, reveals that while democratization and autocratization each significantly increase the level of actor conflict, these conflictual actions are concentrated primarily on the less severe end of the COPDAB scale. That is, new democracies may exhibit higher levels of interstate conflict that they send to other states, but these actions are concentrated on the verbal and economic end of

the COPDAB scale. Also, negatively signed coefficients prevail with respect to the military conflict categories on the scale.

Next, I turn the final set of empirical analyses in this chapter, an examination of the relationship between the political authorities and interstate conflict.

4.3.3. Political Authorities and Conflict

In this section of the paper, I examine the impact of the frequency and proximity of change in political authorities on interstate conflict. Recall that based on the notions of vulnerability and aggression, the sixth and seventh hypotheses anticipate a positive relationship between leadership turnover and interstate conflict. Here, I test these hypotheses with respect to the COPDAB measures of total actor and target conflict. In terms of my measure of leadership change, I rely primarily on Banks' (1996) measure of the yearly frequency of changes in a state's chief executive per year, supplemented with information from Banks (1976-93), Bienen and Van de Walle (1991), and Langville (1979).²⁸

In order to test the sixth and seventh hypotheses, I regress the natural log of total actor and target conflict on various length lags of the frequency of leadership changes. The results of these models are reported in Table 4.10. Due to the presence of high levels of multicollinearity when multiple lags of regime changes were included in the same model specification, the coefficients in Table 4.10 summarize the results from separate OLS equations.

²⁸ In order to measure leadership change, I use a variable identifying the frequency of changes in a state's chief executive during a given year from Banks' (1979) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. This data set records the frequency of such changes from 1816-1988, except during WWI (1914-18) and WWII (1940-45). I use Banks (1979-1993) and Bienen and Van de Walle (1991) to identify leader changes during the two war periods and from 1988-92.

Table 4.10. Leadership Change and
Total Target Conflict, 1948-78.

Variable		Total Actor	Total Target	N
Leader Change _{t-1} ^b	coef.	.038	-.057	3,320
	s.e.	.062	.071	
	p	.546	.421	
Leader Change _{t-2}		-.021	.077	3,165
		.060	.064	
		.728	.225	
Leader Change _{t-3}		.071	-.076	3,012
		.055	.070	
		.193	.276	
Leader Change _{t-4}		.068	.126	2,862
		.057	.066	
		.231	.057	
Leader Change _{t-5}		.113	.049	2,719
		.057	.065	
		.047	.452	

Note: Coefficients are from individual OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable and the Breusch and Pagan (1979) correction for heteroskedasticity. Probabilities are two-tailed. Estimation in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aLog(total weighted events per nation-year).

^bLeader change variable is a frequency count per nation-year from Banks (1996).

In the left-hand panel of Table 4.10, the measure of total actor conflict has been regressed separately on various length lags of the frequency of leadership changes. As is evident from a review of the t-ratios for the respective coefficients, none of the coefficients, save the five-year lag, are statistically significant from zero. This also appears to be the case when we consider the relationship between the lagged frequency of leadership change and total target conflict.

On the whole, then, leadership changes appear to have no consistent cross-temporal effect on the level of interstate conflict sent or received by a state. These results fail to suggest much in the way of support for the hypotheses regarding the impact of leadership change on interstate conflict. Political systems that experience a high frequency of leadership turnover do not send or receive significantly more interstate conflict.

4.3.4. Unified Model of the Political System and General Interstate Conflict

In the previous sections of this chapter, I examined the individual impact of the three political system components, community, regime, and authorities, on the level and type of conflict sent and received by states. In this final section, I present a unified empirical analysis of the relationship between the political system components and of interstate conflict. The operationalization of the variables, as well as the sample of states, is identical to those discussed earlier, although the precise number of observations may vary slightly given the spatial and temporal overlap of multiple data sources.

In Table 4.11 I report the results of two OLS models where the measures of total actor and target conflict are regressed on all eight measures of the political system that I have discussed above.

Table 4.11. Unified Model of the Political System and Total Conflict . 1948-78.

Variable	Actor ^a				Target ^a			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Polity Persistence	-.021	.025	-8.25	.409	-.014	.029	-.492	.622
Civil War Duration	.372	.164	2.268	.023	.304	.184	1.655	.098
Post-Civil War	.106	.131	.808	.419	-.033	.138	-.236	.813
Protest _{t-1}	.116	.019	6.045	.000	.159	.024	6.632	.000
Rebellion _{t-1}	.052	.021	2.442	.015	.062	.024	2.568	.010
Democratization	.150	.102	1.474	.140	-.056	.116	-.483	.629
Autocratization	-.009	.083	-.104	.918	-.015	.090	-.161	.872
Leader Chg. _{t-1}	-.021	.069	-.301	.764	-.098	.079	-1.241	.215
Constant	1.637	.112	14.642	.000	1.551	.115	13.435	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1}	.642	.015	42.698	.000	.621	.014	42.955	.000
Adj. R ²	.442				.409			
B-P χ^2 (df=9)	206				100			
p of B-P χ^2	<.000				<.000			
N	3,018				3,018			

Note: OLS models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aLog(total weighted events per nation-year).

^bRegime change variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for ten-years following, and including, the year of change, and 0 otherwise.

^cOne-year lag of COPDAB Actor and Target, respectively, to reduce autocorrelation.

^dBreusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) correction for heteroskedasticity.

I discuss the results of each model in turn. Scanning the significance levels for the independent variables in the left-hand panel of the table, where the dependent variable is the natural log of total actor conflict, it is apparent that little change occurs when I include all of the variables in the same equation. However, there are some items that are worth noting. First, although the coefficient for polity persistence indicates a statistically significant effect in the individual analysis in Table 4.1, the coefficient becomes insignificant in Table 4.10. The coefficients measuring the impact of ongoing civil war and the post-civil war period approximate the results identified in the earlier analysis. That is, political systems experiencing ongoing civil war are estimated to send significantly more conflict to other states than are states not experiencing such domestic upheaval. Again, the coefficient for the variable measuring the residual effects of civil wars is insignificant.²⁹

As with the earlier, reduced analyses, the two measures of domestic conflict, protests and rebellion and government instability, the one-year lags of each indicate a positive relationship with total actor conflict. In terms of regime changes, I include only the general indicators, democratization and autocratization, in the model. Again, hints of a statistically significant and positive relationship between democratization and total actor conflict. Of course, these results regarding the impact of regime changes are tempered by the knowledge that disaggregating these general measures, as I have done earlier, suggests additional information and some qualifications.

Lastly, there appears to be no statistically significant relationship between the one-year lag of the frequency of leadership change and conflict sent and received by the state. The results reported in the right-hand half of the table, where the dependent variable is the log of total target conflict, essentially mirror those in the left-hand panel, save the impact of democratization.

²⁹ The potential for multicollinearity across the set of variables in Table 4.11 is high. For example, nascent polities are likely to experience high levels of domestic unrest. Moreover, several of the variables are likely endogenous to one another. That is, domestic unrest may precede or follow regime change, for example. I do not model these dynamic processes here, but the attenuation of previously significant variables may be the result of some multicollinearity and endogeneity.

4.4. Conclusions

I began this chapter by discussing the importance of studying the relationship between the domestic political system and foreign policy behavior less severe than military acts. I suggest that when political authorities are faced with the twin conditions of vulnerability and aggression, leaders may resort to foreign policy as a method to moderate these conditions.

Yet in resorting to action abroad as a policy solution, it is also evident that leaders have available to them a range of policy options more varied than the most dramatic and lethal option, the use of militarized force. As such, leaders are able to “mix and match” the extent of their levels of conflict abroad with their policy predicament. Therefore, one might argue that political leaders may respond to domestic stress and vulnerability with mild conflictual actions abroad, and if these actions fail to elicit relief, escalate the conflictual acts abroad further. This is not to say that I have formulated a model of foreign policy escalation given the conditions of vulnerability and stress. I have not. Rather, this notion of policy escalation with respect to the severity of the foreign policy actions is hypothetical evidence supporting the argument that it is important to explore the impact of the political system variables across a range of foreign policy actions.

I summarize the analysis in this section as follows:

- First, with respect to the relationship between political community persistence and interstate conflict, the empirical analysis indicates a statistically significant and negatively signed relationship where the dependent variable is total actor conflict. No statistically significant relationship obtains between political community persistence and total actor conflict. In general, then, the empirical analysis tends to support the argument that new political systems are more aggressive in foreign policy, but not the argument that they are necessarily more vulnerable to aggression from other states:

- Second, there appears to be a significant relationship between the domestic political climate and interstate conflict. In particular, across the interstate measures of total actor and total target conflict, there is a strong, positive relationship with the lagged values of two the conflict dimensions, protest and rebellion and government instability. Furthermore, states experiencing civil war send and receive significantly higher levels of interstate conflict. However, the analysis indicates very little residual impact from civil wars on the level of interstate conflict sent and received:
- Third, the analysis of the relationship between regime change and actor and target conflict in this section leads to a number of findings. First, democratic and autocratic regime changes have significant implications for foreign policy behavior less severe than military conflict. However, on the whole the empirical analyses indicate that regime changes of either type have a greater impact on a state's subsequent role as an initiator (i.e., actor) of interstate conflict than as a target. New political regimes are more aggressive than vulnerable to conflict in foreign policy, but these actions are concentrated primarily on the non-military end of the conflict scale: and
- Fourth, estimation of the relationship between leadership change and foreign policy does not provide consistent support for the sixth and seventh hypotheses. Specifically, the analysis of a range of foreign policy behavior in this chapter fails to provide much consistent support for the general notion that leadership change has a significant and positive impact on foreign policy. States that experience the high levels of leadership turnover neither send, nor receive, significantly higher levels of conflict abroad in the short-term.

Having explained the estimated impact of the domestic political system variables on the range of interstate conflict measure available in the COPDAB data, I turn now to a more focused analysis of the impact of these variables for two specific types of foreign conflict: militarized interstate disputes and interstate wars. I examine these relationships in chapters five and six, respectively.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTES

5.1. Introduction

The following chapter begins the process of restricting the operationalization of the dependent variable, interstate conflict. Specifically, in the analysis below I investigate the impact of the domestic political system components outlined in chapter two on the frequency of a specific form of interstate conflict: militarized interstate disputes.

My discussion in this chapter is organized as follows. First, I briefly recapitulate some of the basic theoretical ideas and related hypotheses outlined in the third chapter about the relationship between the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities and the incidence of conflict between states. Second, I discuss the implications of moving from the general class of interstate conflict analyzed in the previous chapter to the subset of behavior referred to as militarized interstate disputes. Third, I discuss the data and necessary to test the aforementioned hypotheses. Fourth, I test the hypotheses individually, and then present a unified model in order to facilitate comparison across indicators. Finally, I present some concluding remarks.

5.2. Theory and Hypotheses

In an effort to provide some organizing concepts for the literature in comparative foreign policy and world politics, my discussion in the third chapter is anchored to two related notions: vulnerability and aggression. Briefly, in the third chapter I discuss the relevance of vulnerability and

aggression not only as a framework for organizing previous scholarship, but also regarding their roles as bellwethers for the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.

My theoretical arguments can be summarized in the following manner. Certain dynamics characteristic of the domestic political system affect perceptions of vulnerability and aggression between states. As a result, states experiencing changes in their political climate, changes to their political regime, or changes in their political authorities are more likely to behave differently in foreign policy than when these changes are absent. Similarly, these changes also affect the behavior of other states in the interstate system. To date, the literature has investigated a general set of hypotheses linking the dynamics of vulnerability with aggression. I argue that vulnerable states are more likely to be the initiators and targets of conflict with other states.

Within this general context of vulnerability and aggression, I propose three sets of hypotheses corresponding to the three components of Easton's model of the political system. With regard to the political community and foreign policy, I draft two hypotheses. First, I anticipate that a negative relationship obtains between political community survival and interstate conflict. Second, I anticipate a positive relationship between domestic political climate and interstate conflict.

In terms of the domestic political regime, I discuss three hypotheses derived from the literature. The first hypothesis anticipates a positive relationship between regime change and interstate conflict. The second and third hypotheses, again based on arguments in the literature, expect a positive relationship between democratic and autocratic regime change, respectively.

Lastly, with respect to the political authorities, I identify two hypotheses pertaining to the proximity and frequency of leadership changes and interstate conflict, and I anticipate positive relationships between these variables as well. Next, I turn to a discussion of the dependent variable, militarized interstate disputes.

5.3. Militarized Interstate Disputes

The previous chapter examines the relationship between the political system components and seven categories capturing the range of interstate conflictual actions, ranging from verbal demands to extensive war acts. In this chapter, I begin to narrow the focus of the analysis by considering a set of interstate conflicts called militarized interstate disputes (MIDs).

The MID data have several advantages over the COPDAB data. First, the data are much more finely grained; that is, it is possible to identify the participants of each dispute, the start and end dates of this involvement and the severity of the actions taken by the participants.³⁰ Second, the temporal range of these data is greater (1816-1992 versus 1948-78) and therefore offer a number advantages in terms of statistical robustness and generalizability.

Disputes represent deliberate militarized actions taken by states against one another, and they allow me the benefit of separating these actions from the most severe form of interstate military action—war. Yet, while one can argue that disputes and wars are empirically separable, a number of scholars argue that they are by their very nature intertwined (e.g., see Bremer 1993b; Gochman 1993; Maoz 1996b; Vasquez 1996.) Therefore, while it is important to separate these two phenomena for analytical reasons, it is also important to understand how and why disputes and wars are related. In the next section, I briefly discuss this link between disputes and wars.

5.3.1. The Relationship between Disputes and Wars

Interstate war and peace are just two of many outcomes that may result from the clash of interests between two or more states (see Bremer 1993b; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; and Gochman 1993). States engaged in following the “path toward war” (Mansfield and Snyder 1995b, 31)

³⁰ However, some might argue that the data are overly discrete; that is, conflicts are artificially independent from one another.

are doing just that. They are participating in the process of interstate disagreement, a dialogue that leaders can use to their advantage domestically. Maoz (1996, 61) reasons it is precisely the escalation properties available between the extremes of peace and war that would be particularly helpful to leaders in rallying domestic constituents and consolidating leaders' power during a period of domestic political impasse.

Second, elites in stable or unstable regimes have at their disposal a broad set of foreign policy tools, even within the subset of actions the scholarly community categorizes as interstate conflict. Vasquez (1993, 200, emphasis removed) suggests that "the steps to war, then, must be viewed as foreign policy decisions that are interrelated and cumulative." These cumulative, perhaps escalatory interactions, between states yield a set of probabilistic outcomes, a relatively small subset of which may be conflictual. As Bremer frames the process (1993b, 3):

many, perhaps most, of these interstate conflicts of interest are resolved by the peaceful means of negotiation and accommodation or tolerated until forgotten. Some of these conflicts of interest (perhaps a small minority) are so fundamental and irreconcilable that at least one of the states involved feels compelled to use force, explicitly, or implicitly, to bring about a favorable resolution of the conflict. This militarization of the conflict is assumed to mark the passing of an important threshold in the escalation of interstate conflict...

Bremer's argument is supported empirically by Maoz (1996, 38) who finds that, "97% of all wars in the 1816-1995 era did not break of the blue, but emerged out of—sometimes quite long—international crises."

Furthermore, many scholars agree with the generalization that the threat, display, or use of force by one state in an interstate dispute marks a significant increase in the likelihood of subsequent war (see Bremer 1993b; Gochman 1993; Partell 1997, 1998; and Senese 1994). In his analysis of the causes of the Second World War, Vasquez (1996, 163) argues that territorial disputes handled in a "power politics fashion" result in military buildups, alliance making, repeated crises, and an increased probability

of war. In turn, an interstate crisis is most likely to result in war when physical threats are made to a vital issue, arms races are present, escalatory bargaining occurs across crises, a hostile spiral exists, and hard-line policy makers are present in at least one of the states (Vasquez 1996, 163).

The literature suggests, then, that there is an important link between disputes and wars. Therefore, it is important to examine whether there are any differential effects of the political system components on the occurrence of disputes and wars. Having established the general reasoning as to why it is important to consider conflicts less severe than wars, I now turn to the empirical analysis.

5.4. Empirical Analyses

In the following section, I examine the relationships between the independent variables, domestic political community, the domestic political regime, the domestic political authorities, and the dependent variable, militarized interstate disputes. The breadth and frequency of information about disputes between nations allows for statistical analysis on the general involvement of disputes, in the differentiation between the initiators and targets of these actions.³¹

Specifically, I use two measures of interstate conflict, the frequency of militarized interstate dispute initiator and target per state-year, each of which are drawn from the Correlates of War's (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set (see Jones, et al., 1996).³² I record a state's participation as the initiator or target of a dispute as being on side A or Side B in the year in which the dispute begins.

³¹ As I indicate below, there are some rather significant limitations on our ability to discern the "true" initiators and targets of interstate disputes. Indeed, the data that I use to measure the frequency of disputes between nations does not allow me to trace the interstate behavior occurring prior to the militarized phase of the dispute. That is, basing initiation on those states that are the first to threaten, display, or use military force in a dispute carries the possibility of mis-attributing the responsibility for the start of the dispute to the wrong state.

³² See Gochman and Maoz (1984) for an extensive discussion of the threat, display, and use of force dimensions of militarized interstate disputes. In the analysis below, I take advantage of the recent

respectively, not for those years across which the dispute may endure.³³ An alternative measure of dispute conflict incorporates all years for which a state is involved in a dispute, sometimes referred to as dispute-years, has been employed in other research examining the effects of regime change on interstate conflict (see Oneal and Russett 1997; Maoz 1996). I view onset (i.e., the year a dispute is begun) and duration (i.e., the years across which a dispute is ongoing) as distinct phenomena. In the statistical analyses below I concern myself with dispute origination, rather than involvement.

The independent variables remain the same as those employed in chapter four. Similarly, the characteristics of the data analyzed are identical to those in the previous chapter. The time frame that I analyze in this section includes 1816-1992, although the period is contingent upon the statistical model that I specify.

Given that the dependent variables, militarized dispute initiator and target, are frequency counts per state-year, I resort to a class of models designed to estimate relationships between variables under these circumstances.³⁴ The interpretation of the statistical model that I use here, the Negative Binomial model appears, is similar to those for OLS and Logistic specifications. The direction and significance of the respective parameter estimates are interpreted accordingly. However, Negative Binomial models predict an expected frequency of a variable given a set of covariates, rather than the log-odds, a probability, or a level, for instance. Therefore, the language that I use to interpret the effects of various independent variables refers to the unit change in the estimated frequency of the dependent variable.

update of the dispute data through 1992 (version 2.10.) See Appendix B for a discussion of the descriptive properties of these data.

³³That is, I am concerned with the originators of disputes, not states that join the disputes after they are underway.

³⁴These models, termed event count models, including the Poisson and Negative Binomial specifications, are discussed at length by King (1989), Greene (1992), and Liao (1994).

5.4.1. The Political Community and Disputes

In this section, I investigate the relationship between the political community and interstate disputes. First, I examine the relationship between political community persistence and dispute origination. Recall that the first hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between political community persistence and interstate conflict: that is, the more mature a polity, the less likely it will be the target or initiator of interstate conflict. This hypothesis receives some support in the previous chapter, where the dependent variable was measured with total weighted conflict using the COPDAB data (the estimated coefficients are consistently negatively signed, but their statistical significance is rather weak.) Second, I examine the relationship between political climate and interstate disputes in an effort to test the hypothesis that the presence of a poor domestic political climate (i.e., high levels of domestic turmoil) increases the expected rate of a state's involvement in a dispute, either as the initiator, or target.

5.4.1.1. Political Community Persistence

First, I estimate impact of political community persistence by regressing the frequency in which a state is involved as the initiator or target of disputes in a given year on the Polity II (see Gurr, et al. 1989) measure of the log of polity persistence in two separate models. The results of these two Negative Binomial estimations are each reported in the left- and right-hand panels of Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Impact of Polity Persistence on Disputes, 1816-1986.

Variable	Initiator ^a				Target ^a			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Polity Persistence ^b	-.026	.019	-1.39	.163	-.072	.016	-4.47	.000
Constant	-1.914	.062	-31.02	.000	-1.729	.051	-33.81	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1} ^c	.878	.031	27.89	.000	.848	.036	23.78	.000
α^d	1.488	.101	14.73	.000	1.246	.100	12.51	.000
ULL ^e	-4691				-4818			
RLL ^f	-5070				-5007			
χ^2	759				378			
p of χ^2								
N	9,498				9,498			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aInitiator is side A on first day of dispute; Target is side B on first day of dispute. Data are from Singer and Small (1994).

^bPolity persistence is from Gurr, et al. (1989).

^cThe lagged dependent variable is the frequency of dispute initiator and target origination, respectively.

^d α is the dispersion coefficient.

^eUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^fRestricted Log-likelihood.

In Table 5.1, the estimates for dispute initiator are reported in the left-hand panel of the table, while the results for dispute target are in the right-hand panel of the table. The statistical significance of the coefficient for polity persistence indicates that, while the coefficient fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance (even one-tailed), the negative sign suggests a relationship similar to the one reported in the previous chapter. That is, as a political community matures, its expected frequency of dispute initiation per year decreases. Save the issue of statistical insignificance, these findings generally support the first hypothesis.


Turning to the right-hand panel, where the dependent variable is dispute target, it is clear that the coefficient for the polity persistence variable is statistically significant (two-tailed), and negatively signed. In short, these results indicate that the more mature (i.e., older) the political

community, the lower the expected frequency of that political community being the target of a dispute by another state. Again, this finding reinforces the general conclusion that a negative relationship obtains between political community persistence and its overall involvement in disputes. As I discussed in the third chapter, one might surmise that the older the polity, the less vulnerable it is to external pressure, and the longer it will persist. Similarly, the longer a polity persists, the less vulnerable it may appear to other states, and therefore it will be the target of fewer interstate disputes as a function of time.

As with my previous analysis of the COPDAB data, it is important not only to distinguish between coefficients that are statistically significant and those that are not, but also to estimate the relative impact of these effects on the dependent variable. In Figure 5.1 I plot the estimated effect of a range of values for the log of polity persistence on the expected frequency of dispute initiator and target, respectively.³⁵

³⁵I plot the effect of polity persistence on dispute initiation despite the fact that it fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Figure 5.1. Impact of Polity Persistence on Dispute Initiator and Target, 1816-1986



In Figure 5.1, it is evident that polity persistence has a much more dramatic effect on a political community's expected frequency of becoming the target, rather than the initiator, of a dispute. The steeper slope of the line representing the expected dispute target frequency indicates this effect. Of course, this is not surprising, given that the magnitude and direction of the estimated coefficient for dispute target when it is regressed on the log of polity persistence in Table 5.1 is nearly three times the size of its counterpart for dispute initiator. It is also clear that as the values for the log of polity persistence increase, the slope of the each of the lines decreases, suggesting that the effect of polity persistence on dispute involvement is a negative function of time. Indeed, scanning from the minimum to the maximum values of the log of polity persistence along the x-axis, the reduction in the estimated frequency of a state being the target of a dispute changes from about 0.17 to about 0.15. This constitutes about a 13% decrease in the expected frequency of a political system being the target of a militarized interstate dispute.

5.4.1.2. Political Climate

5.4.1.2.1. Protest and Rebellion and Government Instability

In Table 5.2, I report the results of the multivariate negative binomial models in which I regress dispute initiator and target on one-year lagged values of the factor scores protest and rebellion and government instability for the period 1919-1992.

Table 5.2. Effect of Domestic Conflict on Subsequent Disputes, 1919-1992.

Variable	Initiator ^a				Target ^a			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Protest _{t-1} ^b	.138	.027	5.05	.000	.100	.027	3.70	.000
Rev. and Gov. Inst. _{t-1} ^b	.110	.038	2.90	.004	-.010	.043	-0.23	.819
Constant	-2.084	.040	-51.98	.000	-1.907	.037	-51.48	.000
Dep. Var. _{t-1} ^c	.904	.033	27.18	.000	.830	.045	18.43	.000
α^d	1.466	.111	13.21	.000	1.088	.116	9.41	.000
ULL ^e	-3279				-3545			
RLL ^f	-3746				-3642			
χ^2	935				193			
p of χ^2	.000				.000			
N	6,805				6,805			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aInitiator is side A on first day of dispute; Target is side B on first day of dispute. Data from Singer and Small (1994).

^bFactor scores (principle components, varimax normalized) of weighted Banks' (1996) domestic conflict events.

^cThe lagged dependent variable is the frequency of dispute initiator and target origination, respectively.

^d α is the dispersion coefficient.

^eUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^fRestricted Log-likelihood.


From the table, it is evident that the measures of protest and rebellion and government instability have statistically significant and positive relationships with the dependent variable. That is, as the values of each conflict dimension increase, the expected frequency for state initiation of militarized disputes

against other states increases as well. These findings firmly support the second hypothesis that political communities experiencing high levels of domestic turmoil, i.e., a poor political climate, will initiate significantly greater than average expected frequencies of conflicts with other states.

Turning to the results reported in the right-hand panel of Table 5.2, the coefficient for rebellion and government instability becomes insignificant and negatively signed. This is an interesting finding because it suggests that the occurrence of some of the most severe forms of domestic unrest, such as revolution and guerrilla warfare, do not increase the expected frequency of a state being the target of disputes initiated by other states. However, the results of the second model suggests that this vulnerability dynamic may obtain when the political climate is characterized by more moderate forms of domestic unrest, as indicated by significant coefficient for the protest dimension.

Again, it is important to illustrate the estimated effect of various values for the protest and rebellion and government instability dimensions on the expected frequency of dispute initiation and target. In Figure 5.2, I illustrate the estimated impact of a range of hypothetical values for protest and rebellion and government instability on the expected frequency of dispute initiator and target.

Figure 5.2. Impact of Protest on the Expected Frequency of Initiator and Target, 1919-92



The slope of each line is positive and monotonically increasing. The figure reinforces the results identified in Table 5.2 that the impact between the variables is positive. The line representing the expected rate of dispute initiation indicates that as one moves from the minimum to the maximum value along the x-axis, the expected rate of initiation changes by about 50%. In terms of the expected rate of a state being the target of a dispute, the corresponding line in Figure 5.2 suggest that across the range of values for the protest variable, the expected rate of a state becoming the target of a dispute increases by about 35–40%.

This same basic shape in the relationship between the dependent and the independent variable is repeated in Figure 5.3, where I illustrate the estimated effect of rebellion and government instability on the expected frequency of initiation (but not for dispute target, because it is statistically insignificant from zero.)

Figure 5.3 Impact of Rebellion and Government Instability on the Expected Frequency of Initiator, 1919-92




Figure 5.3 indicates that as one increases the value of the variable rebellion and government instability to its maximum point on the x-axis (2.5), the estimated expected rate of a state being the initiator of a dispute increases by a little more than 30%. This represents a rather considerable change. In substantive terms, the increase in the expected rate of dispute initiator increases from 0.10 dispute initiations per year to 0.17 dispute initiations per year.

5.4.1.2.2. Civil Wars

In this section, I examine the relationship between two variables measuring the impact of civil wars on the expected frequency of disputes between states. Examining the relationship between civil wars and disputes is important for two reasons. First, it allows me to use a separate data source to corroborate the empirical estimates generated in the previous section of this chapter with the domestic conflict factor scores. Second, it allows me to analyze longer temporal span, the period 1816-1992 as opposed to the period 1919-1992.

To do so, I regress the frequency of dispute initiator and target per country-year on the dichotomous variables ongoing civil war and post-civil war. The results are reported in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3. Impact of Civil War on Disputes, 1816-1992.

Variable	Initiator				Target			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Civil War Duration ^a	.578	.132	4.39	.000	.444	.122	3.64	.000
Post-civil War _{t-t+9} ^b	.357	.095	3.75	.000	.243	.102	2.37	.018
Constant	-2.117	.032	-65.45	.000	-2.014	.031	-65.77	.000
Dep Var. _{t-1} ^c	.899	.029	31.01	.000	.869	.035	25.03	.000
α^d	1.583	.100	15.88	.000	1.267	.097	13.08	.000
ULL ^e	-5171				-5415			
RLL ^f	-5792				-5624			
χ^2	1241.07				418.88			
p of χ^2	.000				.000			
N	11.086				11.086			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aCivil war duration variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for the length of the war, and 0 otherwise.

^bPost-civil war variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for t0...t+9 years following the terminal duration year.

^cThe lagged dependent variable is the frequency of dispute initiator and target origination, respectively.

^d α is the dispersion coefficient.

^eUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^fRestricted Log-likelihood.


In the left-hand panel of Table 5.3, where the dependent variable is dispute initiator, the estimated coefficients for ongoing civil war and post-civil war are statistically significant from zero and positively signed. Specifically, political communities with ongoing civil wars have an increased expected frequency of dispute initiation; that is, states afflicted with civil wars start disputes with other states. The significance and sign of the coefficient for post-civil war suggests that there is also a residual effect from civil wars, a finding that does not emerge in with the analysis of the COPDAB data in the fourth chapter. States that endure civil wars are expected to initiate a significantly greater frequency of disputes during the decade following that civil war than are those states not experiencing such challenges to the survival

of the political regime, and perhaps, the political community. In short, domestic political upheaval is often followed by aggression abroad.

Turning to the results in the right-hand panel of the table, it appears that a number of relationships hold when the dependent variable is the frequency of dispute target events per country-year. Again, states that are undergoing civil wars are more likely to be the targets of disputes by other states, and this vulnerability appears to have some residual effects, given the significant coefficient for post-civil war.

It is evident, then, that the phenomenon signifying perhaps the most severe domestic political climate a political system may exhibit, a civil war, has implications for a political community's vulnerability and aggression on the interstate level. This relationship can also be illustrated by plotting the change in the expected frequencies of dispute initiation and target given the occurrence of an ongoing civil war and the fallout from this event during the decade thereafter. I illustrate this relationship in Figure 5.4

Figure 5.4. Impact of Ongoing Civil War on Expected Disputes, 1816-1992



As anticipated, the histograms indicate a significant and positive relationship between ongoing civil war and dispute initiator and target. In general, the increase in the expected frequency is approximately 30%. This basic pattern is repeated in the for the post-civil war indicator show in Figure 5.5.

Figure 5.5. Impact of Post-civil War Period on Expected and Disputes, 1816-1992




Figure 5.5 post-civil war periods increase the expected frequency of dispute initiator and target by about 25%.

5.4.1.3. Conclusions

My statistical analysis of the relationship between the political community and the frequency of militarized interstate disputes leads me to the following conclusions:

- Across all three indicators of what I have termed the political climate (protest, rebellion and government instability), and the two measures of civil war), a generally positive relationship obtains for the two dependent variables, dispute initiation and target frequency. The only instance in which this positive relationship fails to be borne out is when dispute target is

regressed on rebellion and government instability, in which case the coefficients for the conflict dimension are statistically insignificant from zero:

- The analysis of the measures of ongoing and post-civil war periods provides some statistical corroboration for the more temporally limited analysis of the two domestic conflict dimensions in this, as well as the previous, chapter: and
- However, the relative impact of the variables measuring the political climate in some cases reaches 30 percent.

In the next section of this chapter I turn to an analysis of the relationship between different types of political regime changes and the frequency of interstate disputes.

5.4.2. The Political Regime and Disputes

Recall that in the third chapter I identified three hypotheses focusing on the relationship between regime changes and the occurrence of interstate conflict. In all three hypotheses I anticipated a positive relationship between general, democratic, and autocratic regime changes and the involvement of states undergoing such changes in interstate conflict. In the following section, I examine the relationship between these three categories of regime change and interstate disputes across three periods: 1816-1992, 1816-45, and 1946-92. For each sample period, I examine the impact of general democratic and autocratic changes, in addition to disaggregating these general types of regime change, as I do in chapter four.

In table 5.4, I report the frequency counts for the eight regime change variables for the three samples.

Table 5.4. Regime Change Frequencies.
1816-1945, 1946-92, and 1816-1992

Regime Change Type	1816-1945		1946-92		1816-1992	
	freq.	%	freq.	%	freq.	%
Democratization	128	60%	153	55%	281	57%
Autocratization	87	40%	124	45%	211	43%
Total	215		277		492	
Major Democratization	28	13%	64	23%	92	19%
Consolidating Democracy	28	13%	28	10%	56	11%
Retreating Democracy	7	3%	15	5%	22	4%
Major Autocratization	22	10%	37	13%	59	12%
Liberalizing Autocracy	72	33%	61	22%	133	27%
Consolidating Autocracy	58	27%	72	26%	130	26%
Total	215		277		492	

Note: frequency counts are derived from the Gurr, et al. (1989, 1996) measure of institutional democracy, and updates in Jagers and Gurr (1995).

5.4.2.1. 1816-1992 Sample

5.4.2.1.1 General Democratic and Autocratic Regime Changes

To assess the relationship between the two general categories of regime change, I regress the frequency of dispute initiator and target per state-year on the two dichotomous measures of democratization and autocratization. The estimates from the Negative Binomial estimations for the 1816-1992 period are reported in the upper panel of Table 5.5.

Table 5.5. Impact of Regime Change on Disputes, 1816-1992.

Variable	Initiator				Target			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Democratization ^a	.263	.077	3.40	.001	.135	.072	1.87	.061
Autocratization ^a	.340	.072	4.73	.000	.231	.071	3.24	.001
Constant	-2.154	.035	-61.18	.000	-2.031	.034	-60.50	.000
Dep Var. _{t-1} ^b	.898	.030	30.15	.000	.866	.035	24.90	.000
α^c	1.574	.101	15.51	.000	1.273	.097	13.14	.000
ULL ^d	-5174				-5418			
RLL ^e	-5784				-5626			
χ^2	1222				418			
p of χ^2	.000				0			
N	11,086				11,086			
Major Democratization ^a	.152	.123	1.23	.218	.168	.121	1.39	.164
Consolidating Democracy ^a	.334	.159	2.11	.035	.071	.142	0.50	.614
Retreating Democracy ^a	.542	.214	2.54	.011	.364	.187	1.95	.051
Major Autocratization ^a	.288	.113	2.55	.011	.360	.118	3.04	.002
Liberalizing Autocracy ^a	.286	.109	2.61	.009	.146	.102	1.44	.150
Consolidating Autocracy ^a	.326	.093	3.51	.000	.150	.092	1.63	.103
Constant	-2.154	.035	-61.03	.000	-2.030	.034	-60.48	.000
Dep Var. _{t-1}	.896	.030	29.76	.000	.867	.035	24.97	.000
α^b	1.565	.102	15.30	.000	1.270	.097	13.10	.000
ULL	-5172				-5416			
RLL	-5782				-5625			
χ^2	1219				418			
p of χ^2	.000				.000			
N	11,086				11,086			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aRegime change variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for ten-years following, and including, the year of change, and 0 otherwise.

^bThe lagged dependent variable is the frequency of dispute initiator and target origination, respectively.

^c α is the dispersion coefficient.

^eUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^dRestricted Log-likelihood.

Reviewing the upper left-hand panel of the table, the coefficients estimating the effect of democratization and autocratization on dispute initiation are statistically significant from zero and positively signed.

These findings suggest that states undergoing regime changes in either direction, democratic or autocratic

will on average initiate a significantly greater expected frequency of disputes than will states not undergoing these changes. More specifically, the coefficients for democratization and autocratization only differ with respect to magnitude, not direction. That is, the coefficient for autocratization has a greater positive effect on states' subsequent expected dispute initiation than does democratization.

Shifting attention to the right-hand panel of the table, where the dependent variable is the frequency of dispute target, it is evident that the general relationship is similar to the corresponding results identified in the first panel. Specifically, democratization and autocratization each increase a state's expected frequency of being the target of a dispute by another state. Again, autocratization has almost twice the impact of democratization.

To illustrate these relationships in a different form, Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the change in the expected of dispute initiator and target given democratic and autocratic regime changes.

Figure 5.6. Impact of Democratization on the Expected Frequency of Subsequent Dispute Initiator and Target, 1816-1992





Figure 5.7. Impact of Autocratization on the Expected Frequency of Subsequent Dispute Initiator and Target, 1816-1992



It is evident from Figures 5.6 and 5.7 that regime changes have a positive impact on dispute behavior in general. It is also evident that democratization and autocratization have a uniformly greater impact on dispute initiator than they do on dispute target. Stated differently, while regime change increases the expected frequency of each type of militarized conflict, the effect on the former is greater than it is on the latter. Substantively, the change in the expected rate of dispute involvement in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 is about five-tenths of a single dispute, or about 50% in the expected frequency of a dispute. Next, I break down the general measures of regime change and perform an identical statistical analysis.

5.4.2.1.2. Disaggregated Regime Changes

The lower half of Table 5.5 reports the results of the Negative Binomial analyses where I regress the disaggregated regime change variables on the two measures of militarized conflict, dispute initiator and dispute target. The purpose of this analysis is to try to identify the relationships that are responsible for the general results. Again, I address the results reported in each panel, in turn.

Surprisingly, the only coefficient failing to reach conventional levels of statistical significance is the variable measuring major changes in democratization (i.e., major democratization). The coefficients for the remaining five types of regime changes are each statistically significant, and, it is important to note, positively signed. Similar to general indicators, the discussion of the results for this model center around the relative magnitude of the regime change effects. As such, it appears that the coefficient for retreating democracy, a process in which the some limitations are placed on the latitude of democratic institutions, is the largest, hovering around a third to a half again larger than the remaining coefficients. Save the insignificant coefficient for major democratization, there are few inconsistencies with the general results.

Turning to the right-hand panel of Table 5.5, where the dependent variable is dispute target, a review of the significance levels for the six variables indicates some important findings. First, only the variables measuring retreating democracy, major autocratization, and consolidating autocracy reach conventional levels of statistical significance (the last one is on the cusp of the one-tailed significance-level.) Perhaps the most important point is that, individually, none of the variables measuring types of democratization are statistically significant from zero in and of themselves, but only when they are aggregated into the general measure of democratization.

Disaggregating regime changes, then, suggests three conclusions. First, the impact of regime changes on dispute initiation is generally robust across the location, direction, and type of change (save, of course, major democratization.) Second, disaggregating the regime change measures indicates that all of the coefficients for the general and the disaggregated measures of regime change are positively signed, suggesting that the general relationship between dispute involvement and regime change is positive. Lastly, comparison for the results of the general and disaggregated analyses of for the Negative Binomial equations where the dependent variable is the frequency of involvement dispute target demonstrates the importance of breaking down the general measure. Having done so, it appears that

states that have undergone autocratic regime changes are much more likely to be threatened or attacked militarily than are their democratizing counterparts. I return to these issues later in this chapter.

In the next two subsections I examine the temporal robustness of the relationship between regime changes and the frequency of disputes, and I do so for two reasons. First, I argue that the post-WWII interval is of primary interest in studying the applicability of the regime change and interstate conflict relationship in the current interstate system. The frequency of states in the interstate system explodes during the post-WWII period. The average frequency of states in the pre-1946 period is about 41, while the average frequency of states in the post-1945 period is approximately 126.

Second, the circumstances under which many of these states became independent during the post-WWII period contributed to a distinctly different interstate environment, one that reveals the gamut by which states democratized and autocratized during and after joining “the club of nations,” to borrow Maoz’s (1989) phrase. Indeed, the post-1945 period demonstrates not only great power regime changes (e.g., France and Russia), but numerous instances of democratization and autocratization in Eastern Europe, Latin America, South America, Africa, and Asia. Therefore, it is important to explore the relationship between regime change and interstate conflict in the post-WWII period, with its prominent “third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991), as well as several cases of regime “reversion” (Starr 1991, 1995). I turn next to analyzing the relationship across two sub-periods, 1816-1945 and 1946-1992.

5.4.2.2. 1816-1945 Sample

5.4.2.2.1. General Democratic and Autocratic Regime Changes

The procedures by which I carry out the statistical analyses in this section are identical to those employed in the previous section. In Table 5.6, I regress the frequency of dispute initiator and target on the eight measures of political regime change. In keeping with my earlier practice, I review the relationship between the two general regime change measures, democratization and autocratization, and

the two dependent variables, dispute initiator and dispute target, in turn. In the upper, left-hand panel of Table 5.6, the coefficients for democratization and autocratization are statistically significant and positively signed. Therefore, commensurate with the previous analysis, regime changes in general increase a state's expected frequency of subsequent dispute initiation. However, in a departure from the earlier findings, the magnitude of these two coefficients is virtually identical. In fact, the magnitude for the coefficient for democratization is slightly larger than its autocratic counterpart.

Table 5.6. Impact of Regime Change on Disputes, 1816-1945.

Variable	Initiator				Target			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Democratization ^a	.385	.116	3.31	.001	.147	.113	1.30	.194
Autocratization ^a	.380	.117	3.25	.001	.332	.114	2.92	.003
Constant	-2.271	.054	-42.11	.000	-2.150	.052	-41.38	.000
Dep Var. _{t-1} ^b	.897	.052	17.30	.000	.842	.058	14.56	.000
α^c	2.038	.210	9.72	.000	1.870	.189	9.88	.000
ULL ^d	-2266				-2332			
RLL ^e	-2478				-2456			
χ^2	424				247			
p of χ^2	.000				.000			
N	5,298				5,298			
Major Democratization ^a	.018	.231	0.08	.937	-.008	.229	-0.03	.973
Consolidating Democracy ^a	.618	.218	2.83	.005	.114	.261	0.44	.662
Retreating Democracy ^a	.654	.459	1.42	.155	.581	.360	1.61	.106
Major Autocratization ^a	.383	.178	2.15	.032	.648	.175	3.70	.000
Liberalizing Autocracy ^a	.379	.151	2.52	.012	.214	.138	1.56	.120
Consolidating Autocracy ^a	.337	.147	2.28	.022	.145	.155	0.94	.349
Constant	-2.268	.054	-41.88	.000	-2.151	.052	-41.45	.000
Dep Var. _{t-1}	.889	.054	16.38	.000	.844	.058	14.67	.000
α^b	2.014	.215	9.36	.000	1.851	.191	9.68	.000
ULL	-2264				-2330			
RLL	-2470				-2453			
χ^2	413				248			
p of χ^2	.000				.000			
N	5,298				5,298			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aRegime change variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for ten-years following, and including, the year of change, and 0 otherwise.

^bThe lagged dependent variable is the frequency of dispute initiator and target origination, respectively.

^c α is the dispersion coefficient.

^eUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^dRestricted Log-likelihood.

Turning to the results reported in the upper, right-hand half of the table, where the dependent variable is dispute target, the results appear to strengthen the earlier findings that democratization has very little impact on the expected frequency of a state subsequently becoming the

target of a dispute. Moreover, the statistical strength of the relationship between autocratization and dispute target becomes stronger.

5.4.2.2.2. Disaggregated Regime Change Measures

The lower half of Table 5.6 reports the results for the analysis wherein the general regime change measures are disaggregated. In the lower, left-hand panel, the results suggest only moderate change from the previous analysis in Table 5.5. Specifically, the t-ratios indicate that the variable measuring major democratization is not different from zero. In addition, the variable retreating democracy falls below the one-tailed significance threshold.

Shifting attention to the lower, right-hand panel of Table 5.6, the results are similar to those in Table 5.4, save few differences. First, major autocratization remains strongly significant and positively signed, while the coefficient for consolidating autocracy becomes insignificant. In general, then, the results for the pre-WWII sample mirror the findings reported in Table 5.5. In the next section, I turn to an analysis of the post-WWII period.

5.4.2.3. 1946-92 Sample

5.4.2.3.1. Measures of General Democratic and Autocratic Regime Changes

In this section, I am interested in drawing comparisons between the pre- and post-WWII periods in terms of the impact of regime changes on the frequency of militarized interstate disputes. As I have done in the previous section, in order to estimate these relationships, I regress the frequency of dispute initiator and target on the eight measures of regime change using a Negative Binomial specification. These results are reported in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7. Impact of Regime Change on Subsequent Disputes, 1945-92.

Variable	Initiator				Target			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Democratization ^a	.167	.105	1.59	.113	.137	.094	1.46	.144
Autocratization ^a	.289	.094	3.06	.002	.150	.092	1.64	.102
Constant	-2.053	.047	-43.41	.000	-1.924	.044	-43.70	.000
Dep Var. _{t-1} ^b	.880	.037	24.02	.000	.856	.043	19.87	.000
α^c	1.277	.111	11.47	.000	.889	.111	8.04	.000
ULL ^d	-2897.22				-3067.7			
RLL ^e	-3267.77				-3136.7			
χ^2	741.1				138.08			
p of χ^2	.000				.000			
N	5,788				5,788			
Major Democratization ^a	.173	.144	1.20	.229	.206	.138	1.49	.136
Consolidating Democracy ^a	.052	.260	0.20	.841	.037	.165	0.22	.822
Retreating Democracy ^a	.447	.234	1.91	.056	.202	.213	0.95	.344
Major Autocratization ^a	.211	.164	1.28	.199	.154	.178	0.87	.387
Liberalizing Autocracy ^a	.227	.168	1.35	.176	.126	.161	0.78	.435
Consolidating Autocracy ^a	.297	.119	2.49	.013	.139	.112	1.23	.217
Constant	-2.055	.047	-43.37	.000	-1.924	.044	-43.67	.000
Dep Var. _{t-1}	.880	.037	23.90	.000	.856	.043	19.83	.000
α^b	1.289	.113	11.36	.000	.887	.111	7.98	.000
ULL	-2896.57				-3067.4			
RLL	-3266.947				-3136.2			
χ^2	740.741				137.65			
p of χ^2	.000				.000			
N	5,788				5,788			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aRegime change variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for ten-years following, and including, the year of change, and 0 otherwise.

^bThe lagged dependent variable is the frequency of dispute initiator and target origination, respectively.

^c α is the dispersion coefficient.

^eUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^dRestricted Log-likelihood.

A review of the coefficients and their respective t-scores indicates some contrasting results with those from the 1816-1945 sample. Specifically, although the coefficients for democratization remain positively signed, they fall considerably below conventional levels of statistical significance (one-tailed.) Thus, I

am less confident that these coefficients are representative of the population of democratization and dispute involvement for the post-WWII period.

The coefficients for autocratization, however, remain statistically stronger than their democratic counterparts. In particular, with respect to dispute initiator the coefficient for autocratization is statistically significant, although the magnitude of the coefficient shrinks somewhat compared to the previous results. With respect to dispute target, the coefficient for autocratization remains on the cusp of statistical significance (one-tailed): its magnitude shrinks considerably compared with the corresponding results from the analysis of the pre-WWII sample.

5.4.2.3.2. Disaggregated Regime Changes


As I have stressed in the earlier analyses, it is important to disaggregate the general measures of regime change, and I do so in the lower half of Table 5.7. Examining the lower, left-hand column of table, it is clear that the results here are markedly different from those of the earlier analysis. Specifically, the only coefficients reaching statistical significance are retreating democracy and consolidating democracy. None of the coefficients estimating positive changes along the democracy scale are statistically significant from zero. Turning to the lower, right-hand panel, the frequency of dispute target is regressed on the six types of regime change. Surprisingly, a review of the t-ratios reveals that none of the coefficients are statistically significant from zero. That is, it is only when the regime type indicators are aggregated that some hints of statistically significant relationships emerge.

Comparison of the results in Table 5.6 and 5.7 is important because they demonstrate that the impact of regime changes on the frequency of states' involvement in disputes varies cross-temporally. One criticism might be that these results are simply an artifact of the samples. Yet, as I argued above, examining these relationships in the post-WWII period is theoretically interesting.

As with the earlier analysis, it is also important to illustrate the estimated substantive impact of these regime changes on the dependent variable. In Figures 5.8 and 5.9, I show the two instances in

which the magnitude of the coefficient for autocratization is greater than the coefficient for democratization (recall that in the pre-WWII sample, the coefficients for democratization and autocratization are statistically significant, positive, and nearly identical in magnitude.)

Figure 5.8 Impact of Regime Changes on Dispute Target, Pre-WWII Sample



5.4.2.3.3. Conclusions

The empirical analysis of the relationship between domestic political regime changes and interstate disputes in this section identifies some intriguing findings. They may be summarized as follows:

- For the 1816-1992 sample, the general measures of democratization and autocratization each increase the expected frequency of subsequent dispute initiation and target;
- For the 1816-1992 sample, all of the disaggregated measures of regime change, save major democratization, are statistically significant from zero and positively-signed when the dependent variable is the frequency of dispute initiation. However, in samples where the

dependent variable is the frequency of dispute target, only those regime change indicators measuring negative changes in democracy (i.e., retreating democracy, major autocratization, and consolidating democracy) are statistically significant from zero. That is, autocratic regime changes appear to make a state subsequently more vulnerable to attack by other states, while autocratic and democratic regime changes make states subsequently more prone to initiate disputes with other states:

- In general, behavior of the regime changes coefficients from the 1816-1945 sample closely mirror those from the full sample: and
- In the 1946-92 sample, the effect of democracy, in terms of its statistical significance, is quite weak, while the impact of autocratization remains strong. In the disaggregated analysis, only the measures of retreating democracy and consolidating autocracy are statistically significant from zero when the dependent variable is dispute initiator. No measure of regime change is statistically significant from zero when the dependent variable is dispute target, and these are very different results from those one finds with the 1816-1945 sample.

Next, I turn to the final stage of the empirical analysis in this chapter, an analysis of the impact of changes in the political authorities on the expected frequency of subsequent disputes.

5.4.3. The Political Authorities and Disputes

In order to explore relationships between domestic political authorities and interstate conflict, I formulate two hypotheses in chapter three. The first hypothesis anticipates a positive relationship between leadership turnover and interstate conflict, while the second identifies relationship between the proximity of leadership changes and interstate conflict. In the following empirical section, I examine the validity of these hypotheses with militarized disputes as the measure of interstate conflict.

Specifically, in five separate Negative Binomial models I regress the frequency of dispute initiation and target per country-year on one through five-year lags of the frequency of leadership changes. The results are reported in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8. Impact of Leadership Changes on Subsequent Disputes, 1816-1992.

Variable	Initiator				Target			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Leadership Change _{t-1} ^a	.114	.050	2.29	.022	.094	.044	2.12	.034
Leadership Change _{t-2}	.034	.055	0.63	.531	.150	.045	3.35	.001
Leadership Change _{t-3}	-.005	.059	-0.08	.936	.056	.050	1.12	.263
Leadership Change _{t-4}	.100	.053	1.87	.061	.079	.047	1.67	.094
Leadership Change _{t-5}	.090	.045	1.99	.047	.067	.046	1.47	.142

Note: Row coefficients are from individual Negative Binomial equations with lagged dependent variables. All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aLeadership change variable is the frequency of leadership changes during time t-n.

I review the empirical results in each panel of Table 5.8 in turn. With respect to dispute initiator, the coefficients for the various lag lengths vary in statistical significance. Specifically, the coefficient estimating the one-year lag of leadership change is statistically significant from zero and positive, yet neither the two nor three-year lags of leader change are statistically significant from zero. Turning to the right-hand panel, the results from the left-hand panel are repeated to some degree: the lagged frequency of leadership changes are followed by an increased expected frequency of a state being the target of a dispute.

Figures 5.10 and 5.11 I illustrate the impact of one-year lags of the frequency of leadership change on the expected frequency of dispute initiator and target based on the results reported in Table 5.8.

Figure 5.10. Impact of Frequency of Leadership Change on the Expected Frequency of Dispute Initiation, 1816-1992





Figure 5.11. Impact of Frequency of Leadership Change on the Expected Frequency of Dispute Target, 1816-1992



Figures 5.10 and 5.11 illustrate that the slopes of the lines representing the effect of one-year lags of various frequencies of leadership change are monotonically increasing. In addition, factoring in the occurrence of a dispute at time $t-1$ not only increases the intercept along the y-axis, but also the rate of increase in the line across the values for lagged leadership change arrayed along the x-axis. Analysis of the relationship between the lagged frequency of leadership change and the frequency of dispute involvement generates some interesting, if perplexing results. While there appears to be a generally positive relationship between lagged leadership change and the frequency of interstate disputes, the cross-temporal statistical significance of this relationship reported in Table 5.8 varies markedly.

5.4.4. A Unified Model of the Political System and Disputes

My purpose in this final analysis section is to offer a combined, or unified, statistical analysis of the effect of the political system components on the frequency at which states are involved, either as the initiators, or the targets, of interstate disputes. However, estimating a unified model of this sort does come with some costs. In particular, as I have noted earlier in this chapter, in a number of instances there is an incomplete overlap with respect to the temporal coverage across the set of covariates.

Specifically, a unified analysis effectively constrains the temporal range of the estimation to the period 1919-1986. In one sense this reduces the sample size in a situation where the dependent variable is a rare event. However, an analysis of this sort offers the benefit of checking the temporal robustness of the results presented in the previous sections. This said, I turn now to a unified analysis of the impact of domestic political system components on the militarized interstate dispute involvement. In order to estimate a unified model, I regress the frequency of dispute initiation and target per country-year on the set of political system covariates. These results are reported in Table 5.9.

Table 5.9. Impact of the Domestic Political System on Disputes, 1919-1986 (Unified Model)

Variable	Initiator				Target			
	coef.	s.e.	t	p	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Polity Persistence	-.033	.030	-1.10	.273	-.055	.026	-2.13	.034
Civil War Duration	.311	.191	1.63	.103	.181	.180	1.00	.317
Post-Civil War _{t-1 t-9}	.149	.132	1.13	.260	.132	.151	0.88	.381
Protest _{t-1}	.143	.029	4.89	.000	.102	.029	3.57	.000
Rebellion _{t-1}	.061	.043	1.43	.153	-.042	.048	-0.87	.385
Democratization	-.113	.107	-1.06	.291	-.098	.101	-0.97	.334
Autocratization	.202	.096	2.11	.035	.072	.093	0.77	.442
Leader Chg. _{t-1}	-.040	.064	-0.63	.528	-.079	.063	-1.26	.206
Constant	1.331	.114	11.69	.000	1.064	.122	8.72	.000
Dep Var. _{t-1} ^a	-1.944	.106	-18.37	.000	-1.691	.092	-18.31	.000
α^b	.884	.038	23.38	.000	.818	.048	17.03	.000
ULL ^c					-2825			
RLL ^d					-3086			
χ^2		521				169		
p of χ^2		.000				.000		
N		5,512				5,512		

Note: See appendices for variable operationalization. All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aThe lagged dependent variable is the frequency of dispute initiator and target origination, respectively.

^b α is the dispersion coefficient.

^cUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^dRestricted Log-likelihood.

5.4.4.1. Dispute Initiator

The left-hand panel of Table 5.9 contains the results of the Negative Binomial model where the dependent variable, dispute initiation, is regressed on the set of covariates representing the political system. I discuss the effect of the individual covariates on the dependent variable, in turn.

The variable measuring the political community persistence is insignificant, yet negatively signed. This estimate is generally consistent in terms of the coefficient's sign and statistical insignificance. With respect to the two measures of civil war, ongoing civil wars and post-civil war, the signs of the coefficients are similar to those in the earlier analysis, while the statistical significance of the

coefficients weakens considerably. The coefficient for ongoing civil wars falls just below one-tailed statistical significance. Substantively, this means that states experiencing ongoing civil wars are expected to initiate a significantly greater frequency of disputes than are states not experiencing these forms of domestic upheaval. Interestingly, civil wars do not appear to have any residual effects, as the variable intended to capture this, post-civil war, is not statistically significant. The second set of variables intended to measure the effect of political climate on the frequency of interstate conflict, protest and rebellion and government instability, are positively signed but only the protest indicator is statistically significant from zero.

Turning to the two general measures of regime change, democratization and autocratization, some interesting results are reported for the coefficients in Table 5.9. In particular, the coefficient for democratization is negatively signed, although statistically insignificant; autocratization remains consistent with the earlier analysis. Lastly, the variable measuring the effect of a one-year lag of the frequency of regime change is statistically insignificant.

5.4.4.2. Dispute Target

The results of the Negative Binomial estimates for dispute initiator are reported in the right-hand half of Table 5.9. With respect to polity persistence, the results are consistent with the earlier analysis: that is, the longer a polity persists, the lower the expected frequency in which a state will be the target of a dispute by another state.

In terms of the two measures of civil war, neither of the coefficients for the variables is statistically significant from zero. This finding is quite different from the earlier analysis, where each of the measures is positive and statistically significant. Again, this suggests that the earlier findings are not particularly robust across time. In terms of the second set of variables measuring the impact of the domestic political climate on the frequency of interstate disputes, the measures of protest and rebellion and government instability mirror those of the earlier analysis, which should not be surprising given the

relative similarity of the samples. As such, an increase in the value of the protest predicts a significant increase in the frequency of the state being the target of a dispute, while changes in the rebellion and government instability indicator has no significant effect on this frequency.

Lastly, the results for the relationship between regime changes, as well as leadership change, and dispute target are somewhat perplexing. None of the coefficients for these three variables are statistically significant from zero, as identified in the earlier analysis. Again, these findings are of some concern, and suggest that there is a good deal of temporal inconsistency regarding these relationships in the data.

5.5. Conclusions

The statistical analyses in this chapter provide a further test of the impact of the political system components on a specific category of interstate conflict, militarized interstate disputes. In general, the empirical findings reported in this chapter are consistent with those discussed in the fourth chapter, where interstate conflict was measured with events representing the gamut of interstate conflictual behaviors. In particular, the research in this chapter suggests the following conclusions:

- As with the earlier results, the hypothesized negative relationship between political community persistence and the interstate disputes is reaffirmed; that is, as political communities mature, they are less likely to be involved in disputes. The relationship is particularly strong in terms of the frequency that a state will be the target of a dispute;
- In terms of the relationship between political climate and the frequency of interstate disputes, the empirical results suggest support for the second hypothesis, that a poor political climate predicts an increase in a state's subsequent frequency of involvement in interstate conflict. Specifically, a one-year lag of the less severe dimension of domestic conflict, protest, predicts a subsequent increase in a state being the initiator and target of disputes. A one-year lag of the

more severe conflict dimension. rebellion and government instability, was only statistically significantly related to dispute initiator, but not dispute target:

- The empirical results for the relationship between civil war and dispute frequency are each statistically significant and positive. Curiously, these relationship disappears entirely when I consider their impact on dispute target in the 1919-86 sample:
- In terms of the hypotheses regarding the relationship between political regime change and interstate disputes, the results are in many cases very strong. Specifically, analysis of the impact of democratization and autocratization on interstate disputes indicate support for the hypothesis anticipating a positive relationship between regime changes and subsequent interstate conflict. However, a disaggregation of democratization and autocratization measures based on the location, magnitude, and direction of the change, reveal significant differences in how one might go about interpreting the general relationship. Indeed, autocratic types of regime change account for most of the variance explained in the dependent variable. In addition, sub-setting the 1816-1992 data into pre- and post-WWII samples suggests important temporal variation in the relationship between regime change and interstate disputes, variations that are left unaccounted for in my discussion in the third chapter: and
- Lastly, the empirical analysis of the relationship between political authorities and militarized disputes provides some support for the final hypothesis. Turnover in a political system's authorities appears to be linked to a subsequent increase in militarized interstate dispute involvement.

The empirical analysis reported this chapter supports the general contention that domestic political system change and instability have significant implications for foreign policy. In addition, each of the components of the domestic political system has a positive relationship with the dependent variable, militarized interstate disputes. One claim in the literature is that domestic political change and instability decrease the likelihood of subsequent interstate conflict. This general relationship does not

appear to be supported by the analysis that I conduct here. Rather, if anything, domestic political change and instability increase involvement of the state in foreign policy, a portion of which may involve interstate conflict.

CHAPTER 6

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND INTERSTATE WARS

6.1. Introduction

In keeping with chapters four and five, in the following chapter I examine the relationship between the set of domestic political system components and of interstate conflict. However, below I am concerned with estimating the impact of the political system variables on the most severe form of interstate conflict, interstate war.

I organize the empirical analysis in the following manner. First, in order to test the first hypothesis, that political communities are less likely to become involved in interstate conflict the longer they persist, I estimate a model in which I regress the occurrence of interstate war on polity persistence. Second, I test the second hypothesis by examining the impact of three measures of political system climate, two dimensions of domestic conflict and a third identifying civil wars, on states' war involvement. Third, I examine the relationship between political regime change and the probability of a state becoming involved in a war. Lastly, with respect to the fourth and fifth hypotheses, I test whether the frequency and proximity of changes in political authorities results in changes in the probability of a state's involvement in war.

6.2. Empirical Analysis

In this section of the paper, I test the aforementioned hypotheses. Specifically, I use several empirical methods to examine relationships between the three categories of the domestic political system

(the independent variables) and a single indicator of interstate conflict (the dependent variable), interstate war. While interstate war is considered to be the most extreme and rare form of conflict between states, its causes and effects remain the primary focus of the world politics literature.

6.2.1. The Political Community and Interstate War

6.2.1.1. Political Community Persistence

Recall that I formulated two hypotheses in my discussion of the relationship between the political community and interstate conflict. The first hypothesis focuses on the persistence, or survival, of the political community, and anticipates a negative relationship between persistence of the political community and interstate conflict. In other words, the longer a political community persists, the lower the probability that it should engage in interstate conflict. I resort to the COW data on interstate war participation to measure the dependent variable, war origination.³⁶ To operationalize war origination, I construct a dichotomous variable coded with a value of 1 in any observation (i.e., nation-year) in which a state is on side A or B during the first day of a war, and 0 otherwise.

I test the first hypothesis by estimating a logistic regression (Liao, 1994) on a TSCS data matrix for the interstate system members for the 1816-1986 period. Specifically, I regress the variable war origination on the variable log of polity persistence. The results of this estimation are reported in Table 6.1.

³⁶ See the discussion of the descriptive properties of the COW interstate war participation measure located in Appendix C.

Table 6.1. Logit Estimates of the Impact
of Polity Persistence on Subsequent
War Origination, 1816-1986^a

Variable	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Polity Persistence ^b	-.007	.045	-0.15	.884
Constant	-3.656	.143	-25.60	.000
War Orig. _{t-1}	.906	.284	3.20	.001
ULL ^c	-1127			
RLL ^d	-1131			
χ^2	8.130			
p of χ^2	.017			
N	9,498			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aWar Origination=side A or B on the first day.
Data from Singer and Small (1994).

^bPolity persistence is from Gurr, et al. (1989).

^cUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^dRestricted Log-likelihood.

The results reported in Table 6.1 indicate that there is no statistical relationship between the log of states' polity persistence and their probability of originating wars. Although the sign of the coefficient for polity persistence is in the predicted direction—negative—this finding may, in fact, be due purely to chance. In sum, there appears to be little statistical relationship between the age of the political community, and its involvement in interstate war. In other words, the analysis suggests no link between political community maturity and war involvement: states that are “young” and “old” do not, on average, exhibit statistically significantly different log-odds of originating a war.

6.2.1.2. Political Community Climate

6.2.1.2.1. Protest and Rebellion Dimensions

In the third chapter, I propose that the level of domestic conflict present in a state may serve as a barometer of that state's domestic political climate. Doing so led me to formulate a second hypothesis in which I anticipate a positive relationship between domestic conflict and interstate conflict. I test a lagged relationship between political climate and interstate war origination, so as to avoid the potential problem of circularity between the dependent and independent variables. The results of this estimation for the period 1919-92 are reported in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2. Logit Estimates of the Impact of Domestic Conflict on Subsequent War Origination, 1919-1992.^a

Variable	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Protest _{t-1} ^b	.169	.053	3.17	.002
Rev. and Government Instability _{t-1} ^b	.152	.060	2.52	.012
Constant	-4.206	.102	-41.14	.000
War Orig _{t-1}	1.087	.450	2.42	.016
ULL ^c	-563			
RLL ^d	-571			
χ^2	16			
p of χ^2	0.001			
N	6.805			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aWar Origination=side A or B on the first day.

^bFactor scores (principle components, varimax normilized) of weighted Banks (1993, 1996) domestic conflict events.

^cUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^dRestricted Log-likelihood.

A review of the t-ratios for the one-year lags of the protests and revolution and government instability dimensions in Table 6.2 indicates a positive, statistically significant relationship between these two variables and the probability of war origination. Specifically, the occurrence of high levels of protest in

the previous year predicts a statistically significantly greater probability of war in the current year. The same relationship, albeit a slightly smaller coefficient, emerges for the rebellion and government instability dimension. In supporting the second hypothesis, these results also support the long-standing argument that states experiencing domestic conflict are more likely to be involved in interstate conflict as well.

The coefficients for the protest and rebellion and government instability dimensions shown in Table 6.2 represent the average effect of these variables on the probability of war. What is the predicted impact of domestic conflict on the probability of war for the range of values exhibited by the two independent variables? To address this question, I calculate the predicted probabilities of war across a range of hypothetical values for the protest and rebellion and government instability dimensions. The predicted impact of protest on the probability of war origination is illustrated in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1. Predicted Impact of Protest Dimension on the Probability of War, 1919-1992





Figure 6.1 clearly indicates the positive slope of the predicted probability of war origination across a range of values for protest. Moreover, the figure also reveals that across the range of values for the

protest dimension, the probability of war nearly quintuples. That is, when the value for protest is -5.0, the predicted probability of war is about 0.006. Yet the predicted probability of war increases to 0.033 when the value of protest is 5.0. This is a considerable increase in the probability of war origination. A similar relationship also obtains when we consider the impact of rebellion and government instability on the probability of war. I illustrate this relationship in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2. Predicted Impact of Rebellion and Government Instability on the Probability of War, 1919-1992



6.2.1.2.2. Civil War

In this section, I test these relationships using a set of variables measuring political community climate, as well as variables for ongoing civil wars and the post-civil war period. My theoretical, spatial, and temporal reasons for doing so are explained at length in chapter four. As with the earlier analyses, I estimated a Logit model by regressing war participation on the two civil war variables. The results of this statistical estimation are reported in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3. Logit Estimates of the Impact
of Civil War on Subsequent War
Origination, 1816-1992.

Variable	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Civil War Duration ^a	.078	.344	0.23	.820
Post-civil War _{t, t+9} ^b	.086	.248	0.35	.730
Constant	-3.805	.069	-55.02	.000
War Orig. _{t-1}	.967	.283	3.42	.001
ULL ^c	-1198			
RLL ^d	-1203			
X ²	9.28			
p of X ²	.026			
N	11,086			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aCivil war duration variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for the length of the war, and 0 otherwise.

^bPost-civil war variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for t...t+9 years following the terminal duration year.

^cUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^dRestricted Log-likelihood.

A review of the t-ratios for the two civil war variables demonstrates that neither reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. These results suggest two conclusions. First, occurrence of the most severe form of political community conflict, civil war, is not associated with a state's involvement in interstate wars. Second, having experienced the trauma of civil war, states are not significantly more likely to participate in interstate wars in the decade following the end of the civil war.

In this section of the chapter I test the first and second hypotheses. With the first hypothesis I anticipate a negative relationship between political community persistence and interstate war origination: political communities in their formative years would be the most likely to initiate and be the targets of conflict with other states. I identify little empirical support for this hypothesis. The second hypothesis anticipates a positive relationship between various measures of political climate and subsequent interstate war. I identify relatively firm empirical support for this hypothesis, particularly for

the political conflict dimensions of protest and rebellion and government instability. Measures of civil war duration as well as a variable identifying the decade following the end of a civil war yield little statistical significance.

6.2.2. The Political Regime and Interstate War

In the fourth chapter I formulate three hypotheses about the relationship between political regime change and interstate conflict. The general thrust of the first hypothesis is that the closer, or more proximate, a regime change, the greater the probability of interstate conflict. The second and third hypotheses separate out the effects of democratic and autocratic regime changes. Below, I examine the relationship between different types of regime change and interstate war across three periods, 1816-1992, 1816-1945, and 1946-92.

6.2.2.1. 1816-1992 Sample

First, I estimate Logit models for the 1816-1992 sample. The results are reported in Table 6.4. The first model, located in the upper-half of the table, estimates relationship between two general indicators for regime change, democratization and autocratization, and interstate war origination. The second model, in the lower half of the table, disaggregates the democratization and autocratization variables into six sub-categories of regime change.

Table 6.4. Logit Estimates of the Impact of
Regime Change on Subsequent
War Origination, 1816-1992.

Variable	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Democratization	-.122	.199	-.613	.540
Autocratization	.239	.176	1.363	.173
Constant	-3.815	.077	-49.789	.000
War Orig. _{t-1}	.957	.283	3.384	.001
ULL ^a	-1196.9			
RLL ^b	-1202.7			
χ^2	11.59			
p of χ^2	0.0089			
N	11,086			
Major Democratization	-.372	.388	-.959	.338
Consolidating Democracy	-.157	.389	-.405	.686
Retreating Democracy	.477	.463	1.032	.302
Major Autocratization	.554	.274	2.018	.044
Liberalizing Autocracy	.029	.264	.110	.913
Consolidating Autocracy	.022	.233	.095	.924
Constant	-3.814	.077	-49.800	.000
War Orig. _{t-1}	.944	.283	3.332	.001
ULL	-1195.2			
RLL	-1202.7			
χ^2	15.0			
p of χ^2	.036			
N	11,086			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^bRestricted Log-likelihood.

Examining the t-ratios for democratization and autocratization in the upper half of the table, there appears to be little in the way of statistical significance. Although the coefficient for democratization shows some indication of a negative statistical relationship, it falls well below even a one-tailed threshold for statistical significance. Neither of the general measures of regime change, then, indicates that when these forms of domestic political change occur states have a significantly greater probability of participating in interstate war.

In chapter five the analysis of the impact of regime changes suggests the possibility that the general regime change measures may “wash out” some statistically significant relationships contained within the general categories. Therefore, in the lower half of Table 6.4, I disaggregate the general regime change measures and examine their relationships with interstate war. The only coefficient to achieve statistical significance is major autocratization, a relationship, as I alluded too earlier, that disappears in the aggregate analysis. Specifically, major autocratization is significant and positive, suggesting that political systems that experience major regime changes, from democratic to autocratic, have a greater probability of participating in a war than all other types of political systems, changing or stable.

Again, it is important to demonstrate the substantive impact of major autocratic regime changes on the probability of war, and I illustrate this relationship in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3. Effect of Major Autocratization on Subsequent War, 1816-1992




Figure 6.3 indicates that state-years in which the major autocratic change variable assumes a value of 1 have a higher probability of interstate war origination. Indeed, states that are undergoing major autocratic regime changes experience a 70% increase in the probability of war compared to stable states.

or states undergoing any other type of regime change. Having explored the relationships across the 1816-1992 period, I turn now to an identical set of statistical tests for the pre- and post-WWII samples.

6.2.2.2. 1816-1945 and 1946-92 Samples

6.2.2.2.1. 1816-1945 Sample

In this section, I test the regime change hypotheses on the pre- and post-WWII samples, 1816-1945 and 1946-92. In Table 6.5 I report the Logit estimates for the aggregated and disaggregated measures of political regime change.

Table 6.5. Logit Estimates of the Impact of
Regime Change on Subsequent
War Origination, 1816-1945.

Variable	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Democratization	-.054	.236	-.227	.820
Autocratization	.423	.219	1.937	.053
Constant	-3.517	.095	-36.845	.000
War Orig. _{t-1}	1.000	.301	3.323	.001
ULL ^a	-738.68			
RLL ^b	-745.09			
χ^2	12.832			
p of χ^2	0.005			
N	5,298			
Major Democratization	-.535	.590	-.906	.365
Consolidating Democracy	-.104	.463	-.225	.822
Retreating Democracy	.338	.730	.463	.643
Major Autocratization	.814	.343	2.375	.018
Liberalizing Autocracy	.110	.288	.384	.701
Consolidating Autocracy	.240	.280	.857	.391
Constant	-3.516	.095	-36.856	.000
War Orig. _{t-1}	.980	.302	3.247	.001
ULL	-737.2			
RLL	-745.1			
χ^2	15.777			
p of χ^2	0.0272			
N				

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.


^aUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^bRestricted Log-likelihood.

Review of the t-ratios for the general measures of democratization and autocratization in the upper half of Table 6.5 reveals a statistically significant positive relationship between the latter and war origination for the pre-WWII period. That is, the results of the Logit estimation suggest that autocratic regime change increases the probability of a state's subsequent war participation, finding that is consistent with the results reported for the 1816-1992 sample in Table 6.4.

Another way in which to demonstrate this relationship is to plot the change in the probability of war given an autocratic regime change, and I do so in Figure 6.4.

Figure 6.4. Impact of Autocratic Transition on War Origination, 1816-1945.



As Figure 6.4 illustrates, the probability of a state becoming involved in a war following an autocratic regime change increases from 0.031 to 0.043 during the subsequent ten-year period, change in value of approximately 40%. However, within this pre-WWII sample there appears to be very little empirical support for the argument that democratic regime change has any significant effect on the subsequent war-proneness of states. Commensurate with the weak statistical findings in the upper half of Table 6.5, the bottom half of the same table, where the general regime change indicators are disaggregated, reveal few surprises, although the estimated coefficient for major autocratization is greater in magnitude than its counterpart in Table 6.4.

6.2.2.2.2. 1946-1992 Sample

Lastly, I consider the impact of regime changes on interstate war origination during the post-WWII period, 1946-92. In Table 6.6, I report the results of the Logit estimation where the dichotomous measure of interstate war participation is regressed on the general and disaggregated measures of regime change.

Table 6.6. Logit Estimates of the Impact of
Regime Change on Subsequent
War Origination, 1946-1992.

Variable	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Democratization	-.335	.378	-.887	.375
Autocratization	.093	.298	.312	.755
Constant	-4.192	.129	-32.619	.000
War Orig. _{t-1}	-.258	1.012	-.255	.799
ULL ^a	-438.37			
RLL ^b	-438.93			
χ^2	1.133			
p of χ^2	0.769			
N	5.788			
Major Democratization	-.056	.520	-.108	.914
Consolidating Democracy	-.317	.722	-.438	.661
Retreating Democracy	.836	.601	1.390	.165
Major Autocratization	.341	.470	.727	.467
Liberalizing Autocracy	-.744	.721	-1.032	.302
Consolidating Autocracy	-.275	.430	-.639	.523
Constant	-4.191	.128	-32.627	.000
War Orig. _{t-1}	-.305	1.013	-.301	.764
ULL	-436.8			
RLL	-438.93			
χ^2	4.265			
p of χ^2	0.748			
N	5.788			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^bRestricted Log-likelihood.

In the top half of Table 6.6, the t-scores for democratization and autocratization suggest different results from those found in the pre-WWII sample. Specifically, the coefficient for democratization is negative, but remains statistically insignificant. In addition, the coefficient for autocratization is not statistically different from zero. Again, it is important to review the relationship between the disaggregated regime change measures and interstate war origination. A review of the coefficients in the lower half of Table 6.6 indicates that none of the coefficients achieve statistical significance. That is, the aggregate measures of regime change do not appear to mask any relationships contained in the disaggregated regime change measures.

6.2.2.3. Conclusion

In this section I test the third hypothesis and its corollaries. These hypotheses anticipate that regime changes would have a significant effect on war origination. The analysis reveals some support for the hypotheses for the 1816-1992 sample, where the estimated coefficient for major autocratization was statistically significant and positive. A sub-sampling of the data for the 1816-1992 period into pre- and post-WWII periods suggests that the relationship between major autocratization and subsequent interstate war is the product of the pre-WWII sample rather than in the post-WWII sample. Next, I turn to the analysis of the relationship between the political authorities and interstate war.

6.2.3. The Political Authorities and Interstate War

In the previous chapter, I formulated two hypotheses about the relationship between domestic political authorities and interstate conflict. The first hypothesis identifies a relationship between the frequency of leadership turnover and interstate conflict, while the second anticipates a relationship between the proximity of leadership changes and interstate conflict. In the following section, I test these hypotheses.

To measure leadership change I use a variable recording the frequency of changes in a nation's chief executive per year for the 1816-1992 period. As with the previous analyses, the units of analysis are the nation-year, and the dependent variable is war origination. Employing the lagged frequency of leadership change, it is possible to test the sixth and seventh hypotheses by estimating a single Logistic regression. Therefore, in the following analyses, I examine the impact of the lagged frequency of leadership changes on interstate war origination.

The results of the Logit equations where values for war origination are regressed on the contemporaneous and lagged values for leadership change are reported in Table 6.7.³⁷

Table 6.7. Logit Estimates of the Impact of Leadership Changes on War Origination, 1816-1992

Variable	coef.	s.e.	t	p	N
Leadership Change _t ^a	.388	.086	4.52	.000	11,086
Leadership Change _{t-1}	.301	.092	3.26	.001	11,086
Leadership Change _{t-2}	.220	.100	2.20	.028	10,862
Leadership Change _{t-3}	-.009	.124	-0.07	.944	10,655
Leadership Change _{t-4}	.157	.107	1.46	.145	10,452
Leadership Change _{t-5}	.129	.110	1.17	.241	10,249

Note: Row coefficients are from separate logit equations with lagged dependent variables. All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.

^aLeadership change variable is the frequency of chief-executive changes per state-year (see Banks 1996).


A review of the t-ratios indicates that contemporaneous leadership change, as well as one and two-year lags have statistically significant, positively signed coefficients. Given the statistically insignificant coefficients for the three through five-year lags, turnover in chief executives appears to have an immediate, short-term effect on the probability of war origination. These results provide relatively firm support for the expectations expressed in the sixth and seventh hypotheses: that is, the more proximate,

³⁷ Again, I estimate separate logit equations for each lag length.

and the greater the frequency of leadership change, the greater the probability that a political system will originate a subsequent war.

As with the previous analysis of the other political system components, it is important to demonstrate how the probability of war origination changes across a range of values for the leadership change variable. Figure 6.5 illustrates these predicted probabilities in which the coefficient for leadership changes at time $t-1$ is employed in the calculations.

Figure 6.5. Impact of the Frequency of Leadership Changes on the Probability of War, 1816-1992



As indicated by the steep, positive slope of the line in the figure, as the frequency of chief-executive change increases, so too does the probability of a state's participation in war during the following year. In particular, across the range of values for leadership change (0-7), the predicted probability of war origination increases by about seven-fold (from 0.02 to about 0.146). Stated differently, a state experiencing seven leadership changes at time $t-1$ has a 600% increase in the probability of participating in a war at time t . However, instances in which states experience seven leadership changes in a single year are infrequent. Yet, if I only consider the maximum value of leadership change to be a value of two,

then the change in probability along the y-axis is from 0.020 to 0.036, an 83% increase in the probability of a state experiencing such changes participating in a war. Thus, even a relatively low frequency of leadership change at time $t-1$ results in a significant increase in the probability of war at time t . Next, turn to a unified analysis of the relationship between the political system components and interstate war.

6.2.4. A Unified Empirical Model

There are several reasons to analyze the set of political system components in a single, unified statistical model. Namely, my general argument is that the dynamics of the political system as a whole are linked to the probability of interstate conflict. Therefore, it is important to be able to understand their joint impact on the probability of war origination. In order to accomplish this task, I estimate a Logistic regression including each of the independent political system variables from the previous analyses. As with the earlier models, these data are arranged in a TSCS format, with state-year as the unit of analysis. As I noted above, including each of these variables in the analysis reduces the temporal sample to the period 1919-86. In addition, where a variable has been lagged in an earlier analysis, I only include a measure of a one-year lag in the model. The Logit estimates for the unified model, where the variable war participation is regressed on the eight measures of the political system, are reported in Table 6.8.

Table 6.8. Logit Estimates of the Impact of Domestic Political System Attributes on Subsequent War Origination, 1919-1986 (Unified Model)

Variable	coef.	s.e.	t	p
Polity Persistence	.020	.084	0.24	.814
Protest _{t-1}	.161	.053	3.04	.002
Rebellion _{t-1}	.134	.065	2.05	.040
Civil War	.485	.443	1.10	.274
Post-Civil War _{t-1 t-4}	-.681	.598	-1.14	.255
Democratization	-.610	.339	-1.80	.072
Autocratization	-.175	.291	-0.60	.548
Leader Chg. _{t-1}	.297	.140	2.12	.034
Constant	-4.096	.288	-14.24	.000
War Orig. _{t-1}	.970	.454	2.14	.033
ULL ^a	-499			
RLL ^b	-512			
χ^2	26			
p of χ^2	.002			
N	5,512			

Note: All models estimated in LIMDEP 7.0.


^aUnrestricted Log-likelihood.

^bRestricted Log-likelihood.

The results reported in Table 6.8 do not deviate significantly from the previous analyses. Specifically, the coefficient for polity persistence is statistically insignificant. The one-year lags of protest and rebellion and government instability, on the other hand, are statistically significant and positively signed. Interestingly, the variables for the duration of a civil war and the post-civil war period are positively and negatively signed, respectively. Each of these variables, however, although more significant than in the individual analysis, still fall short of conventional significance criteria. In considering the general measures of regime change, it is again clear that democratization has a negative impact on subsequent war origination. Finally, the coefficient for the one-year lag of leadership change indicates that the frequency and proximity of leadership change is associated with a subsequent increase in the probability of war.

Given the estimated effects that are reported for the unified model in Table 6.8, it may prove useful to illustrate the additive effect of these political system variables on the probability of a state's war participation. In Figure 6.6, I illustrate how the statistically significant coefficients from the unified model in Table 6.8 affect the probability of war.³⁸

Figure 6.6. Impact of Significant Coefficients on P(War) from Unified Model



The histogram in Figure 6.6 represents several "scenarios" of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. In particular, the first category indicates the probability of war when only the

³⁸ I show two series in Figure 6.6. The dotted column illustrates the impact of the four independent variables when the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is multiplied by a value of 1 (indicating that the state was involved in a war at time $t-1$.) The cross-hatched columns reflect the impact of these same independent variables when the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is multiplied by a value of 0 (indicating that the state did not participate in a war origination at time $t-1$.) A note about the categories along the x-axis. The first category, labeled "R," means that each of the four independent variables is restricted to zero. The next four categories restrict the value of a specific independent variable to zero, while allowing the other independent variables to vary from zero, respectively. Hence, the label "Prot R" means that the value of the protest dimension is held to zero, while the other variables are not. The final category, labeled "UR" contains the predicted probabilities when all of the coefficients are allowed to vary; that is, they are unrestricted.

lagged dependent variable is allowed to take on a value (i.e., one), while the other four independent variables are held constant at zero. In this scenario, the probability of a state being in a war at time t more than doubles when that state has been a party to a war origination in time $t-1$. In the second and third categories on the x-axis, Prot R and Reb R, the respective probabilities for war decrease, as the negative coefficient for democratization exerts more influence on the equation. Indeed, when I restrict democratization to zero (the fourth category), the probability of war regardless of the value of the lagged dependent variable jumps by approximately 34%. This scenario, then, represents the probability of war for states that are experiencing a poor political climate and leadership turnover in time $t-1$. It seems clear, then, that the presence of a regime change (here the negative effect of democratization) has the capacity to attenuate the impact of the other political system variables.

6.3. Conclusions

At the outset this chapter, I discuss the relationship between the domestic political system and interstate conflict as they are grounded in the notions of vulnerability and aggression. After formulating a set of hypotheses about the relationship between three components of the domestic political system, the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities and interstate war origination, I carry out a series of empirical tests intended to explore the validity of these hypotheses. The empirical analysis generates moderate support for the set of hypotheses. Specifically, the empirical analysis suggests the following findings in regards to the relationship between the political system components and interstate war:

- Neither the hypothesized direction, nor the statistical significance, of the relationship between political community persistence and war origination obtains;
- The two measures of political climate, protest and rebellion and government instability, demonstrate a positive and significant lagged relationship with war origination;

- Exploring the relationship between the most severe form of domestic conflict, civil war, and war origination reveals no statistically significant relationship with interstate war:
- With respect to domestic political regimes, particularly types of regime change, some interesting results emerged when (a) the general indicators of democratic and autocratic regime change are disaggregated into sub-categories, and (b) the 1816-1992 sample is divided into pre- and post-WWII sub-samples. In short, while states undergoing autocratic change are significantly more likely, on average, to originate wars in the pre-WWII period, states undergoing democratic changes during the post-WWII period are significantly less likely, on average, to originate wars: and
- There is support for a relationship between changes in political leaders and interstate war: lagged leader turnover has a significant and positive, if short-term impact on war origination.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

7.1. Introduction

In this concluding chapter I address three tasks. First, I identify and discuss the findings and conclusions identified in the previous chapters, particularly the analyses conducted in chapters four, five, and six. Second, I discuss some of the implications that these findings have for our understanding of the linkage of domestic politics–foreign policy. Lastly, I raise some issues for future research.

7.2. Conclusions

7.2.1. General Conclusions

Thus, the empirical analysis that I presented above suggested that the attributes of the domestic political system, primarily political system maturity, change, and instability have significant implications for the occurrence of interstate conflict. I demonstrated that incorporating these domestic political system components—the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities—into models focusing on the conditions contributing to the occurrence of interstate conflict added to our knowledge about when states are likely to engage one another in conflict.

This empirical confirmation of a long-standing intuitive notion of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy was, at the very least, supportive purely from the standpoint of replication. Yet as the empirical analyses themselves indicated, some domestic political system

components appeared to have more relevance, at least statistically, than did others. In the next section, I discuss some of the specific empirical findings, as well as reflecting on their implications for the hypotheses formulated in the third chapter.

7.2.2. Empirical Findings and Conclusions

In chapter three I developed several hypotheses based on the two notions that are central to the world politics literature's treatment of the relationship between domestic political system change and interstate conflict: vulnerability and aggression. Briefly, the literature suggested that states that are experiencing domestic political change are likely vulnerable to foreign pressure, pressure that may manifest itself in the form of military conflict. Thus, states undergoing domestic political change, or experiencing domestic instability, increased their likelihood of being the target of aggression from abroad. Similarly, stable states undergoing domestic political change or instability were found to be attractive targets for pressure, behavior that manifested itself in the form of militarized conflict.

Maoz (1989, 1996a) suggests that this link between domestic political change and instability may be reversed. States that are undergoing domestic political change and instability may be aggressive in foreign policy in their attempts to consolidate their power domestically and demonstrate their resolve as members of the interstate system (e.g., Cuba following Castro's ascendance to power.) States may also have an ulterior motive: to convince stable states that the newly changed state is not vulnerable: rather, that the state is capable of defending itself and its national security interests. Though less frequently cited, there is also an alternative argument for the behavior of stable states. While the classic hypothesis is that stable states will seek to pressure unstable states, a plausible alternative is that stable states will be

less likely to aggress changing or unstable states for fear that they will be drawn into complex conflicts that will be long and costly to prosecute.³⁹

Having identified the concepts of vulnerability and aggression, I integrated these concepts into the systems framework that I adopted from the research of Easton (1953, 1957, 1965). Easton focuses on three primary components of the political system, the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities. Drawing on the vulnerability and aggression dynamic, I formulated hypotheses for each of the components. It is clear from the discussion above that one can formulate hypotheses capturing several plausible relationships. Specifically, domestic political system change and instability may result in the unstable state being more or less likely to be the initiator and target of interstate aggression. A similar set of relationships likely holds for stable states that are proximate to unstable or changing states. That is, hypotheses might be derived from arguments suggesting that stable states would be more or less likely to pressure states that are experiencing change.

Below, I review the empirical analysis with several queries in mind: How does political system change in one state affect the behavior of other states? Are unstable and stable states more or less likely to initiate, and be the targets of, conflict with each other? How do these relationships, if any, vary across the type of domestic political change and type of interstate conflict?

7.2.2.1. Chapter Four: The Political System and General Interstate Conflict

I began the empirical analysis by examining the relationships hypothesized between the political system components discussed in chapters two and three and the range of conflictual behaviors sent and received by states as recorded in the COPDAB data set (Azar, 1993). The analysis suggested several conclusions. First, the relationship between political community persistence and interstate

³⁹ "Complex conflicts" are cases concern those in which, for example, the central authority of a state is weak or absent. These conditions may be the result of continued civil war conditions, regime change, or government turnover.

conflict was negatively signed. Substantively, the finding suggested that as political communities matured, they were less likely to be involved in interstate conflict, either as the sources, or as targets, of this conflict. This finding confirmed the dynamic whereby new political systems are more aggressive and vulnerable in interstate politics. However, while the statistical relationships for the aggregate COPDAB measures of total conflict sent and received by a nation-state were each negatively signed, only the former approximated conventional levels of statistical significance. Thus, immature political systems were likely to be aggressive in their foreign policies, but stable states were not statistically significantly more likely to direct conflict toward new political communities. These findings corroborated those reported by Maoz (1989, 1996a). They also suggested that the maturity of the political community might have a significant effect on a range of foreign conflict behavior, not solely those behaviors identified as militarized.

Second, in addition to constructing a hypothesis about the relationship between a political community's persistence and nation-states' involvement in interstate conflict, I also introduced hypotheses plumbing a second dimension of the political community, something I referred to as the political climate, and the occurrence of interstate conflict. I examined the validity of these hypotheses in two ways. First, I estimated the relationship between two dimensions of political climate, protest and rebellion and government instability, and the measures of total conflict sent and received by nation-states as derived from the COPDAB data. The empirical models indicated a statistically significant and positive relationship between the domestic conflict dimensions and interstate conflict for conflict sent and received by political communities. As such, these findings lent support to the hypotheses, as well as the long-standing contention in the world politics literature that states experiencing domestic political turmoil are more likely to be involved in conflict with other states.

In addition to my analysis of the political climate, I also investigated the relationship between two measures of civil war, ongoing civil war and a variable designed to capture the residual effects of civil wars on interstate behavior, post-civil war. The statistical analysis indicated a significant

and positive relationship between ongoing civil wars and the level of total conflict sent and received by a state. However, there appeared to be little in the way of residual effects from civil wars, as the measure of the post-civil war period was statistically insignificant. Still, the overall findings of this section generally supported the expectations that the presence of political turmoil in a political system significantly increased a state's conflict with other states. Much of the literature's contention is that change and instability increase, rather than decrease, the interactions between states, and these arguments were supported in my analysis of political community climate.

Third, I tested whether changes in political regimes, specifically democratic change (i.e., democratization) and autocratic change (i.e., autocratization), affected the conflict propensity of political systems. In order to do so, I estimated the relationship between measures of total conflict sent and received by each nation-state and eight measures of democratic and autocratic regime change. Interestingly, the general analysis indicated that democratizing states send significantly more conflict to other states, while autocratizing states do not. Neither general regime change measure showed any signs of a statistically significant relationship with total target conflict, suggesting that these types of domestic political change do not increase the vulnerability of states to conflict sent by other states.

A disaggregation of the total conflict sent and received revealed that the statistical significance between democratization and total actor conflict is concentrated primarily on the less severe end of the conflict scale. Moreover, a disaggregation of the general regime change indicators suggests that the statistical significance of autocratic change is contingent on the subcategory of change. Moreover, the breakdown of democracy, a process that I refer to as retreating democracy, suggested that the presence of statistically significant and positive relationships across the gamut of total actor and total target conflict. These findings led me to the conclusion that on the rare occasion when democratic regimes do erode, or break down, the resulting political system is significantly more aggressive and vulnerable as measured in terms of interstate conflict. This finding corroborates the findings of Ward

and Gleditsch (1998), in which the authors identify relationships between democratic breakdown (i.e., regime reversion) and war involvement.

Lastly, I developed two hypotheses addressing the relationship between the frequency and proximity of leadership change and the level of total actor and target interstate conflict as recorded in the COPDAB data. Regressing measures of total actor and target conflict on lagged values of the frequency of leadership change failed to indicate any consistent statistically significant relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Therefore, I concluded that there is little in the way of support for the sixth and seventh hypotheses linking the frequency of leadership change and interstate conflict.

My analysis of the relationship between the three political system components and the information on interstate conflict behavior taken from the COPDAB data set suggested some important findings. Of primary importance was the realization that the subset of political system components had "statistically relevant" implications for our understanding of interstate behavior. Having said this, my empirical analysis also indicated that the impact of many of these variables measuring characteristics and change in the domestic political system was often marginal in absolute terms. It was only by employing relative comparisons of the level of interstate conflict given the presence and absence of an independent variable "condition" that I was able to assess the impact of these political system components on the level of interstate conflict. Substantively, domestic political change and instability increased the foreign conflict activity of the political system. Alternatively, there was little indication that any of the domestic political components had a negative effect on conflict in foreign policy.

7.2.2.2. Chapter Five: The Political System and Militarized Interstate Disputes

The purpose of the fifth chapter was to investigate the impact of the set of domestic political components on a specific class of interstate conflict actions, militarized interstate disputes (see Gochman and Maoz, 1984; and Jones, et al., 1996). Below, I summarize the results and reflect upon their implications for the hypotheses formulated in the third chapter.

As with the earlier results, the hypothesized negative relationship between political community persistence and the frequency of militarized interstate disputes was generally supported by the analysis. Specifically, the coefficient for polity persistence was negative for the frequency of dispute initiation and target, although the latter relationship was the strongest in terms of statistical significance. From a substantive standpoint, these findings corroborated the conclusions drawn in the literature, particularly Maoz (1989, 1996a) and ONeal, et al. (1996), that as political systems mature they are less likely to be the initiators and targets of interstate conflict.

In terms of the relationship between political climate and the frequency of interstate disputes, the empirical results supported the second hypothesis. One-year lags of the two dimensions measuring domestic political conflict, protest and rebellion and government instability, achieved statistical significance and were positively signed. As such, these results indicated that high levels of each form of domestic political instability resulted in significantly greater expected frequencies of dispute initiation by the state.

With respect to the expected frequency with which a nation-state was the target of militarized disputes, only the protest dimension was statistically significant from zero. Thus, the results suggested that states experiencing high levels of rebellion and government instability were, on average, not any more likely to be the targets of a dispute than were states not experiencing this type of domestic conflict. This finding failed to support the argument that political systems experiencing high levels of domestic instability were the most vulnerable to external pressure. This absence of a relationship between rebellion and government instability and dispute target was somewhat puzzling, and even more so when I considered the relationship between the civil war indicators and interstate disputes.

The second set of political climate indicators, the measures of ongoing civil war and the post-civil war period, were uniformly supportive of the hypotheses. Specifically, each variable was statistically significant from zero and positively signed. These findings suggested that states undergoing civil wars had a significantly increased expected frequency of initiating, as well as being the target of,

disputes. Moreover, this finding failed to jibe with the empirical results for the relationship between the second domestic political climate dimension, rebellion and government instability, and states' frequency of being the target of disputes. Civil wars did appear to have some significant residual effects on states' propensity to engage in militarized disputes. Moreover, the results for the post-civil war period also suggested significant increases in the aggressiveness and vulnerability of states. Thus, the most severe form of domestic turmoil, civil war, appeared to have important implications of the behavior of states toward another. Again, each measure of civil war increased, rather than decreased, the subsequent interactions between states.

In terms of the analysis of the relationship between political regime change and interstate disputes, from a statistical standpoint the results are in many cases very strong. Specifically, analysis of the relationship between the two measures of general regime change, democratization and autocratization indicated support for the hypothesis anticipating a positive relationship between all types of regime change and subsequent interstate conflict. However, a breakdown of democratization and autocratization measures based on the location, magnitude, and direction of the change, revealed some important differences about how one might go about interpreting the general relationship.

In particular, each of the disaggregated measures of regime change, save the measure for major democratization, was statistically significant from zero and positively signed when the dependent variable was the frequency of dispute initiation. However, when the dependent variable was the frequency of dispute target only those regime change indicators measuring negative changes in democracy (i.e., retreating democracy, major autocratization, and consolidating democracy) were statistically significant from zero. That is, autocratic regime changes made a state subsequently more vulnerable to attack by other states. Autocratic and democratic regime changes made states subsequently more prone to initiate disputes with other states (although not when the democratic change consists of changes toward the most coherent form of democratic political system via a major democratic change.)

In addition, sub-setting the 1816-1992 sample into pre- and post-WWII samples indicated significant cross-temporal variation in the relationship between regime change and interstate disputes, variation that is not accounted for by the hypotheses. Specifically, while democratization and autocratization each appeared to increase political systems' subsequent frequency of dispute involvement during the pre-WWII sample, only the latter form of regime change accounted for this increase in the expected frequency in the post-WWII sample. Lastly, commensurate with the empirical findings in this and chapter four, the relationships between the regime change indicators and militarized disputes were uniformly positive. Again, domestic political regime change increased, rather than decreased, interstate conflict in foreign policy.

My analysis of the relationship between the lagged frequency of leadership change and the frequency of dispute involvement also suggested some interesting results. Specifically, while there appeared to be a generally positive relationship between lagged leadership change and the frequency of interstate disputes, the cross-temporal statistical significance of this relationship varied considerably. The results of the empirical analysis where the dependent variable was involvement in interstate disputes generally corresponded to the results for the analysis of the COPDAB data. That is, the lagged frequency of leadership change had a statistically significant and positive relationship with interstate conflict, although the relationship exhibited temporal variation.

In sum, the empirical results reported in the in the fifth chapter, where the dependent variable was militarized interstate disputes, paralleled those identified with analysis of the COPDAB data in chapter four. This overall pattern was encouraging, given the difference in the dependent variables, as well as the periods across which the models were estimated. In the next section, I sum up the final set of analyses reported in chapter six, where the dependent variable was war origination.

7.2.2.3. Chapter Six: The Political System and International War

In chapter six I examined whether the hypotheses outlined in the third chapter were supported when I examined the most severe form of interstate conflict, interstate war. Although the occurrence of war is rare relative to other forms of interstate conflict, it remains one of the most catastrophic phenomenon occurring between states, and the world politics literature has devoted considerable energy to exploring the reasons for its outbreak. As I have done in the previous two sections of this chapter, I review the basic empirical results with respect to each hypothesis.

The analysis of the relationship between political community persistence and states' war proneness indicated, perhaps surprisingly, the absence of a statistically significant relationship. That is, the maturing, or persistence, of polities appeared to have no discernible effect on the probability with which political systems originated interstate wars. As such, these empirical findings offered little support for the first set of hypotheses concerning the relationship between the age of the political community and the likelihood of interstate conflict.

With respect to the relationship between political community climate and subsequent international war involvement, the empirical tests of the relationship between one-year lags of the two domestic conflict dimensions, protest and rebellion and government instability, indicated statistically significant and positive relationships with war origination. In substantive terms, the greater the value of these two dimensions at time $t-1$ in a given state, the greater the probability that the state originated a war. War proneness and domestic turmoil, then, do appeared to be linked, at least statistically. However, this relationship between domestic conflict and war-proneness attenuated considerably when I consider the relationship between the two civil war indicators and war origination; neither of the two variables approach conventional levels of statistical significance. It is unclear why these results diverged in this fashion, particularly given the general consistency across the indicators in the analyses in chapters four and five.

With respect to the relationship between domestic political regime change and interstate war, some interesting results emerged from the statistical analysis. This is particularly the case when (a) general indicators of democratic and autocratic regime change were disaggregated, and (b) the 1816-1992 sample was divided into pre- and post-WWII samples. In short, while states undergoing autocratic change were significantly more likely, on average, to have originated wars in the pre-WWII period, neither type of regime change had any appreciable effect on the probability of states originating wars in the post-WWII period.

Lastly, the statistical analysis yields support for the relationship between changes in political leaders and interstate conflict: at least in short term. Specifically, similar to some of the earlier analysis on the militarized interstate disputes in chapter five, the lagged effects of the frequency leadership change had a significant and positive, although short-lived, impact on subsequent war origination. That is, across a series of Logit models containing lags of one through five-years, only the coefficients measuring one and two-year lags of the frequency of leadership change were statistically significant from zero, while the remaining coefficients were not statistically different from zero.

7.2.3. General Discussion and Summation of Empirical Analyses

Perhaps the primary conclusion one can draw from the empirical analysis reported in chapters four, five, and six centers on the connection between political systems as dynamic structures and foreign policy behavior. I examined these general relationships across a broad set of conflictual foreign policy behaviors, ranging from verbal demands to war origination. Within the context of this analysis, a number of empirical consistencies emerged. Simply put, the analyses demonstrated that changes in the structure and stability of the domestic political system influence the foreign policy behavior of states. In particular, the analyses suggested that political system change and instability generally increased the conflictual interactions occurring between states. In the remainder of this section, I demonstrate this finding.

To facilitate comparison of the results of the empirical analyses across chapters four, five, and six, I summarize these findings in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. Summary of Statistical Results, Chapters 4, 5, 6

Variables	COPDAB ^a		Disputes ^b		Wars ^c
	<i>Actor</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Initiator</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Origination</i>
Polity Persistence	-1	—	—	-2	—
Protest _{t-1}	+2	+2	+2	+2	+2
Rebellion & Gov. Inst. _{t-1}	+2	+2	+2	—	+2
Ongoing Civil War	+2	+2	+2	+2	—
Post-Civil War _{t0...t+9}	—	—	+2	+2	—
Democratization _{t0...t+9} ^d	+2	—	+2	+1	—
Autocratization _{t0...t+9} ^d	—	—	+2	+2	—
Leader Chg. _{t-1}	—	—	+2	+2	+2

Note: +1=positively signed and statistically significant from zero, one-tailed.

+2=positively signed and statistically significant from zero, two-tailed.

-1=negatively signed and statistically significant from zero, one-tailed.

-2=negatively signed and statistically significant from zero, two-tailed.

"—" =coefficient not statistically significant from zero.

^aTotal actor and target conflict scores, see Chapter 4.

^bFrequency count, 1816-1992 sample, see Chapter 5.

^cDichotomous variable, see Chapter 6.

^dGeneral regime change indicators.

Table 7.1 reports some interesting overall patterns in the analysis. First, each of the statistically significant relationships, save the two for political community persistence, is positively signed. In other words, the table indicates that the effect of most of the political system components is to increase the general conflict activity of states. As such, domestic political change and climate do not neutralize a state's participation in conflict with other states.

Second, note the puzzling inconsistency of the relationship between polity persistence and the three sets of interstate conflict measures. The polity persistence measure does not have a consistently statistically significant effect across the COPDAB, militarized interstate disputes, or interstate war indicators of interstate conflict. The polity persistence indicator is perhaps most consistent in the

analyses where the dependent variable is dispute initiator or target frequency (with a negative and nearly statistically significant coefficient, one-tailed.) This said, there does not appear to be a very powerful, general negative effect on interstate conflict behavior.

Third, note that in Table 7.1 there does not appear to be much in the way of a significant difference between the impact of these political system components on the conflict initiation or vulnerability (i.e., target) behavior of states. That is, the statistical analyses summarized in Table 7.1 do not suggest stark differences regarding the impact of the political system variables on interstate conflict behavior. States do not generally appear to be more or less likely to initiate, than to be the targets of, interstate conflict given the presence of these conditions. Thus, vulnerable states are both the aggressor and the aggressed, depending upon the behavior one chooses to analyze.

Fourth, the set of political system components appears to have its broadest impact on the occurrence of militarized interstate disputes (columns three and four), as 14 of the relationships reported for this form of conflict are statistically significant from zero. Unfortunately, there is no compelling reason why this finding emerges. Furthermore, while the relationship between political system change and instability is consistently the strongest when the dependent variable is militarized interstate disputes, the direction of the coefficients is consistent with the analyses where the dependent variables are derived from the COPDAB and interstate war data sets.

Fifth, the statistical relationships between the set of political system components and the three measures of interstate conflict are statistically their weakest when the dependent variable is interstate war origination. In Table 7.1, only the lagged measures of protest, rebellion and government instability, and leadership change register statistically significant relationships with war origination. Perhaps the generally statistically insignificant results of the analyses where interstate war is the dependent is not surprising given the sample size restrictions incurred with the inclusion of these independent variables.

Lastly, the summary of the empirical results reported in Table 7.1 suggests that the political system components that register the most consistent statistical relationships across the three measures of interstate conflict are the two domestic conflict dimensions, protest and rebellion and government instability. Regardless of the specific measure of interstate conflict, the relationships between these two dimensions and interstate conflict are nearly uniformly statistically significant and positively signed (save the relationship between rebellion and government instability and dispute target and war origination.) These results are intriguing expressly because previous research has found the empirical relationship between domestic political change and instability and interstate conflict to be inconsistent. However, my analysis here suggests a positive and robust relationship (i.e., with respect to the dependent variable.)

7.2.4. Implications of Empirical Findings for Literature

What are the implications of these findings for the literature focusing on the relationship between the domestic political system and interstate conflict? Reduced to its most basic form, the research conducted herein suggests that a number of domestic political conditions and dynamics that we associate with a dynamic domestic political system do have significant implications for the interstate conflict behavior of states. The hypotheses analyzed during the course of this dissertation join a growing body of research in the world politics and comparative foreign policy fields, both quantitative and qualitative, identifying linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy.

The research that I report in the previous chapters presents some important innovations. First, I showed that the research agendas outlined in the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures are similar to one another with respect to their treatment of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. Second, working from Easton's (1956) notions of a political system, I introduced a general framework of the domestic political system, and I formulate variables measuring components of this framework. Specifically, I focused on the political community, the political regime,

and the political authorities. Through the notions of vulnerability and aggression, I examined the statistical strength of the relationships between these political system components and indicators of interstate conflict, in addition to identifying the relative impact of these relationships on interstate behavior.

7.3. Implications of Study for Policymaking

In this section, I discuss the implications of this study for policymaking in international politics. The first item is less a suggestion than a realization, and probably one the policy-maker and country specialist would find unsurprising. I am referring here to the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy. Within the context of this linkage, I have identified consistent empirical results suggesting several relationships between components and dynamics of the domestic political system and the occurrence of interstate conflict. I suggest that it is helpful to think about this linkage in terms of the two notions of vulnerability and aggression. Changes in domestic political regimes, for instance, alter leaders' perception of their domestic and interstate vulnerability, and this change in their perception affects the probability of conflict between states. Therefore, it is important that policy makers responsible for formulating foreign policy to consider this linkage, and its impact on the dynamics of domestic and interstate vulnerability and aggression. Moreover, the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities each appear to have a generally positive, or increasing, effect on the level, frequency, and probability of conflict involvement by the changing and stable state.

This general point aside, I now turn to some of the policy implications emerging from the specific aspects of the empirical analyses. In terms of the relationship between domestic political climate and interstate behavior, it is clear that a cross-time relationship of likely short- to medium-term obtains (depending on the model specification.) Therefore, states that are experiencing poor political climates are more likely to be the targets as well as initiators of interstate conflict. This finding is important for policy primarily because it suggests that mitigating, or from a strategic point of view, exacerbating, the

domestic political climate in other states has an impact on their relations with other states. Moreover, there was little evidence to suggest that domestic political climate has a negative, or depressing, effect on the probability of conflict between nations.

Given the public and academic attention to the resurgence of democratic political regimes in the international system during the past six years, my analyses herein also has relevance for policies that encourage the proliferation of democratic regimes. The relevance of these findings becomes apparent when one considers the debate about the relationship between democracy and war and democratization and interstate conflict. Some theorists assert that because democratic states only rarely go to war with one another, increasing the percentage of democratic regimes in the interstate system will decrease the probability of war (Russett, 1993; Kegley and Hermann, 1996).

The analyses I conduct herein indicate that, in general, regime change has a significant effect on the probability of interstate conflict. I also demonstrate that the period in which one examines the relationship between regime change and interstate conflict makes a difference. This variation is important because it influences one's interpretation of the impact of democratization on interstate behavior. For example, while the disaggregated regime change variable major democratization exhibits a statistically insignificant relationship with interstate conflict, the relationship between the variable consolidating democracy is statistically significant and positive in the period 1816-1945 and statistically significant and negative in the 1946-1992 period. Thus, the sample that one selects can determine whether one concludes that democratization increases or decreases the likelihood of interstate conflict.

Perhaps the most significant implication of the analyses that I carry out above is that phenomenon that the social sciences often associate with dynamic systems—the emergence of political communities, political instability, political regime change, and leadership change—each have implications for interstate behavior. More important than their individual relationships with interstate behavior, these phenomena underscore the idea that political systems, by definition, are not static, but rather dynamic. Therefore, while studying the relationship between democracy and peace, for example,

is important, my analysis here suggests that a critical avenue for future research would entail examining the relationship between democracy and peace cross-temporally. As waves (Huntington, 1991) of new democratic regimes enter the system, there is some probability that some of these regimes will mature, while others will revert to more nondemocratic forms of government. Other scholars (e.g., Ward and Gleditsch, 1998) corroborate my finding that democratic reversion (i.e., autocratization) may precipitate conflict between states. Perhaps the connection between democracy and peace may be moderated by time, a concept that is explicitly dynamic. As such, it may prove fruitful to move from the current static analyses of the democratic peace to approaches that exploit the dynamic qualities of this relationship.

This point about the dynamic aspects of the peace between democracies may suggest a second more general avenue for future research. As I have formulated them here, the political system components are incorporated as individual (i.e., additive) relationships with the dependent variable, interstate conflict. However, it is evident that, as discussed in second chapter (see Figure 2.3), that these components, particularly their rates of change and instability, are interrelated. Thus, when political communities collapse and are reconstituted, regimes and authorities face an increased likelihood of change. When regimes change the political authorities are likely to change. Furthermore, leadership turnover may also moderate the likelihood that regimes may change, as leaders weigh whether to alter the structure of the regime. Therefore, it may be the case that a dynamic model integrating these three components may be necessary, whereby their endogeneity is incorporated into the model directly. As it stands, the components are isolated from one another, and it is difficult to interpret their interactive or composite effects.

This issue of endogeneity has implications beyond purely the domestic political system. Just as the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities are likely causally related to one another, so too is this domestic political process and interstate conflict. Historical examples and empirical analysis (e.g., Stein and Russett, 1980; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1992, 1995; Crescenzi and Enterline, 1998) suggest that domestic political regime change and foreign conflict are

processes that are endogenous to one another. The models I specify in the previous chapters determine the causal process structurally. That is, the way in which I have structured my empirical models only allows me to test for the impact of the domestic political system on interstate conflict. Future research, then, may profit by modeling the dynamic domestic political system and the endogenous relationship between the domestic political system and interstate conflict directly.

7.7. Conclusion

In this dissertation I present the argument that the comparative foreign policy and world politics literatures are undergoing a convergence of substantive, theoretical, and empirical interests with respect to their investigation of the relationship between domestic political system dynamics and interstate behavior. My research herein is an example of this convergence. It is evident that some foreign policies are often predicated on the notion that the encouragement of domestic political change within states will affect interstate relations. The empirical analyses that I present here demonstrate that domestic political system dynamics do indeed have significant effects on the behavior of states toward one another. In particular, change and maturity in the political community, the political regime, and the political authority of states is each linked to an increased likelihood of interstate conflict.

APPENDIX A

A1.1. Introduction

The following appendix identifies the data employed in the fourth chapter. I define the dependent and independent variables, in addition to identifying their spatial and temporal characteristics.

A1.2. Data

The data are arranged in a time-series–cross-section format (TSCS), with state-year as the unit of analysis. Given the temporal constraints of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) (Azar, 1993) conflict data, 1948-78, the maximum number of years, or observations, per state is 31. I use the COW definition of membership in the interstate system (see Small and Singer 1982, Singer and Small, 1994). The spatial domain of the data for the fourth chapter ranges from 72 states in 1948 to 154 states in 1978. All tolled the data set for this chapter includes a maximum of 3,504 raw observations, not excluding missing values for various independent variables. The mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of observations for each variable for the period 1948-78 are reported in Table A1.1.

Table A1.1. Descriptive Statistics for Data in Chapter 4, 1948-78

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Democracy ^a	3.43	4.22	0	10	3,233
Democratization ^b	.100	.300	0	1	3,502
Autocratization ^b	.197	.398	0	1	3,502
Consolidating Democracy ^b	.020	.140	0	1	3,502
Major Democratization ^b	.035	.185	0	1	3,502
Retreating Democracy ^b	.019	.135	0	1	3,502
Major Autocratization ^b	.043	.203	0	1	3,502
Liberalizing Autocracy ^b	.045	.206	0	1	3,502
Consolidating Autocracy ^b	.136	.343	0	1	3,502
Leadership Change ^c	.21	.50	0	7	3,475
Protest ^d	-.01	1.07	-4.29	21.92	3,294
Reb. & Gov. Instab. ^d	.07	1.16	-5.92	21.94	3,294
Target Total Conflict ^e	440.74	1768.58	1	59,194	3,502
Target Mild Verbal Demand ^e	31.07	89.87	1	1,501	3,502
Target Serious Verbal Demand ^e	135.96	416.93	1	5,985	3,502
Target Diplomatic-Economic Hostility ^e	64.37	166.39	1	2,002	3,502
Target Political-Military Hostility ^e	46.80	156.05	1	2,861	3,502
Target Small Scale Military Acts ^e	37.45	146.65	1	3,151	3,502
Target Limited War Acts ^e	58.65	533.47	1	24,376	3,502
Target Extensive War Acts ^e	72.45	1220.45	1	54,469	3,502
Actor Total Conflict ^d	502.16	2044.78	1	77,537	3,502
Actor Mild Verbal Demand ^d	35.75	78.61	1	1,105	3,502
Actor Serious Verbal Demand ^d	147.89	353.64	1	5,169	3,502
Actor Diplomatic-Economic Hostility ^d	74.16	178.13	1	4,496	3,502
Actor Political-Military Hostility ^d	46.58	97.83	1	1,497	3,502
Actor Small Scale Military Acts ^d	41.52	166.88	1	4,201	3,502
Actor Limited War Acts ^d	65.16	476.38	1	17,551	3,502
Actor Extensive War Acts ^d	97.09	1559.22	1	68,545	3,502

^aPolity III institutional democracy score (see Gurr, et al., 1989, 1996; and Jagers and Gurr 1995).

^bRegime change variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for ten-years following, and including, the year of change, and 0 otherwise.

^cFrequency of Chief-executive changes per nation-year (Banks 1996a-b)

^dFactor score (principle components, varimax normalized) of weighted Banks (1996a-b) events per nation-year.

^eSummed COPDAB weighted events per nation-year (Azar, 1993).

^fPolity persistence is from Gurr, et al. (1989, 41).

A1.2.1. The Dependent Variable: The (COPDAB) International Conflict Scale

The COPDAB data contain information on a variety of domestic (monadic) and interstate (dyadic) conflictual and cooperative events. I use the interstate conflict events for those states in the COPDAB data corresponding with the COW state list for 1948-78. Definitions of the 7 interstate conflict actions are as follows (Azar 1993, 26):

1. Mild Verbal Expressions Displaying Discord in Interaction. Low key objection to policies or behavior: communicating dissatisfaction through third party: failing to reach an agreement: refusing protest note: denying accusations: objecting to explanation of goals, position, etc.: requesting change in policy:
2. Strong Verbal Expressions Displaying Discord in Interaction. Warning retaliation for acts: making threatening demands and accusations: condemning strongly specific actions or policies: denouncing leaders, system, or ideology: postponing heads of state visits: refusing participation in meetings or summits: leveling strong propaganda attacks: denying support: blocking or vetoing policy proposals in the UN or other international bodies:
3. Diplomatic-economic Hostile Actions. Increasing troop mobilization: boycotts: imposing economic sanctions: hindering movement on land, waterways, or in the air: embargoing goods: refusing mutual trade rights: closing borders and blocking free communication: manipulating trade or currency to cause economic problems: halting aid: granting sanctuary to opposition leaders: mobilizing hostile demonstrations against target country: refusing to support foreign military allies: recalling ambassador for emergency consultations regarding target country: refusing visas to other nations or restricting movement within country: expelling or arresting nationals or press: spying on foreign government officials: terminating major agreements:

4. Political-military Hostile Actions. Inciting riots or rebellions (training or financial aid for rebellions); encouraging guerrilla activities against target country; limited and sporadic terrorist actions; kidnapping or torturing foreign citizens or prisoners of war; giving sanctuary to terrorists. breaking diplomatic relations; attacking diplomats or embassies; expelling military advisors. nationalizing companies without compensation:
5. Small Scale Military Acts. Limited air, sea, or border skirmishes; border police acts; annexing territory already occupied; seizing material of target country; imposing blockades; assassinating leaders of target country; material support of subversive activities against target country:
6. Limited War Acts. Intermittent shelling or clashes; sporadic bombing of military or industrial areas; small scale interception or sinking of ships; mining of territorial waters; and
7. Extensive War Acts. Use of nuclear weapons; full scale air, naval, or land battles; invasion of territory; occupation of territory; massive bombing of civilian areas; capturing of soldiers in battle; large scale bombing of military installations; chemical or biological warfare.

Azar (1993) formulates a weighting system based on expert interviews for the scale of interstate events. The seven interstate conflict behaviors, their location on the scale, and the corresponding weight value are reported in Table A1.2.

Table A1.2. COPDAB Actor and Target Conflict Scale and Weights

Scale	Action	Weight
9	Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction	6
10	Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction	16
11	Diplomatic-economic hostile actions	29
12	Political-military hostile actions	44
13	Small scale military acts	50
14	Limited war acts	65
15	Extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic costs	102

Source: Azar (1993).

The COPDAB interstate conflict data are arranged by dyadic event. I separate each dyadic event according to COPDAB actor (states "sending" the conflict behavior) and targets (those states "receiving" the conflict behavior), and assign the scale value to those states involved in an event during a given year. I then total each of the seven types of interstate actor and target conflict by state-year, and multiply these by the appropriate weight from Table A1.2. Doing so generates the weighted sum of each type of interstate conflict for each state-year. The natural log of this sum (plus 1, in order to eliminate taking the natural log of zero in an observation where no conflict event occurred) of actor and target conflict behavior by state-year is then used as the dependent variable throughout the analysis in chapter four.

In terms of the spatial behavior of the data, Table A1.2 reports the frequency distribution of target conflict by state for the 1948-78 period.

Table A1.2. COPDAB Target Conflict Frequencies by State, 1948-78

State	Target							total
	MV	SV	D-EH	P-MH	SSM	LW	EW	
Afghanistan	13	21	8	3	7	2	0	54
Albania	29	64	26	10	1	3	0	133
Algeria	86	130	47	21	18	19	2	323
Angola	20	26	15	4	11	3	1	80
Argentina	145	98	52	21	11	0	0	327
Australia	38	30	12	5	1	0	0	86
Austria	21	35	14	6	1	0	0	77
Bahamas	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Bahrain	10	9	4	0	0	0	0	23
Bangladesh	28	29	7	0	2	0	0	66
Barbados	10	1	1	0	0	0	0	12
Belgium	95	81	46	31	1	2	0	256

Benin	38	16	8	6	0	0	0	68
Bhutan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	84	36	22	11	6	0	0	159
Botswana	3	11	3	4	3	1	0	25
Brazil	138	53	35	12	1	0	0	239
Bulgaria	32	107	36	11	5	0	0	191
Burkina Faso	39	19	6	4	0	0	0	68
Burma	35	31	13	7	7	7	2	102
Burundi	12	26	4	1	2	1	0	46
Cambodia	99	118	43	16	28	23	34	361
Cameron	8	11	4	1	2	0	0	26
Canada	75	55	34	12	3	0	0	179
Cape Verde	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Central African Republic	9	20	9	2	0	0	0	40
Chad	13	20	9	6	2	4	0	54
Chile	174	125	79	33	7	0	0	418
China	710	1,433	276	100	75	152	89	2,835
Colombia	67	16	12	4	3	0	0	102
Comoros	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Congo	14	36	12	10	2	1	0	75
Costa Rica	60	13	9	0	2	3	0	87
Cuba	200	349	163	78	22	2	0	814
Cyprus	53	84	22	9	12	10	19	209
Czechoslovakia	87	161	82	19	6	4	2	361
Denmark	33	43	27	1	1	1	0	106
Djibouti	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	5
Dominican Republic	67	44	22	34	8	3	0	178
Dominica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
East Germany	171	244	72	12	5	0	0	504
Equatorial Guinea	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Ecuador	58	23	14	5	4	0	0	104
Egypt	723	1,729	302	101	140	275	226	3,496
El Salvador	63	20	22	3	22	3	0	133
Ethiopia	51	117	25	32	24	28	14	291
Fiji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	8	15	1	0	0	0	0	24
France	735	1,397	324	144	100	177	7	2,884
Gabon	7	21	3	5	0	0	0	36
Gambia	3	7	1	5	0	0	0	16
Ghana	51	43	16	6	0	0	0	116
Greece	90	190	38	33	14	7	0	372
Grenada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	66	30	15	7	3	1	0	122
Guinea	12	24	7	11	2	0	2	58
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guyana	8	3	4	0	2	0	0	17
Haiti	59	18	12	10	3	0	0	102
Honduras	55	23	9	8	17	5	1	118
Hungary	37	87	42	7	6	0	3	182
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	377	710	116	65	94	46	58	1,466
Indonesia	100	203	56	23	9	10	5	406
Iran	70	230	46	22	17	8	1	394
Iraq	157	319	90	36	29	20	17	668
Ireland	19	16	21	1	3	1	0	61
Israel	783	2,570	521	507	498	533	163	5,575
Italy	143	145	68	17	2	1	0	376

Ivory Coast	39	25	6	5	0	0	0	75
Jamaica	3	2	2	1	0	0	0	8
Japan	203	302	87	27	4	0	0	623
Jordan	219	548	130	63	145	142	20	1,267
Kenya	17	50	27	21	6	2	0	123
Korea	731	65	163	56	22	105	45	1,187
Korea	732	87	113	27	16	33	86	1,094
Kuwait	29	46	15	9	5	0	1	105
Laos	40	49	19	11	7	7	0	133
Lebanon	133	189	104	60	124	110	16	736
Lesotho	0	11	2	1	0	0	0	14
Liberia	5	8	2	5	0	0	0	20
Libya	67	213	71	23	6	6	2	388
Luxembourg	72	34	11	2	0	0	0	119
Malagasy Republic	6	18	4	2	1	1	0	32
Malawi	7	23	6	1	1	0	0	38
Malaysia	87	73	32	18	5	0	0	215
Maldives	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mali	8	9	5	1	0	0	0	23
Malta	4	2	4	1	0	0	0	11
Mauritania	29	24	7	5	5	0	0	70
Mauritius	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	3
Mexico	89	26	22	10	2	0	0	149
Mongolia	19	9	3	8	0	0	0	39
Morocco	56	128	40	10	32	26	12	304
Mozambique	10	16	4	3	11	14	1	59
North Yemen	58	117	29	21	24	23	8	280
Nepal	15	12	8	3	8	0	0	46
Netherlands	113	143	87	54	9	14	3	423
New Zealand	9	11	3	1	0	0	0	24
Nicaragua	67	30	16	11	12	1	1	138
Niger	39	17	5	4	1	0	0	66
Nigeria	37	43	16	5	1	1	0	103
Norway	24	40	18	3	1	2	0	88
Oman	4	6	4	2	0	0	1	17
Pakistan	293	519	112	28	42	92	91	1,177
Panama	68	23	20	8	4	1	1	125
Papua New Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paraguay	67	11	8	4	4	0	0	94
Peru	89	45	25	11	5	0	0	175
Philippines	42	51	14	16	1	0	0	124
Poland	60	83	54	11	0	0	0	208
Portugal	70	177	98	48	19	12	5	429
Qatar	5	10	3	0	0	0	0	18
Romania	47	68	37	9	1	0	0	162
Rwanda	8	29	6	5	1	0	1	50
South Yemen	28	33	8	16	1	10	2	98
Sao Tome-Principe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	103	151	21	13	4	19	2	313
Senegal	10	19	6	3	4	1	0	43
Seychelles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	3	9	2	1	0	0	0	15
Singapore	24	20	10	0	0	0	0	54
Solomon Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	45	93	32	12	21	19	22	244
South Africa	116	293	145	69	11	5	0	639
Soviet Union	1,759	3,006	560	128	40	11	0	5,504

Spain	93	123	43	19	13	7	0	298
Sri Lanka	14	16	7	0	0	0	0	37
Sudan	38	102	27	11	10	3	1	192
Surinam	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Swaziland	1	8	2	0	0	0	0	11
Sweden	27	62	27	9	3	0	0	128
Switzerland	15	21	16	15	1	0	0	68
Syria	299	750	142	58	113	218	54	1,634
Taiwan	149	227	73	43	24	47	104	667
Tanzania	29	89	38	13	11	4	0	184
Thailand	24	66	11	8	27	9	0	145
Togo	9	18	4	4	1	0	0	36
Trinidad & Tobago	7	2	5	2	0	0	0	16
Tunisia	69	121	36	14	6	22	5	273
Turkey	106	224	64	19	50	15	2	480
United Arab Emirates	10	8	4	2	0	1	0	25
Uganda	60	96	47	13	4	8	3	231
United Kingdom	934	1,818	487	258	96	55	7	3,655
United States	3,581	5,188	1,102	570	159	40	20	10,660
Uruguay	56	8	22	8	0	0	0	94
Venezuela	86	58	22	16	5	0	0	187
Vietnam	816	191	342	52	12	26	635	2,074
Vietnam	817	208	206	34	16	7	11	1,299
West Germany	373	732	145	91	6	5	0	1,352
Western Samoa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yugoslavia	78	188	64	23	4	2	0	359
Zaire	80	80	41	15	8	4	6	234
Zambia	28	73	32	10	12	10	0	165
Zanzibar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	97	234	81	43	15	4	1	475
Total Events	20,096	29,267	8,307	3,748	2,448	2,500	1,815	68,181
%Total Events	29%	43%	12%	5%	4%	4%	3%	100%

Source: Azar (1993).

With respect to the spatial behavior of the data, Table A1.3 reports the frequency distribution of actor conflict by state for the 1948-78 period.

Table A1.3. COPDAB Actor Conflict Frequencies by State, 1948-78

State	Actor							total
	MV	SV	D-EH	P-MH	SSM	LW	EW	
Afghanistan	42	44	16	4	5	9	0	120
Albania	41	216	6	2	5	0	0	270
Algeria	144	229	74	76	15	11	5	554
Angola	26	42	12	13	6	3	3	105
Argentina	250	157	106	107	14	1	0	635
Australia	121	112	34	14	2	4	4	291
Austria	34	26	14	1	2	0	0	77
Bahamas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bahrain	11	8	2	9	0	0	0	30
Bangladesh	20	25	7	4	3	0	0	59
Barbados	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	158	73	36	11	5	1	4	288
Benin	14	60	7	6	0	0	0	87
Bhutan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Bolivia	171	90	30	30	7	0	0	328
Botswana	9	53	9	6	2	0	0	79
Brazil	212	70	64	29	6	0	0	381
Bulgaria	51	138	31	18	4	2	0	244
Burkina Faso	11	25	4	3	0	0	0	43
Burma	55	52	24	8	17	4	0	160
Burundi	11	26	7	8	1	1	0	54
Cambodia	177	337	45	18	40	220	56	893
Cameron	13	14	5	15	1	0	0	48
Canada	135	140	45	18	1	0	1	340
Cape Verde	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Central African Republic	13	46	13	9	0	0	0	81
Chad	25	51	17	14	5	2	0	114
Chile	275	227	134	43	10	0	0	689
China	549	1,738	183	130	101	93	510	3,304
Colombia	83	61	45	27	4	0	0	220
Comoros	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Congo	23	65	12	17	2	5	0	124
Costa Rica	77	38	36	23	5	0	0	179
Cuba	259	449	147	95	30	3	3	986
Cyprus	49	69	18	10	13	3	0	162
Czechoslovakia	136	212	128	38	3	4	0	521
Denmark	58	62	19	3	0	0	0	142
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dominican Republic	80	61	29	23	10	1	0	204
Dominica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
East Germany	139	341	91	47	12	11	0	641
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ecuador	106	45	82	19	3	0	0	255
Egypt	721	1,592	413	166	115	315	106	3,428
El Salvador	72	27	35	18	13	5	1	171
Ethiopia	66	186	52	43	28	22	26	423
Fiji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	23	13	11	1	1	0	0	49
France	888	1,117	414	85	74	263	123	2,964
Gabon	14	29	26	4	0	0	0	73
Gambia	17	13	3	1	2	0	0	36
Ghana	48	60	31	17	1	1	0	158
Greece	90	219	52	25	11	14	2	413
Grenada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	84	62	22	28	6	1	0	203
Guinea	33	64	18	21	2	1	0	139
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guyana	12	17	6	5	2	1	0	43
Haiti	59	25	17	13	4	1	0	119
Honduras	105	33	18	5	26	3	1	191
Hungary	51	146	42	21	5	2	1	268
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	674	1,160	186	47	62	133	89	2,351
Indonesia	218	306	164	93	16	12	6	815
Iran	156	229	57	42	13	23	3	523
Iraq	223	745	273	88	53	28	53	1,463
Ireland	25	26	9	2	1	1	0	64
Israel	880	2,181	337	147	589	695	314	5,143
Italy	142	193	43	15	1	5	0	399
Ivory Coast	15	17	9	12	0	0	0	53
Jamaica	16	10	3	1	0	0	0	30
Japan	321	231	80	13	0	0	0	645
Jordan	299	632	179	67	66	204	8	1,455

Kenya	62	111	61	18	3	0	0	255
Korea	585	109	366	17	17	60	159	1,313
Korea	561	115	195	42	14	88	23	1,038
Kuwait	79	126	52	21	9	2	1	290
Laos	52	106	9	4	18	69	17	275
Lebanon	206	470	148	83	107	52	11	1,077
Lesotho	4	18	6	2	0	0	0	30
Liberia	23	59	8	5	1	0	0	96
Libya	166	414	146	59	18	1	1	805
Luxembourg	52	27	6	4	3	1	0	93
Malagasy Republic	14	15	7	3	0	0	0	39
Malawi	7	26	13	3	0	0	0	49
Malaysia	117	121	29	21	5	1	0	294
Maldives	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mali	28	34	6	4	0	0	0	72
Malta	8	9	1	4	0	0	0	22
Mauritania	17	16	7	21	1	0	0	62
Mauritius	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	225	109	60	28	5	0	0	427
Mongolia	16	37	3	0	0	0	0	56
Morocco	155	210	61	49	32	28	8	543
Mozambique	3	10	7	0	5	0	0	25
North Yemen	80	197	12	25	14	32	1	361
Nepal	32	42	19	1	6	0	0	100
Netherlands	161	151	50	7	6	11	6	392
New Zealand	40	61	11	1	3	2	2	120
Nicaragua	69	44	24	3	7	3	0	150
Niger	11	25	4	9	0	1	0	50
Nigeria	69	100	45	19	6	6	42	287
Norway	54	47	13	5	1	0	0	120
Oman	7	11	3	2	1	4	0	28
Pakistan	445	541	105	76	69	32	50	1,318
Panama	101	78	44	22	2	1	0	248
Papua New Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paraguay	60	35	20	4	7	0	0	126
Peru	137	99	41	35	5	0	0	317
Philippines	161	116	48	24	6	0	2	357
Poland	152	206	80	17	1	1	1	458
Portugal	57	64	20	11	16	5	3	176
Qatar	9	14	24	2	0	0	0	49
Romania	100	128	29	8	0	0	0	265
Rwanda	15	33	2	2	2	0	1	55
South Yemen	16	71	44	17	5	14	0	167
Sao Tome-Principe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	184	288	84	19	6	4	8	593
Senegal	23	27	20	13	2	0	0	85
Seychelles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	7	18	7	2	0	1	0	35
Singapore	43	20	13	0	2	0	0	78
Solomon Is.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	64	242	18	24	20	27	14	409
South Africa	77	127	36	15	19	3	0	277
Soviet Union	1,266	3,387	512	104	106	6	3	5,384
Spain	67	90	51	10	26	10	8	262
Sri Lanka	51	52	25	13	2	0	0	143
Sudan	83	217	45	71	14	7	2	439
Surinam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Swaziland	0	11	6	1	0	0	0	18
Sweden	84	106	52	9	2	0	0	253

Switzerland	39	29	34	6	1	0	0	109
Syria	347	1,073	255	72	317	94	47	2,205
Taiwan	171	157	17	63	23	92	67	590
Tanzania	74	171	52	25	7	3	2	334
Thailand	125	128	55	31	31	14	2	386
Togo	11	20	19	3	0	0	0	53
Trinidad & Tobago	7	7	2	2	0	0	0	18
Tunisia	131	312	68	32	10	14	0	567
Turkey	160	235	55	47	40	27	19	583
United Arab Emirates	16	22	1	11	0	1	0	51
Uganda	80	229	89	43	13	4	0	458
United Kingdom	1,167	1,490	392	129	101	78	20	3,377
United States	2,801	3,027	1,069	102	69	465	431	7,964
Uruguay	108	51	33	26	2	0	0	220
Venezuela	179	153	107	99	8	4	0	550
Vietnam	254	17	37	6	2	8	3	327
Vietnam	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	15
West Germany	446	415	140	26	9	0	0	1,036
Western Samoa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yugoslavia	185	295	61	19	3	1	0	564
Zaire	75	145	63	33	20	11	2	349
Zambia	67	218	56	29	15	7	1	393
Zanzibar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	66	74	33	19	25	25	1	243
Total Events	21,459	31,793	9,368	3,660	2,715	3,428	2,277	74,700
%Total Events	29%	43%	13%	5%	4%	5%	3%	100%

Source: Azar (1993).

There is one final issue regarding the COPDAB interstate conflict data that requires mention, and this concerns the compatibility of these data with the COW interstate conflict data. In terms of the sheer frequency of events across the 1948-78 period, the COPDAB data primarily military conflict (i.e., small scale military acts, limited war acts, and extensive war acts) far outnumber those identified by COW in terms of the frequency of disputes and wars. Indeed, the COPDAB data codes all interactions between states during a dispute or war, not simply the point of onset.

A1.2.2. Independent Variables

In this section, I discuss the operationalization and descriptive characteristics of the independent variables. The data for the independent variables that I use in the analyses in chapter four are a subset of the data analyzed in chapters five and six. Thus, the variable definitions that I identify in Appendix A apply to the analyses carried out in chapters five and six.

A1.2.2.1 Political Community Persistence

I use the measure of polity persistence described in Gurr, et al. (1989, 41). This is a measure of the number of years since an abrupt polity change. Polities existing prior to the year 1800 receive the appropriate values corresponding to earlier approximate start date. For example, the starting year for the United States is 1798. Thus, the polity persistence value for the United States in the year 1816 is 11. I take the natural log of this persistence value for each state-year in the data set.

A1.2.2.2. Political Climate

A1.2.2.2.1 Protest and Rebellion and Government Instability

For the first set of measures for domestic political climate, I use principal components analysis on eight domestic conflict event counts from Banks' (1996) Cross-Polity–Time-Series Data Archive, data available for the years 1919-92. Definitions of the eight domestic conflict variables from Banks (1979, p. 14) are as follows: (1) General Strikes: "any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority"; (2) Guerrilla Warfare: "any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime"; (3) Riots: "any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force"; (4) Revolutions: "any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government"; (5) Anti-government Demonstrations: "any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature"; (6) Assassinations: "any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician"; (7) Major

government crises: “any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present situation—excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow”: and (8) Purges: “any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition.” The Banks’ (1996b) scale weights for each of these variables are contained in Table A1.4.

Table A1.4. Scale Weights for Domestic Conflict Events

Variable	Weight
Antigovernment Demonstrations	24
Riots	43
General Strikes	46
Assassinations	48
Purges	86
Government Crises	102
Guerrilla Warfare	148
Revolutions	200

Source: Weights and data from Banks (1996b).

I use factor analysis in order to identify some common dimensions from the eight conflict indicators. Briefly, factor analysis is grounded in the notion that “some underlying factors, which are smaller in number than the number of observed variables, are responsible for the covariation among the observed variables” (Kim and Mueller, 1978a, 12). I follow the three steps suggested by Kim and Mueller (1978b, p. 10) for conducting exploratory factor analysis: (1) preparation of an appropriate covariance matrix; (2) extraction of initial (orthogonal) factors; and (3) rotation to a terminal solution. To accomplish this, I used the principal components option in the factor analysis module available in Statistica (release 5.0) to extract information on two factors (with a minimum eigenvalue setting of ≥ 1.0). The unrotated factors and their respective loadings appear in the first two columns of Table A1.5

Table A1.5. Domestic Conflict Factors

Variables	Unrotated ^a		Rotated ^b	
	factor 1	factor 2	Protest	Rebellion and Government Instability
Anti-government Dem.	.605	.584	<u>.840</u>	-.029
Riots	.707	.498	<u>.859</u>	.104
General Strikes	.575	.178	<u>.546</u>	.253
Assassinations	.439	-.134	.237	.393
Purges	.389	-.418	.009	<u>.571</u>
Government Crises	.555	-.207	.274	<u>.525</u>
Guerrilla Warfare	.537	-.454	.095	<u>.697</u>
Revolutions	.450	-.505	-.003	<u>.677</u>
Explained Variance	2.34	1.32	1.88	1.78
Proportion of Total	0.29	0.16	0.24	0.22

Source: Banks (1996a). Underline indicates loadings $\geq .50$. Eigenvalue threshold of ≥ 1.0 .

^aExtraction method is principle components in Statistica 5.0.

^bRotation was achieved using varimax normalized.

I used the “varimax normalized” option in the same software package to rotate the factors to an orthogonal solution. These rotated loadings appear in the third and fourth columns of the table. In terms of the rotated factors, the first factor appears to represent less severe forms of mass instability, with high factor loadings for general strikes, riots, and anti-government demonstrations. Conversely, the second factor represents a more severe form of domestic conflict and governmental instability, with guerrilla warfare, revolutions, in addition to two government variables, major government crises and purges, registering high loadings on this factor relative to the first factor. Only assassination fails to register a high loading on either dimension, although I do not discard it. In the following analysis, I refer to these two dimensions as protest and rebellion and government instability, respectively. Having derived these two rotated factors, I then save the corresponding individual factor scores for each observation in the data set.

The mean protest and rebellion and government instability factor scores by state for the 1948-78 period are reported in Table A1.6.

Table A1.6. Mean Domestic Conflict Factors Per State, 1948-78.

State	Rebellion and	
	Protest	Government Instability
Afghanistan	-.278	-.342
Albania	-.313	-.236
Algeria	-.322	-.316
Angola	-.506	1.077
Argentina	1.114	2.559
Australia	-.110	-.384
Austria	-.207	-.363
Bahamas	-.285	-.456
Bahrain	-.285	-.456
Bangladesh	-.226	.289
Barbados	-.285	-.456
Belgium	.189	-.133
Benin	-.302	.110
Bhutan	-.273	-.422
Bolivia	-.066	1.501
Botswana	-.275	-.419
Brazil	-.021	1.345
Bulgaria	-.332	-.173
Burkina Faso	-.287	-.352
Burma	-.297	.456
Burundi	-.271	-.044
Cambodia	-.265	1.081
Cameroon	-.297	-.342
Canada	-.105	-.166
Cape Verde	-.285	-.456
Central African Republic	-.326	-.306
Chad	-.366	.095
Chile	.236	.320
China	.142	.638
Colombia	.116	.550
Comoros	-.450	.147
Congo	-.283	.029
Costa Rica	-.290	-.146
Cuba	-.205	.937
Cyprus	-.137	.165
Czechoslovakia	-.119	.376
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	-.393	.170
Denmark	-.197	-.365
Djibouti	-.285	-.456
Dominica	-.285	-.456
Dominican Republic	-.004	.076
East Germany	-.258	-.361
Ecuador	-.131	.201
Egypt/UAR	-.136	.166
El Salvador	-.214	-.133
Equatorial Guinea	-.315	-.343
Ethiopia	-.244	.508
Fiji	-.285	-.456
Finland	-.132	-.024
France	1.441	.733
Gabon	-.239	-.430
Gambia	-.285	-.456
Ghana	-.285	-.018

Greece	-.055	.656
Grenada	-.094	-.380
Guatemala	.049	1.112
Guinea	-.300	-.119
Guinea-Bissau	-.285	-.456
Guyana	-.225	-.357
Haiti	-.131	.238
Honduras	-.301	-.070
Hungary	-.219	.005
Iceland	-.237	-.370
India	2.045	.253
Indonesia	-.113	.747
Iran	.633	.414
Iraq	-.289	.759
Ireland	-.197	-.326
Israel	.263	-.080
Italy/Sardinia	1.817	.733
Ivory Coast	-.288	-.430
Jamaica	-.123	-.392
Japan	.575	-.339
Jordan	-.195	.492
Kenya	-.202	-.137
Korea (North)	-.289	-.439
Korea (South)	.506	.107
Kuwait	-.287	-.332
Laos	-.391	1.087
Lebanon	.128	.602
Lesotho	-.266	-.201
Liberia	-.270	-.437
Libya	-.245	-.223
Luxembourg	-.281	-.441
Malagasy Republic	-.127	-.371
Malawi	-.294	-.419
Malaysia	-.159	.136
Maldives Islands	-.303	-.389
Mali	-.331	-.286
Malta	-.223	-.449
Mauritania	-.308	-.338
Mauritius	-.215	-.471
Mexico	.296	-.268
Mongolia	-.273	-.444
Morocco	-.203	.091
Mozambique	-.604	.937
Nepal	-.262	-.108
Netherlands	-.191	-.303
New Zealand	-.243	-.459
Nicaragua	-.118	-.213
Niger	-.314	-.348
Nigeria	-.059	.146
Norway	-.222	-.381
Oman	-.518	.571
Pakistan	.770	.665
Panama	-.020	-.018
Papua New Guinea	-.285	-.456
Paraguay	-.325	.041
Peru	.037	.140
Philippines	-.143	.576
Poland	-.008	.046
Portugal	.102	.189

Qatar	-.285	-.456
Republic of Vietnam	.790	2.026
Romania	-.328	-.081
Rwanda	-.303	-.389
Sao Tome-Principe	-.285	-.456
Saudi Arabia	-.297	-.329
Senegal	-.254	-.326
Seychelles	-.358	-.188
Sierra Leone	-.278	-.145
Singapore	-.239	-.358
Solomon Islands	-.285	-.456
Somalia	-.332	-.208
South Africa	.870	-.129
Soviet Union/Russia	-.289	.069
Spain	1.107	.213
Sri Lanka	.053	-.170
Sudan	-.394	.409
Surinam	-.285	-.456
Swaziland	-.285	-.456
Sweden	-.182	-.409
Switzerland	-.286	-.410
Syria	-.229	.566
Taiwan	-.272	-.201
Tanzania	-.274	-.359
Thailand	-.261	.473
Togo	-.321	-.293
Trinidad & Tobago	-.247	-.246
Tunisia	-.186	-.353
Turkey/Ottoman Empire	.232	.169
United Arab Emirates	-.296	-.205
Uganda	-.367	.427
United Kingdom	.406	-.083
United States	4.116	-1.164
Uruguay	.080	.004
Venezuela	-.091	.590
West Germany	.179	-.239
Western Samoa	-.285	-.456
Yemen (North)	-.340	.099
Yemen (South)	-.373	-.058
Yugoslavia/Serbia	-.340	.066
Zaire	-.039	.904
Zambia	-.239	-.316
Zanzibar	—	—
Zimbabwe	-.162	.327

Source: Banks (1996).

A1.2.2.2.2. Ongoing Civil Wars and Post-Civil War Period

I use two measures of civil war, ongoing and post-civil war, to measure the impact of perhaps the most severe type of political climate on a state's interstate conflict behavior. The data on civil wars is from the Correlates of War Project's International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992 (see Singer and Small, 1994). The data contain information on 150 major civil wars for the 1816-1992

interval. According to Singer and Small (1994), "An internal war is classified as a major civil war if (a) military action was involved, (b) the national government at the time was involved, (c) effective resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces occurred on both sides, and (d) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted during the civil war." These data allow one to differentiate between those civil wars that occur with that without external intervention by other nation-states. There are 118 major civil wars without external intervention in the raw data. I do this primarily to remove any a priori bias in the empirical models toward confirmation of the civil war–interstate war relationship.

Civil war duration and the frequency of onset years by state are contained in Table A1.6.

Table A1.7. Civil War Duration and
Onset by State, 1948-78

State	Ongoing	Onset
Algeria	2	1
Argentina	1	1
Bolivia	1	1
Burma	15	2
Burundi	1	1
China	5	1
Colombia	15	2
Costa Rica	1	1
Cuba	2	1
Guatemala	9	4
Indonesia	7	3
Iran	1	1
Iraq	1	1
Laos	3	1
Nicaragua	1	1
Nigeria	4	1
Pakistan	6	2
Philippines	10	2
Rwanda	2	1
Sri Lanka	1	1
Sudan	10	1
Uganda	1	1
Yemen (North)	1	1
Zimbabwe	7	1
total	107	33

Source: Small and Singer (1994).

A1.2.2.3. Regime Change

The details concerning the operationalization of regime changes are contained in the text of chapter 4, and I refer the reader to this section of the dissertation. I report the general democratic and autocratic regime changes by state for the 1948-78 period in Table A1.8.

Table A1.8. Democratic and Autocratic Regime Changes by State, 1948-78

State	Year	Democracy _t	Democracy _{t-1}	Magnitude	Type
Argentina	1957	3	0	3	d
Argentina	1966	0	3	-3	a
Argentina	1973	6	0	6	d
Argentina	1976	0	6	-6	a
Bangladesh	1974	2	8	-6	a
Bangladesh	1975	0	2	-2	a
Benin	1965	0	4	-4	a
Benin	1970	1	0	1	d
Benin	1972	0	1	-1	a
Bolivia	1964	0	1	-1	a
Brazil	1948	6	7	-1	a
Brazil	1961	5	6	-1	a
Brazil	1963	4	5	-1	a
Brazil	1965	0	4	-4	a
Brazil	1974	2	0	2	d
Burkina Faso	1978	6	0	6	d
Burma	1952	10	8	2	d
Burma	1958	8	10	-2	a
Burma	1962	0	8	-8	a
Burundi	1963	1	3	-2	a
Burundi	1966	0	1	-1	a
Chile	1955	5	3	2	d
Chile	1963	6	5	1	d
China	1949	0	1	-1	a
Colombia	1948	1	6	-5	a
Colombia	1957	7	1	6	d
Colombia	1974	8	7	1	d
Comoros	1976	0	5	-5	a
Congo	1963	0	5	-5	a
Cuba	1955	0	4	-4	a
Cyprus	1968	7	8	-1	a
Cyprus	1974	10	7	3	d
Czechoslovakia	1948	0	10	-10	a
Dominican Republic	1966	1	0	1	d
Dominican Republic	1978	6	1	5	d
Ecuador	1948	4	1	3	d
Ecuador	1961	1	4	-3	a
Ecuador	1968	4	1	3	d
Ecuador	1972	0	4	-4	a
Egypt	1953	0	5	-5	a
El Salvador	1961	1	0	1	d
El Salvador	1964	3	1	2	d
El Salvador	1972	2	3	-1	a
El Salvador	1977	0	2	-2	a
France	1958	6	10	-4	a

France	1969	8	6	2	d
German Federal Republic	1949	10	0	10	d
Ghana	1970	5	0	5	d
Ghana	1972	0	5	-5	a
Greece	1949	7	8	-1	a
Greece	1967	0	7	-7	a
Greece	1975	8	0	8	d
Guatemala	1950	4	6	-2	a
Guatemala	1954	0	4	-4	a
Guatemala	1966	4	0	4	d
Guatemala	1970	3	4	-1	a
Guatemala	1974	1	3	-2	a
Guatemala	1978	0	1	-1	a
Guyana	1967	4	5	-1	a
Guyana	1978	3	4	-1	a
Haiti	1950	0	3	-3	a
Hungary	1948	0	1	-1	a
India	1975	7	9	-2	a
India	1977	8	7	1	d
Indonesia	1948	5	4	1	d
Indonesia	1950	3	5	-2	a
Indonesia	1957	2	3	-1	a
Indonesia	1959	0	2	-2	a
Iran	1955	0	3	-3	a
Iraq	1958	0	1	-1	a
Ireland	1952	10	8	2	d
Israel	1967	9	10	-1	a
Italy	1948	10	0	10	d
Japan	1952	10	5	5	d
Jordan	1951	1	0	1	d
Jordan	1952	3	0	3	d
Jordan	1957	0	3	-3	a
Kenya	1966	3	5	-2	a
Kenya	1969	2	3	-1	a
Kenya	1970	0	2	-2	a
Korea (South)	1960	10	0	10	d
Korea (South)	1961	0	10	-10	a
Korea (South)	1963	1	0	1	d
Korea (South)	1972	0	1	-1	a
Laos	1958	8	7	1	d
Laos	1959	1	8	-7	a
Laos	1975	0	1	-1	a
Lebanon	1971	5	4	1	d
Lesotho	1970	0	9	-9	a
Malagasy Republic	1966	2	3	-1	a
Malagasy Republic	1972	0	2	-2	a
Malaysia	1969	4	10	-6	a
Malaysia	1971	8	4	4	d
Mauritania	1963	0	2	-2	a
Mexico	1978	1	0	1	d
Morocco	1965	0	1	-1	a
Morocco	1977	1	0	1	d
Nepal	1959	4	0	4	d
Nepal	1960	0	4	-4	a
Nigeria	1966	0	8	-8	a
Pakistan	1948	3	0	3	d
Pakistan	1950	4	0	4	d
Pakistan	1952	5	4	1	d
Pakistan	1956	8	5	3	d

Pakistan	1958	0	8	-8	a
Pakistan	1962	6	0	6	d
Pakistan	1965	4	6	-2	a
Pakistan	1977	0	4	-4	a
Panama	1950	1	0	1	d
Panama	1956	5	1	4	d
Panama	1968	0	5	-5	a
Paraguay	1954	0	1	-1	a
Peru	1950	5	4	1	d
Peru	1960	6	5	1	d
Peru	1968	0	6	-6	a
Philippines	1950	6	4	2	d
Philippines	1969	4	6	-2	a
Philippines	1972	0	4	-4	a
Portugal	1976	9	0	9	d
Rwanda	1973	0	1	-1	a
Senegal	1964	0	3	-3	a
Senegal	1978	2	0	2	d
Sierra Leone	1967	0	6	-6	a
Sierra Leone	1968	4	0	4	d
Sierra Leone	1969	3	4	-1	a
Sierra Leone	1971	0	3	-3	a
Singapore	1965	2	8	-6	a
Somalia	1969	0	7	-7	a
Spain	1978	8	0	8	d
Sri Lanka	1970	8	7	1	d
Sri Lanka	1978	6	8	-2	a
Sudan	1958	0	8	-8	a
Sudan	1965	8	0	8	d
Sudan	1971	0	8	-8	a
Swaziland	1973	0	3	-3	a
Syria	1949	0	5	-5	a
Syria	1950	5	0	5	d
Syria	1952	0	5	-5	a
Syria	1954	7	0	7	d
Syria	1961	2	7	-5	a
Syria	1963	0	2	-2	a
Thailand	1958	0	1	-1	a
Thailand	1969	5	0	5	d
Thailand	1971	0	5	-5	a
Thailand	1975	8	0	8	d
Thailand	1976	0	8	-8	a
Thailand	1978	3	0	3	d
Turkey	1953	7	10	-3	a
Turkey	1961	10	7	3	d
Turkey	1965	9	10	-1	a
Turkey	1971	2	9	-7	a
Turkey	1973	9	2	7	d
Uganda	1967	0	7	-7	a
Uruguay	1952	8	3	5	d
Uruguay	1973	0	8	-8	a
Venezuela	1958	7	1	6	d
Venezuela	1969	8	7	1	d
Venezuela	1970	9	8	1	d
Yemen Arab Republic	1948	1	0	1	d
Yemen Arab Republic	1962	2	1	1	d
Yemen Arab Republic	1967	0	2	-2	a
Zambia	1968	3	4	-1	a
Zambia	1972	0	3	-3	a

Note: Data from Gurr, et al. (1989, 1996) Jagers and Gurr (1995).

A1.2.2.4. Leader Change

To measure the impact of leadership change on interstate conflict, I use the frequency of changes in nation-states' chief executive from the Banks (1979) Cross-Polity—Times-Series Data Archive. The current version of the data covers the 1816-1988 interval, less the two world war intervals, 1914-18 and 1940-45. I use Banks (1976-1993) and Bienen and Van de Walle (1991) to identify leader changes during the two war periods and from 1988-92. Table A1.9 reports the frequency of leadership changes per state.

Table A1.9. Leadership Changes by State, 1948-78.

State	Freq.
Afghanistan	3
Albania	0
Algeria	4
Angola	1
Argentina	12
Australia	5
Austria	5
Bahamas	0
Bahrain	0
Bangladesh	3
Barbados	2
Belgium	13
Benin	11
Bhutan	1
Bolivia	13
Botswana	1
Brazil	14
Bulgaria	2
Burkina Faso	1
Burma	6
Burundi	5
Cambodia	4
Cameroon	2
Canada	5
Cape Verde	1
CAR	2
Chad	2
Chile	5
China	3
Colombia	9
Comoros	6
Congo	7
Costa Rica	9
Cuba	1
Cyprus	3

Czechoslovakia	5
Dem. Rep. of Vietnam	1
Denmark	10
Djibouti	1
Dominica	1
Dominican Republic	7
East German	2
Ecuador	11
Egypt	3
El Salvador	10
Equatorial Guinea	1
Ethiopia	2
Fiji	0
Finland	24
France	24
Gabon	4
Gambia	1
Ghana	4
Greece	19
Grenada	1
Guatemala	10
Guinea	0
Guinea-Bissau	1
Guyana	1
Haiti	11
Honduras	10
Hungary	4
Iceland	9
India	3
Indonesia	2
Iran	4
Iraq	21
Ireland	10
Israel	8
Italy	17
Ivory Coast	1
Jamaica	2
Japan	11
Jordan	2
Kenya	1
Korea (South)	2
Korea (North)	1
Kuwait	2
Laos	13
Lebanon	6
Lesotho	1
Liberia	1
Libya	2
Luxembourg	4
Malagasy Republic	4
Malawi	0
Malaysia	5
Maldives Islands	1
Mali	1
Malta	1
Mauritania	1
Mauritius	0
Mexico	5
Mongolia	1

Morocco	2
Mozambique	1
Nepal	2
Netherlands	10
New Zealand	7
Nicaragua	4
Niger	1
Nigeria	5
Norway	7
Oman	0
Pakistan	9
Panama	14
Papua New Guinea	1
Paraguay	6
Peru	8
Philippines	5
Poland	3
Portugal	8
Qatar	1
Rep. of Vietnam	10
Romania	1
Rwanda	1
Sao Tome-Principe	1
Saudi Arabia	3
Senegal	0
Seychelles	2
Sierra Leone	4
Singapore	0
Solomon Islands	1
Somalia	2
South Africa	6
Soviet Union	4
Spain	2
Sri Lanka	9
Sudan	10
Surinam	1
Swaziland	0
Sweden	3
Switzerland	0
Syria	19
Taiwan	1
Tanzania	0
Thailand	11
Togo	2
Trinidad & Tobago	0
Tunisia	1
Turkey	14
UAE	1
Uganda	1
United Kingdom	8
United States	6
Uruguay	9
Venezuela	9
West Germany	4
Western Samoa	1
Yemen (North)	9
Yemen (South)	4
Yugoslavia	0
Zaire	6

Zambia	0
Zanzibar	1
Zimbabwe	1
total	733

Source: Banks (1996a); Langville (1979); Van de Walle and Bienen (1991).

APPENDIX B


B1.1. Introduction

In this section, I review some of the data and methods employed in chapter five. As I note earlier, operationalization of the independent variables for the chapter five is identical to chapter four, and I refer the reader to the discussion in chapter four, as well as Appendix A, for this information. My primary purpose in this appendix is to define the characteristics of the dependent variable that I use in chapter five, militarized interstate disputes.

B1.2. Data

In this section I define the data used for the dependent variable, militarized interstate disputes. I use the COW definition of interstate system membership based on population and diplomatic recognition (see Singer and Small, 1994). The spatial domain of this study ranges from 23 states in 1816 to 181 in 1992. There are 202 states present in the period 1816-1992 (some states, such as Hesse Grand Duchal (1816-1867) drop from the sample by 1992.) The growth in interstate system membership, according to the COW project criteria, is illustrated in Figure B1.1.

Figure B1.1. Frequency of States Per Year, 1816-1992



The data set that I upon which test the hypotheses includes a maximum of 11,314 and a minimum of 6,985 observations. As indicated in the empirical analyses above, these thresholds reduce depending on the combination of independent variables, the length of the lag structures employed, and the presence of missing data. The mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of observations for each variable are reported in Table B1.1.

Table B1.1. Descriptive Statistics for Data in
Chapters 5&6, 1816-1992

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Democracy ^a	3.271	3.841	0	10	10,236
Democratization ^b	.136	.343	0	1	11,314
Autocratization ^b	.128	.334	0	1	11,314
Consolidating Democracy ^b	.033	.178	0	1	11,314
Major Democratization ^b	.041	.198	0	1	11,314
Retreating Democracy ^b	.012	.109	0	1	11,314
Major Autocratization ^b	.035	.183	0	1	11,314
Liberalizing Autocracy ^b	.062	.241	0	1	11,314
Consolidating Autocracy ^b	.081	.274	0	1	11,314
Protest ^c	.006	1.025	-4.29	21.92	6,985
Reb. & Gov. Instab. ^c	.010	1.019	-5.92	21.94	6,985
Leader Change ^d	.219	.527	0	7	11,314
Civil War Duration ^e	.033	.179	0	1	11,314
Civil War Post ^f	.065	.247	0	1	11,314
Dispute Initiator ^g	.190	.655	0	23	11,314
Dispute Target ^g	.190	.542	0	10	11,314
Interstate War ^h	.023	.150	0	1	11,314

Note: For specifics regarding variable definitions and operationalization see text of appendix.

^aPolity III institutional democracy score (see Gurr, et al. 1989, 1996; Jagers and Gurr 1995).

^bRegime change variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for ten-years following, and including, the year of change, and 0 otherwise.

^cFactor score (principle components, varimax normalized) of weighted Banks (1996a-b) domestic conflict events.

^dFrequency of Chief-executive changes per year (Banks, 1996a)

^eDuration variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for all years in which a civil war occurs, and 0 otherwise (see Singer and Small, 1994).

^fPost variable is dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 for ten-years following the cessation of a civil war, and 0 otherwise.

^gDispute initiator and target are event counts of originators on side A and B, respectively, per nation-year (see Jones, et al., 1997).

^hInterstate war is an event count of originators on side A or B, per nation-year (see Singer and Small, 1994).

ⁱPolity persistence is from Gurr, et al. (1989, 41).

B1.2. Dependent Variable

B1.2.1 Militarized Interstate Disputes

Gochman and Maoz (1984, 587) define militarized interstate disputes as “a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force. To be included, these acts must be explicit, overt, non-accidental, and government sanctioned.” Gochman and Maoz (587) base their definition of militarized disputes on four criteria. First, only those disputes that take place between entities recognized as member of the interstate system, according to COW criteria (see Singer and Small, 1994), are included. Second, because these data were designed, in part, to study the evolution of wars, the threshold for inclusion is military force. Third, the threats, displays, or uses of force must be explicit acts by the participants. Lastly, that such threats, displays, and uses of force are the result of decisions by government authorities. Currently, there are 22 types of acts falling within the militarized interstate dispute definition (Jones, et al. 1996). Below, I provide the definitions for each type of threat, display, and use, as contained in a more recent treatment of the militarized interstate dispute data by Jones, et al. (1996):

B1.2.1.1. Threats of Force

- a. Threat to use force: threat by one state to use its regular armed forces to fire upon the armed forces or violate the territory of another state;
- b. Threat to blockade: threat by one state to use its ships, airplanes or troops to seal off the territory of another state, so as to prevent either entry or exit;
- c. Threat to occupy territory: threat by one state to use military force to occupy the whole or part of another state's territory;
- d. Threat to declare war: threat by one state to issue an official declaration of war against another state; and

- e. Threat to use nuclear weapons: threat by one state to use all or part of its nuclear arsenal against the territory or forces of another state.

B1.2.1.2. Displays of Force

- a. Alert: reported increase in the military readiness of a state's regular armed forces:
- b. Mobilization: activation by a state of all or part of its previously inactive forces:
- c. Show of troops: public demonstration by a state of its land based military forces. not involving combat operations. Large-scale military movements (often called maneuvers) are one such example of this type of behavior:
- d. Show of ships: public demonstration by a state of its naval military forces. A purposeful display of naval forces outside the territorial waters of the targeted state is included within this type of incident:
- e. Show of planes: public demonstration by a state of its airborne capabilities. Repeated air space violations are included within this type of incident:
- f. Fortify border: explicit attempt to publicly demonstrate control over a border area through the construction or reinforcement of military outposts to defend or claim territory:
- g. Nuclear alert: increase in military readiness of a state's nuclear forces: and
- h. Border violation: crossing of a recognized land, sea or air boundary for a period of less than twenty-four hours by official forces of one state, without any force being used on the territory (or population) of the targeted state or any significant public demonstration of military force capability.

B1.2.1.3. Uses of Force

- a. Blockade: use of ships, planes or troops by one state to seal off the territory of another state so as to prevent entry or exit of goods or personnel. Boarding, stopping, or inspection of

ships, land vehicles or the confiscation of goods is sufficient evidence for the erection of a blockade:

- b. Occupation of territory: use of military force by one state to occupy the whole or part of another state's territory for a period of more than twenty-four hours. The immediate occupation after a war by the victorious side's army is not coded as an incident unless provisions of the treaty are violated by the occupying forces or further militarized incidents are undertaken by the state being occupied:
- c. Seizure: capture of material or personnel of official forces from another state, or the detention of private citizens operating within contested territory. Seizures must last at least twenty-four hours to be included:
- d. Clash: outbreak of military hostilities between regular armed forces of two or more system members, in which the initiator may or may not be clearly identified.
- e. Raid: use of regular armed forces of a state to fire upon the armed forces, population, or territory of another state. Within this incident type, the initiator can be clearly identified and its action is not sanctioned by the target:
- f. Declaration of war: official statement by one state that it is in a state of war with another state:
and
- h. Use of CBR Weapons: use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from the arsenal of one state employed against the territory or forces of another resulting in less than 1,000 total battle deaths per dispute.

As I note in chapter five, I use the militarized interstate dispute data to measure a state's participation in a dispute as the initiator or target. Specifically, the dispute data provide information allowing the researcher to identify those states that are on either side A (state(s) that threaten, show, or display force), or side B (the state(s) that have threatened, displayed, or used force against them) on the first day of the

dispute. I define states that are side A/originators as the dispute initiators, while those states that are side B/originators are the dispute targets.

B1.2.2.4. Descriptive Characteristics of the Dispute Data

In this section, I show the spatial distribution of militarized interstate disputes for the 1816-1992 period. There are 2,153 cases of dispute initiator and 2,149 cases of dispute target across the 1816-1992 period. Table B1.1 reports the frequency of dispute initiator and target for this sample by state.

Table B1.1. Summed Dispute Initiations and Target by State, 1816-1992.

State	Initiator	Target
Afghanistan	13	6
Albania	7	14
Algeria	3	5
Angola	2	3
Argentina	33	32
Armenia	1	0
Australia	1	2
Austria	2	7
Austria-Hungary	24	11
Azerbaijan	0	1
Bahamas	0	1
Bahrain	0	4
Bangladesh	1	6
Belgium	5	6
Benin	2	0
Bolivia	18	17
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0	2
Botswana	1	12
Brazil	15	27
Bulgaria	17	20
Burkina Faso	0	3
Burma	14	11
Burundi	1	3
Cambodia	9	20
Cameroun	3	1
Canada	6	3
Central African Republic	1	0
Chad	2	5
Chile	27	28
China	74	108
Colombia	16	20
Comoros	0	1
Congo	1	7
Costa Rica	3	10
Croatia	2	0
Cuba	12	14
Cyprus	1	14
Czechoslovakia	7	8
Denmark	3	14
Djibouti	0	1

Dominican Republic	6	10
Ecuador	14	23
Egypt	35	31
El Salvador	5	11
Equatorial Guinea	1	1
Estonia	2	6
Ethiopia	18	11
Finland	1	6
France	86	44
Gabon	0	3
Gambia	0	2
Georgia	0	1
German Democratic Republic	3	4
German Federal Republic	1	16
Germany	105	49
Ghana	6	4
Greece	22	34
Grenada	0	1
Guatemala	14	5
Guinea	4	4
Guinea-Bissau	0	2
Guyana	1	8
Haiti	6	17
Hanover	0	1
Hesse Electoral	0	1
Honduras	12	11
Hungary	7	15
Iceland	6	0
India	40	43
Indonesia	20	0
Iran	82	38
Iraq	64	23
Ireland	2	1
Israel	41	65
Italy	64	36
Ivory Coast	0	3
Japan	40	96
Jordan	8	15
Kenya	3	9
Korea	0	3
Korea (North)	19	8
Korea (South)	22	27
Kuwait	0	16
Laos	8	11
Latvia	0	6
Lebanon	1	9
Lesotho	0	1
Liberia	2	6
Libya	16	16
Liechtenstein	0	1
Lithuania	2	6
Luxemburg	0	1
Malagasy Republic	1	0
Malawi	0	2
Malaysia	6	5
Maldives Islands	0	1
Mali	3	1
Malta	0	3
Mauritania	2	5
Mexico	8	29
Moldova	0	1

Mongolia	4	2
Morocco	15	12
Mozambique	4	1
Nepal	0	7
Netherlands	7	19
New Zealand	0	1
Nicaragua	19	14
Niger	0	1
Nigeria	1	3
Norway	7	12
Oman	1	5
Pakistan	30	25
Panama	4	12
Papal States	1	3
Papua New Guinea	2	5
Paraguay	19	16
Peru	42	20
Philippines	6	5
Poland	7	9
Portugal	21	17
Qatar	1	3
Republic of China	25	12
Rumania	11	12
Russia	174	92
Rwanda	2	3
Saudi Arabia	12	16
Saxony	0	2
Senegal	5	6
Sierra Leone	1	0
Singapore	0	3
Solomon Islands	0	1
Somalia	14	7
South Africa	19	4
Spain	25	42
Sri Lanka	1	3
Sudan	3	18
Surinam	1	1
Swaziland	0	2
Sweden	2	20
Switzerland	5	4
Syria	54	15
Tanzania	2	7
Thailand	24	32
Togo	1	4
Tunisia	3	7
Turkey	44	72
Tuscany	0	1
Two Sicilies	0	3
Uganda	14	8
Ukraine	0	1
United Arab Emirates	0	4
United Kingdom	121	87
United States of America	151	112
Uruguay	2	5
Venezuela	16	13
Vietnam (Dem. Rep. of)	14	10
Vietnam (Republic of)	13	5
Yemen Arab Republic	8	7
Yemen People's Republic	6	3
Yugoslavia	20	22
Zaire	16	7

Zambia	4	23
Zimbabwe	13	6
Total	2,153	2,149

Note: Dispute data from Jones, et al. (1996)

B1.3. Independent Variables

I employ five categories of independent variables to measure the political system in chapters five and six. The definitions and operationalization of these variables are discussed at length in chapter four and Appendix A and I refer the reader to this section for further details. In this section, I report the descriptive statistics for the variables measuring domestic political climate, regime change, and leadership change for the 1816-1992 period.

B1.2.2.1. Domestic Political Climate

B1.2.2.1.1. Protest and Rebellion and Government Instability

I report the mean protest and rebellion and government instability factor scores for each state in the 1919-92 sample.

Table B1.2. Mean Domestic Conflict Factors
by State, 1919-92 (N=184)

State	Rebellion and Government	
	Protest	Instability
Afghanistan	-.300	.040
Albania	-.190	-.190
Algeria	-.040	-.370
Angola	-.500	.650
Antigua & Barbuda	-.150	-.390
Argentina	.650	1.250
Armenia	-.170	-.010
Australia	-.130	-.400
Austria	.040	-.090
Azerbaijan	1.510	.002
Bahamas	-.280	-.450
Bahrain	-.290	-.410
Bangladesh	.410	.030
Barbados	-.240	-.450
Belarus	-.280	-.450
Belgium	.070	-.110
Belize	-.170	-.450
Benin	-.260	-.120
Bhutan	-.250	-.450

Bolivia	.050	.850
Bosnia/Herzegovina	-.500	.340
Botswana	-.250	-.440
Brazil	-.010	.720
Brunei	-.280	-.450
Bulgaria	-.190	.100
Burkina Faso	-.320	-.140
Burma	-.210	.470
Burundi	-.290	-.200
Cambodia	-.360	.990
Cameroun	-.230	-.360
Canada	-.090	-.300
Cape Verde	-.280	-.410
CAR	-.300	-.250
Chad	-.440	.430
Chile	.350	.270
China	.080	.920
Colombia	.030	.320
Comoros	-.290	.010
Congo	-.280	-.100
Costa Rica	-.220	-.260
Croatia	-.260	.300
Cuba	-.020	.670
Cyprus	-.170	-.100
Czechoslovakia	-.060	.080
Denmark	-.190	-.380
Djibouti	-.200	-.370
Dom. Rep.	.080	-.130
Dominica	-.170	-.250
E. Germany	-.130	-.380
Ecuador	-.110	.240
Egypt/UAR	-.090	-.004
El Salvador	-.100	.170
Equatorial Guinea	-.300	-.320
Estonia	-.340	-.140
Ethiopia	-.310	.330
Fiji	-.220	-.360
Finland	-.180	-.160
France	1.220	.400
Gabon	-.180	-.430
Gambia	-.280	-.400
Georgia	-.500	2.590
Germany/Prussia	1.360	1.570
Ghana	-.310	-.070
Greece	.030	.450
Grenada	-.230	-.170
Guatemala	.010	.790
Guinea	-.280	-.190
Guinea-Bissau	-.300	-.340
Guyana	-.170	-.370
Haiti	.010	.170
Honduras	-.240	-.002
Hungary	-.200	.030
Iceland	-.220	-.380
India	3.180	.220
Indonesia	-.120	.400
Iran	.300	.170
Iraq	-.320	.530
Ireland	-.120	-.220
Israel	.790	-.070
Italy/Sardinia	1.270	.730

Ivory Coast	-.200	-.440
Jamaica	-.070	-.400
Japan	.260	-.140
Jordan	-.200	.180
Kazakhstan	-.003	-.540
Kenya	-.070	-.220
Korea (North)	-.260	-.450
Korea (South)	1.370	-.250
Kuwait	-.250	-.360
Kyrgyz Rep.	-.280	-.450
Laos	-.340	.440
Latvia	-.280	-.390
Lebanon	.150	.780
Lesotho	-.290	-.170
Liberia	-.280	-.210
Libya	-.250	-.290
Liechtenstein	-.280	-.450
Lithuania	-.290	-.230
Luxembourg	-.270	-.420
Malagasy Rep.	.009	-.350
Malawi	-.250	-.430
Malaysia	-.190	-.030
Maldives Islands	-.310	-.330
Mali	-.280	-.280
Malta	-.150	-.430
Marshall Islands	-.280	-.450
Mauritania	-.300	-.300
Mauritius	-.210	-.440
Mexico	.270	.490
Micronesia	-.280	-.450
Moldova	.050	.160
Mongolia	-.250	-.450
Morocco	-.160	-.010
Mozambique	-.530	.660
Nepal	-.140	-.290
Netherlands	-.190	-.340
New Zealand	-.230	-.450
Nicaragua	-.160	.110
Niger	-.290	-.320
Nigeria	-.040	-.002
Norway	-.250	-.390
Oman	-.340	-.180
Pakistan	.970	.240
Panama	.010	-.140
Papua New Guinea	-.300	-.200
Paraguay	-.300	-.040
Peru	.040	.360
Philippines	.210	.840
Poland	.460	.005
Portugal	-.080	.230
Qatar	-.280	-.450
Romania	-.080	.010
Rwanda	-.300	-.280
San Marino	-.280	-.450
Sao Tome-Principe	-.260	-.460
Saudi Arabia	-.280	-.340
Senegal	-.210	-.390
Seychelles	-.300	-.270
Sierra Leone	-.150	-.260
Singapore	-.260	-.410
Slovenia	-.280	-.450

Solomon Islands	-.280	-.450
Somalia	-.280	.030
South Africa	1.110	-.290
Soviet Union/Russia	.160	.460
Spain	.960	.560
Sri Lanka	.120	.100
St. Kitts-Nevis	-.280	-.450
St. Lucia	-.190	-.390
St. Vincent & Grenadines	-.200	-.450
Sudan	-.260	.540
Surinam	-.340	.020
Swaziland	-.290	-.380
Sweden	-.210	-.410
Switzerland	-.250	-.420
Syria	-.210	.310
Taiwan	-.150	-.360
Tajikistan	1.140	2.100
Tanzania	-.280	-.380
Thailand	-.270	.190
Togo	-.190	-.260
Trinidad & Tobago	-.230	-.300
Tunisia	-.180	-.370
Turkey/Ottoman Empire	.040	.190
Turkmenia	-.280	-.450
UAE	-.280	-.310
Uganda	-.410	.480
Ukraine	.490	-.420
United Kingdom	.750	.130
United States	2.550	-.860
Uruguay	.020	-.150
Uzbekistan	.760	-.710
Vanuatu	-.300	-.070
Venezuela	-.080	.220
Vietnam, Dem. Rep.	-.320	-.240
Vietnam, Republic of	.780	2.020
W. Germany	.340	-.310
Western Samoa	-.280	-.450
Yemen (North)	-.320	-.080
Yemen (South)	-.320	-.220
Yugoslavia/Serbia	.080	.070
Zaire	.030	.450
Zambia	-.220	-.340
Zimbabwe	-.150	.180
Mean	-.046	-.042

Source: Banks (1996a).

B1.2.2.1.2. Civil War

Table B1.4 reports the spatial distribution of civil war onset and duration.

Table B1.4. Civil War Onset and Ongoing by State. 1816-1992 (N=202)

State	Onset (freq.)	Ongoing (years)
Afghanistan	2	4
Algeria	1	2

Angola	1	1
Argentina	6	8
Austria	1	1
Austria-Hungary	1	1
Bolivia	1	1
Brazil	3	5
Burma	3	27
Burundi	3	4
Chile	2	2
China	9	30
Colombia	9	40
Costa Rica	1	1
Cuba	1	2
El Salvador	2	15
France	4	4
Georgia	1	2
Guatemala	4	15
Honduras	1	1
Hungary	1	2
India	1	8
Indonesia	3	7
Iran	2	4
Iraq	1	1
Japan	1	1
Laos	1	3
Mexico	5	24
Nicaragua	2	11
Nigeria	3	7
Pakistan	2	6
Paraguay	2	3
Peru	4	19
Philippines	2	24
Romania	2	2
Rwanda	2	5
Soviet Union/Russia	2	4
Spain	5	13
Sri Lanka	2	4
Sudan	2	20
Tajikistan	1	1
Turkey/Ottoman Empire	2	3
Two Sicilies	1	1
Uganda	2	10
United States	2	6
Uruguay	1	1
Venezuela	2	6
Yemen (North)	1	1
Yemen (South)	1	1
Yugoslavia/Serbia	1	2
Zimbabwe	1	8
total	116	374

Source: Singer and Small (1994).

B1.2.2.3. Regime change

In Table B1.4 I report the year and magnitude of democratic and autocratic regime changes by state for the 1816-1992 period

Table B1.4. Democratic and Autocratic Regime Changes by State, 1816-1992
(N=492)

State	Year	Democracy _t	Democracy _{t-1}	Magnitude	Type
Afghanistan	1935	0	1	-1	a
Albania	1925	0	2	-2	a
Albania	1991	3	0	3	d
Albania	1992	8	3	5	d
Algeria	1989	3	0	3	d
Algeria	1992	0	3	-3	a
Argentina	1880	3	1	2	d
Argentina	1912	4	3	1	d
Argentina	1930	0	4	-4	a
Argentina	1937	6	0	6	d
Argentina	1940	0	6	-6	a
Argentina	1957	3	0	3	d
Argentina	1966	0	3	-3	a
Argentina	1973	6	0	6	d
Argentina	1976	0	6	-6	a
Argentina	1983	8	0	8	d
Austria	1848	1	0	1	d
Austria	1920	8	1	7	d
Austria	1934	0	8	-8	a
Austria	1946	10	0	10	d
Azerbaijan	1992	2	3	-1	a
Baden	1841	1	0	1	d
Baden	1848	0	1	-1	a
Bangladesh	1974	2	8	-6	a
Bangladesh	1975	0	2	-2	a
Bangladesh	1991	9	0	9	d
Belgium	1853	7	2	5	d
Belgium	1913	8	7	1	d
Belgium	1919	9	8	1	d
Belgium	1930	10	9	1	d
Benin	1965	0	4	-4	a
Benin	1970	1	0	1	d
Benin	1972	0	1	-1	a
Benin	1991	9	0	9	d
Bolivia	1864	0	1	-1	a
Bolivia	1873	1	0	1	d
Bolivia	1876	0	1	-1	a
Bolivia	1880	4	0	4	d
Bolivia	1936	1	4	-3	a
Bolivia	1964	0	1	-1	a
Bolivia	1982	7	0	7	d
Bolivia	1985	8	7	1	d
Brazil	1934	0	1	-1	a
Brazil	1946	7	0	7	d
Brazil	1948	6	7	-1	a
Brazil	1961	5	6	-1	a
Brazil	1963	4	5	-1	a
Brazil	1965	0	4	-4	a
Brazil	1974	2	0	2	d
Brazil	1985	9	2	7	d
Brazil	1988	10	9	1	d
Bulgaria	1883	3	0	3	d
Bulgaria	1886	1	3	-2	a
Bulgaria	1894	0	1	-1	a
Bulgaria	1918	4	0	4	d
Bulgaria	1919	1	4	-3	a
Bulgaria	1935	0	1	-1	a

Bulgaria	1990	8	0	8	d
Burkina Faso	1978	6	0	6	d
Burkina Faso	1980	0	6	-6	a
Burma	1952	10	8	2	d
Burma	1958	8	10	-2	a
Burma	1962	0	8	-8	a
Burundi	1963	1	3	-2	a
Burundi	1966	0	1	-1	a
Canada	1888	9	7	2	d
Canada	1921	10	9	1	d
Chile	1851	3	1	2	d
Chile	1875	4	3	1	d
Chile	1888	6	4	2	d
Chile	1891	5	6	-1	a
Chile	1925	1	5	-4	a
Chile	1935	3	1	2	d
Chile	1955	5	3	2	d
Chile	1963	6	5	1	d
Chile	1988	2	0	2	d
Chile	1990	9	2	7	d
China	1912	3	1	2	d
China	1914	1	3	-2	a
China	1949	0	1	-1	a
Colombia	1861	1	4	-3	a
Colombia	1867	8	1	7	d
Colombia	1886	1	8	-7	a
Colombia	1900	3	1	2	d
Colombia	1904	1	3	-2	a
Colombia	1930	6	1	5	d
Colombia	1948	1	6	-5	a
Colombia	1957	7	1	6	d
Colombia	1974	8	7	1	d
Colombia	1991	9	8	1	d
Comoros	1976	0	5	-5	a
Comoros	1990	5	0	5	d
Congo	1963	0	5	-5	a
Congo	1992	5	0	5	d
Costa Rica	1841	2	0	2	d
Costa Rica	1854	3	2	1	d
Costa Rica	1867	5	3	2	d
Costa Rica	1875	6	5	1	d
Costa Rica	1883	7	6	1	d
Costa Rica	1890	10	7	3	d
Croatia	1838	5	0	5	d
Croatia	1859	0	5	-5	a
Croatia	1861	3	0	3	d
Croatia	1869	1	3	-2	a
Croatia	1903	5	1	4	d
Cuba	1955	0	4	-4	a
Cyprus	1968	7	8	-1	a
Cyprus	1974	10	7	3	d
Czechoslovakia	1945	10	7	3	d
Czechoslovakia	1948	0	10	-10	a
Czechoslovakia	1990	8	0	8	d
Denmark	1849	5	0	5	d
Denmark	1866	3	5	-2	a
Denmark	1870	1	3	-2	a
Denmark	1915	10	1	9	d
Dominican Republic	1932	0	1	-1	a
Dominican Republic	1966	1	0	1	d
Dominican Republic	1978	6	1	5	d

Dominican Republic	1982	7	6	1	d
Ecuador	1948	4	1	3	d
Ecuador	1961	1	4	-3	a
Ecuador	1968	4	1	3	d
Ecuador	1972	0	4	-4	a
Ecuador	1979	9	0	9	d
Ecuador	1984	8	9	-1	a
Ecuador	1988	9	8	1	d
Egypt	1923	7	0	7	d
Egypt	1930	1	7	-6	a
Egypt	1936	5	1	4	d
Egypt	1953	0	5	-5	a
El Salvador	1903	0	1	-1	a
El Salvador	1961	1	0	1	d
El Salvador	1964	3	1	2	d
El Salvador	1972	2	3	-1	a
El Salvador	1977	0	2	-2	a
El Salvador	1984	7	0	7	d
El Salvador	1991	8	7	1	d
Estonia	1918	10	8	2	d
Estonia	1936	0	10	-10	a
Estonia	1991	8	0	8	d
Ethiopia	1930	0	5	-5	a
Fiji	1987	0	9	-9	a
Fiji	1990	6	0	6	d
Finland	1920	10	8	2	d
Finland	1931	7	10	-3	a
Finland	1944	10	7	3	d
France	1830	3	1	2	d
France	1848	6	3	3	d
France	1852	0	6	-6	a
France	1869	2	0	2	d
France	1877	7	2	5	d
France	1898	8	7	1	d
France	1920	9	8	1	d
France	1930	10	9	1	d
France	1940	0	10	-10	a
France	1946	10	0	10	d
France	1958	6	10	-4	a
France	1969	8	6	2	d
France	1986	9	8	1	d
Gambia	1981	9	10	-1	a
Gambia	1990	10	9	1	d
German Federal Republic	1949	10	0	10	d
Germany	1878	1	0	1	d
Germany	1890	4	1	3	d
Germany	1908	5	4	1	d
Germany	1919	6	5	1	d
Germany	1933	0	6	-6	a
Ghana	1970	5	0	5	d
Ghana	1972	0	5	-5	a
Ghana	1979	6	0	6	d
Ghana	1981	0	6	-6	a
Ghana	1992	1	0	1	d
Greece	1831	1	0	1	d
Greece	1833	0	1	-1	a
Greece	1864	7	0	7	d
Greece	1870	9	7	2	d
Greece	1880	10	9	1	d
Greece	1915	3	10	-7	a
Greece	1924	1	3	-2	a

Greece	1925	0	1	-1	a
Greece	1926	10	0	10	d
Greece	1934	8	10	-2	a
Greece	1936	0	8	-8	a
Greece	1944	8	0	8	d
Greece	1949	7	8	-1	a
Greece	1967	0	7	-7	a
Greece	1975	8	0	8	d
Greece	1986	10	8	2	d
Guatemala	1880	4	1	3	d
Guatemala	1896	1	4	-3	a
Guatemala	1898	4	1	3	d
Guatemala	1900	0	4	-4	a
Guatemala	1920	4	0	4	d
Guatemala	1932	0	4	-4	a
Guatemala	1944	6	0	6	d
Guatemala	1950	4	6	-2	a
Guatemala	1954	0	4	-4	a
Guatemala	1966	4	0	4	d
Guatemala	1970	3	4	-1	a
Guatemala	1974	1	3	-2	a
Guatemala	1978	0	1	-1	a
Guatemala	1986	5	0	5	d
Guatemala	1990	4	5	-1	a
Guyana	1967	4	5	-1	a
Guyana	1978	3	4	-1	a
Guyana	1980	0	3	-3	a
Guyana	1992	6	0	6	d
Haiti	1918	3	0	3	d
Haiti	1950	0	3	-3	a
Haiti	1990	8	0	8	d
Haiti	1992	0	8	-8	a
Honduras	1848	3	1	2	d
Honduras	1865	1	3	-2	a
Honduras	1894	6	1	5	d
Honduras	1904	4	6	-2	a
Honduras	1908	6	4	2	d
Honduras	1936	1	6	-5	a
Honduras	1982	4	1	3	d
Honduras	1985	5	4	1	d
Honduras	1990	6	5	1	d
Hungary	1948	0	1	-1	a
Hungary	1988	2	0	2	d
Hungary	1989	3	2	1	d
Hungary	1990	10	3	7	d
India	1975	7	9	-2	a
India	1977	8	7	1	d
Indonesia	1946	4	0	4	d
Indonesia	1948	5	4	1	d
Indonesia	1950	3	5	-2	a
Indonesia	1957	2	3	-1	a
Indonesia	1959	0	2	-2	a
Iran	1941	2	0	2	d
Iran	1947	3	2	1	d
Iran	1955	0	3	-3	a
Iraq	1958	0	1	-1	a
Ireland	1927	10	8	2	d
Ireland	1933	8	10	-2	a
Ireland	1952	10	8	2	d
Israel	1967	9	10	-1	a
Italy	1900	3	1	2	d

Italy	1928	0	3	-3	a
Italy	1948	10	0	10	d
Japan	1868	5	0	5	d
Japan	1952	10	5	5	d
Jordan	1951	1	0	1	d
Jordan	1952	3	0	3	d
Jordan	1957	0	3	-3	a
Jordan	1992	1	0	1	d
Kenya	1966	3	5	-2	a
Kenya	1969	2	3	-1	a
Kenya	1970	0	2	-2	a
Korea (South)	1960	10	0	10	d
Korea (South)	1961	0	10	-10	a
Korea (South)	1963	1	0	1	d
Korea (South)	1972	0	1	-1	a
Korea (South)	1986	2	0	2	d
Korea (South)	1988	10	2	8	d
Laos	1958	8	7	1	d
Laos	1959	1	8	-7	a
Laos	1975	0	1	-1	a
Latvia	1929	8	7	1	d
Latvia	1934	0	8	-8	a
Latvia	1991	8	0	8	d
Lebanon	1971	5	4	1	d
Lebanon	1990	2	5	-3	a
Lesotho	1970	0	9	-9	a
Liberia	1884	2	7	-5	a
Liberia	1890	1	2	-1	a
Liberia	1910	0	1	-1	a
Lithuania	1928	0	7	-7	a
Lithuania	1991	10	0	10	d
Luxembourg	1880	4	2	2	d
Luxembourg	1890	7	4	3	d
Luxembourg	1920	10	7	3	d
Malagasy Republic	1966	2	3	-1	a
Malagasy Republic	1972	0	2	-2	a
Malaysia	1969	4	10	-6	a
Malaysia	1971	8	4	4	d
Mali	1992	9	0	9	d
Mauritania	1963	0	2	-2	a
Mauritius	1982	10	9	1	d
Mexico	1880	0	1	-1	a
Mexico	1917	1	0	1	d
Mexico	1930	0	1	-1	a
Mexico	1978	1	0	1	d
Mongolia	1990	4	0	4	d
Morocco	1965	0	1	-1	a
Morocco	1977	1	0	1	d
Nepal	1946	0	1	-1	a
Nepal	1959	4	0	4	d
Nepal	1960	0	4	-4	a
Nepal	1981	2	0	2	d
Nepal	1991	8	2	6	d
Netherlands	1840	0	1	-1	a
Netherlands	1848	2	0	2	d
Netherlands	1849	3	2	1	d
Netherlands	1890	4	3	1	d
Netherlands	1917	10	4	6	d
New Zealand	1876	7	10	-3	a
New Zealand	1877	9	7	2	d
New Zealand	1893	10	9	1	d

Nicaragua	1936	0	1	-1	a
Nicaragua	1984	1	0	1	d
Nicaragua	1990	6	1	5	d
Nigeria	1966	0	8	-8	a
Nigeria	1979	8	0	8	d
Nigeria	1984	0	8	-8	a
Norway	1873	2	0	2	d
Norway	1884	4	2	2	d
Norway	1898	10	4	6	d
Oman	1946	0	2	-2	a
Pakistan	1948	3	0	3	d
Pakistan	1950	4	0	4	d
Pakistan	1952	5	4	1	d
Pakistan	1956	8	5	3	d
Pakistan	1958	0	8	-8	a
Pakistan	1962	6	0	6	d
Pakistan	1965	4	6	-2	a
Pakistan	1977	0	4	-4	a
Pakistan	1988	4	0	4	d
Pakistan	1990	3	4	-1	a
Panama	1950	1	0	1	d
Panama	1956	5	1	4	d
Panama	1968	0	5	-5	a
Panama	1990	8	0	8	d
Paraguay	1870	1	0	1	d
Paraguay	1936	0	1	-1	a
Paraguay	1937	4	0	4	d
Paraguay	1940	0	4	-4	a
Paraguay	1947	1	0	1	d
Paraguay	1954	0	1	-1	a
Paraguay	1989	6	0	6	d
Peru	1828	6	1	5	d
Peru	1835	1	6	-5	a
Peru	1886	4	1	3	d
Peru	1920	0	4	-4	a
Peru	1933	4	0	4	d
Peru	1950	5	4	1	d
Peru	1960	6	5	1	d
Peru	1968	0	6	-6	a
Peru	1980	7	0	7	d
Peru	1991	8	7	1	d
Peru	1992	2	8	-6	a
Philippines	1945	4	6	-2	a
Philippines	1950	6	4	2	d
Philippines	1969	4	6	-2	a
Philippines	1972	0	4	-4	a
Philippines	1987	8	0	8	d
Poland	1926	2	8	-6	a
Poland	1935	0	2	-2	a
Poland	1989	5	0	5	d
Poland	1991	9	5	4	d
Portugal	1823	1	0	1	d
Portugal	1836	5	1	4	d
Portugal	1842	1	5	-4	a
Portugal	1855	0	1	-1	a
Portugal	1880	1	0	1	d
Portugal	1890	2	1	1	d
Portugal	1906	3	2	1	d
Portugal	1907	0	3	-3	a
Portugal	1908	5	0	5	d
Portugal	1911	8	5	3	d

Portugal	1930	0	8	-8	a
Portugal	1976	9	0	9	d
Portugal	1982	10	9	1	d
Republic of China	1991	6	0	6	d
Rumania	1864	1	3	-2	a
Rumania	1866	0	1	-1	a
Rumania	1910	1	0	1	d
Rumania	1941	0	1	-1	a
Rumania	1990	5	0	5	d
Russia	1906	1	0	1	d
Russia	1917	5	1	4	d
Russia	1918	1	5	-4	a
Russia	1922	0	1	-1	a
Russia	1989	1	0	1	d
Russia	1990	3	1	2	d
Russia	1991	8	3	5	d
Rwanda	1973	0	1	-1	a
Senegal	1964	0	3	-3	a
Senegal	1978	2	0	2	d
Senegal	1981	3	2	1	d
Sierra Leone	1967	0	6	-6	a
Sierra Leone	1968	4	0	4	d
Sierra Leone	1969	3	4	-1	a
Sierra Leone	1971	0	3	-3	a
Singapore	1965	2	8	-6	a
Somalia	1969	0	7	-7	a
South Africa	1910	7	3	4	d
Spain	1820	1	0	1	d
Spain	1837	3	1	2	d
Spain	1845	2	3	-1	a
Spain	1852	1	2	-1	a
Spain	1871	5	1	4	d
Spain	1873	1	5	-4	a
Spain	1876	4	1	3	d
Spain	1879	6	4	2	d
Spain	1890	7	6	1	d
Spain	1895	6	7	-1	a
Spain	1923	0	6	-6	a
Spain	1931	8	0	8	d
Spain	1939	0	8	-8	a
Spain	1978	8	0	8	d
Spain	1983	9	8	1	d
Sri Lanka	1970	8	7	1	d
Sri Lanka	1978	6	8	-2	a
Sri Lanka	1982	5	6	-1	a
Sudan	1958	0	8	-8	a
Sudan	1965	8	0	8	d
Sudan	1971	0	8	-8	a
Sudan	1986	8	0	8	d
Sudan	1989	0	8	-8	a
Swaziland	1973	0	3	-3	a
Sweden	1855	1	0	1	d
Sweden	1871	2	1	1	d
Sweden	1917	10	2	8	d
Syria	1949	0	5	-5	a
Syria	1950	5	0	5	d
Syria	1952	0	5	-5	a
Syria	1954	7	0	7	d
Syria	1961	2	7	-5	a
Syria	1963	0	2	-2	a
Tajikistan	1992	0	4	-4	a

Thailand	1935	1	0	1	d
Thailand	1958	0	1	-1	a
Thailand	1969	5	0	5	d
Thailand	1971	0	5	-5	a
Thailand	1975	8	0	8	d
Thailand	1976	0	8	-8	a
Thailand	1978	3	0	3	d
Thailand	1988	5	3	2	d
Thailand	1992	6	5	1	d
Trinidad and Tobago	1984	9	8	1	d
Trinidad and Tobago	1990	8	9	-1	a
Turkey	1876	1	0	1	d
Turkey	1877	0	1	-1	a
Turkey	1908	1	0	1	d
Turkey	1909	3	0	3	d
Turkey	1923	0	3	-3	a
Turkey	1946	10	0	10	d
Turkey	1953	7	10	-3	a
Turkey	1961	10	7	3	d
Turkey	1965	9	10	-1	a
Turkey	1971	2	9	-7	a
Turkey	1973	9	2	7	d
Turkey	1980	2	9	-7	a
Turkey	1984	7	2	5	d
Turkey	1987	8	7	1	d
Turkey	1989	10	8	2	d
Two Sicilies	1820	1	0	1	d
Two Sicilies	1821	0	1	-1	a
Uganda	1967	0	7	-7	a
Uganda	1981	4	0	4	d
Uganda	1986	0	4	-4	a
United Kingdom	1837	6	4	2	d
United Kingdom	1880	7	6	1	d
United Kingdom	1902	8	7	1	d
United Kingdom	1922	10	8	2	d
United States of America	1845	10	9	1	d
United States of America	1850	9	10	-1	a
United States of America	1855	8	9	-1	a
United States of America	1865	9	8	1	d
United States of America	1871	10	9	1	d
Uruguay	1904	3	1	2	d
Uruguay	1910	4	3	1	d
Uruguay	1919	5	4	1	d
Uruguay	1934	3	5	-2	a
Uruguay	1952	8	3	5	d
Uruguay	1973	0	8	-8	a
Uruguay	1985	9	0	9	d
Uruguay	1989	10	9	1	d
Venezuela	1908	0	1	-1	a
Venezuela	1940	1	0	1	d
Venezuela	1958	7	1	6	d
Venezuela	1969	8	7	1	d
Venezuela	1970	9	8	1	d
Venezuela	1991	8	9	-1	a
Wuerttemberg	1819	2	0	2	d
Yemen Arab Republic	1948	1	0	1	d
Yemen Arab Republic	1962	2	1	1	d
Yemen Arab Republic	1967	0	2	-2	a
Yugoslavia	1929	0	3	-3	a
Yugoslavia	1939	5	0	5	d
Yugoslavia	1946	0	5	-5	a

Yugoslavia	1980	1	0	1	d
Yugoslavia	1990	2	1	1	d
Zambia	1968	3	4	-1	a
Zambia	1972	0	3	-3	a
Zambia	1991	6	0	6	d
Zimbabwe	1980	6	7	-1	a
Zimbabwe	1983	3	6	-3	a
Zimbabwe	1987	0	3	-3	a

Note: Institutional democracy score from Polity III (Gurr, et al., 1989, 1996; Jagers and Gurr, 1995).

Type Key: d=democratic; a=autocratic.

B1.2.2.4. Leadership change

I identify 2,417 leadership changes the 1816-1992 period and 202 nation-states. The total frequency of leadership change by state is reported in Table B1.5.

Table B1.5. Leadership Changes by State, 1816-1992 (N=202)

State	Freq.
Afghanistan	12
Albania	8
Algeria	6
Angola	2
Antigua & Barbuda	1
Argentina	46
Armenia	1
Australia	16
Austria	19
Austria-Hungary	2
Azerbaijan	1
Baden	1
Bahamas	1
Bahrain	0
Bangladesh	7
Barbados	5
Bavaria	2
Belarus	0
Belgium	27
Belize	3
Benin	12
Bhutan	1
Bolivia	64
Bosnia/Herzegovina	0
Botswana	2
Brazil	37
Brunei	0
Bulgaria	19
Burkina Faso	5
Burma	7
Burundi	6
Cambodia	6
Cameroun	3
Canada	14

Cape Verde	2
CAR	4
Chad	7
Chile	48
China	22
Colombia	87
Comoros	7
Congo	9
Costa Rica	19
Croatia	0
Cuba	13
Cyprus	3
Czechoslovakia	12
Denmark	23
Djibouti	1
Dom. Rep.	25
Dominica	3
E. Germany	5
Ecuador	51
Egypt/UAR	4
El Salvador	44
Equatorial Guinea	2
Estonia	17
Ethiopia	7
Fiji	4
Finland	53
France	99
Gabon	4
Gambia	1
Georgia	1
Germany/Prussia	21
Ghana	7
Greece	69
Grenada	6
Guatemala	30
Guinea	3
Guinea-Bissau	2
Guyana	2
Haiti	42
Hanover	1
Hesse Electoral	1
Hesse Grand Ducal	1
Honduras	33
Hungary	21
Iceland	17
India	9
Indonesia	2
Iran	14
Iraq	41
Ireland	19
Israel	13
Italy/Sardinia	71
Ivory Coast	1
Jamaica	5
Japan	42
Jordan	3
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Korea (Chosen)	1
Korea (North)	1
Korea (South)	6

Kuwait	2
Kyrgyz Rep.	1
Laos	14
Latvia	17
Lebanon	10
Lesotho	3
Liberia	6
Libya	2
Liechtenstein	0
Lithuania	10
Luxembourg	8
Malagasy Rep.	4
Malawi	0
Malaysia	6
Maldives Islands	1
Mali	3
Malta	2
Marshall Islands	1
Mauritania	4
Mauritius	1
Mecklenburg Schwerin	0
Mexico	69
Micronesia	1
Modena	0
Moldova	1
Mongolia	6
Morocco	6
Mozambique	2
Namibia	1
Nepal	5
Netherlands	32
New Zealand	16
Nicaragua	18
Niger	2
Nigeria	8
Norway	30
Oman	0
Pakistan	14
Panama	28
Papal States	0
Papua New Guinea	6
Paraguay	45
Parma	0
Peru	48
Philippines	8
Poland	12
Portugal	43
Qatar	1
Romania	9
Rwanda	1
San Marino	0
Sao Tome-Principe	2
Saudi Arabia	5
Saxony	1
Senegal	1
Seychelles	2
Sierra Leone	6
Singapore	1
Slovenia	1
Solomon Islands	5
Somalia	3

South Africa	10
Soviet Union/Russia	14
Spain	101
Sri Lanka	10
St. Kitts-Nevis	0
St. Lucia	5
St. Vincent & Grenadines	1
Sudan	13
Surinam	5
Swaziland	3
Sweden	37
Switzerland	6
Syria	19
Taiwan	2
Tajikistan	5
Tanzania	1
Thailand	27
Togo	2
Trinidad & Tobago	3
Tunisia	6
Turkey/Ottoman Empire	36
Turkmenia	0
Tuscany	0
Two Sicilies	0
UAE	1
Uganda	6
Ukraine	0
United Kingdom	49
United States	37
Uruguay	31
Uzbekistan	0
Vanuatu	1
Venezuela	32
Vietnam. Dem. Rep.	6
Vietnam. Rep. of	10
W. Germany	5
Western Samoa	7
Wuerttemberg	2
Yemen	1
Yemen (North)	9
Yemen (South)	6
Yugoslavia/Serbia	17
Zaire	6
Zambia	1
Zanzibar	2
Zimbabwe	4
<hr/> Total	<hr/> 2,472 <hr/>

APPENDIX C

C1.1. Introduction

The data I use in the empirical analysis in chapter six are identical to those used in chapter five, save the dependent variable. I discuss the definitions and operationalization of the independent variables used in chapter six throughout chapters four and five, as well as appendices A and B, so there is no need to recapitulate them here. However, it is necessary to identify the descriptive characteristics of the dependent variable that is the focus of the analysis in chapter six, interstate wars.

C1.2 Data

C1.2.1. Dependent Variable

C1.2.1.1. War Origination

I use interstate war origination as my measure of interstate conflict. The information on interstate wars is from the Correlates of War Project's International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992 (see Singer and Small, 1994). According to Singer and Small (1994), conflict between nations constitutes an interstate war when 1,000 battle deaths are sustained by interstate system members in a given year. As I noted earlier, war origination is defined as those states that participate in a war on either side A (the initiator) or side B (the target) on the first day of the conflict. Therefore, I am not interested in the role of nations that join ongoing wars, subscribing to the argument that origination, the evolution, and joining of interstate conflicts are distinct processes. Using these criteria, I identify 259 instances of war origination

across the 1816-1992 interval. I operationalize war origination with a dichotomous variable, coded 1 when a war origination occurs in a specific observation and 0 otherwise.

Spatially, the states that have participated in war origination across the 1816-1992 interval are listed in Table C1.2.

Table C1.1. Total Interstate War
Frequencies by State, 1816-1992 (N=202)

State	Origination
Argentina	3
Armenia	1
Australia	3
Austria-Hungary	6
Azerbaijan	1
Baden	2
Bavaria	2
Belgium	3
Bolivia	2
Brazil	3
Bulgaria	5
Cambodia	2
Canada	3
Chile	2
China	11
Colombia	2
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1
Czechoslovakia	1
Denmark	2
Ecuador	1
Egypt/UAR	6
El Salvador	5
Ethiopia	4
Finland	3
France	17
Germany/Prussia	6
Greece	7
Guatemala	3
Honduras	3
Hungary	3
India	3
Iran	2
Iraq	4
Israel	5
Italy/Sardinia	7
Japan	9
Jordan	3
Korea (North)	1
Korea (South)	2
Lebanon	1
Libya	1
Lithuania	1
Mexico	2
Modena	1

Mongolia	2
Morocco	2
Netherlands	2
New Zealand	2
Nicaragua	1
Norway	1
Pakistan	3
Papal States	2
Paraguay	2
Peru	2
Philippines	2
Poland	3
Portugal	1
Romania	5
Saudi Arabia	2
Saxony	1
Somalia	1
South Africa	1
Soviet Union/Russia	12
Spain	5
Syria	5
Tanzania	1
Thailand	4
Turkey/Ottoman Empire	11
Tuscany	1
Two Sicilies	2
Uganda	1
United Kingdom	10
United States	8
Vietnam, Dem. Rep.	4
Vietnam, Rep. of	1
Wuerttemberg	2
Yugoslavia/Serbia	1
Total	259

Source: Small and Singer (1994).

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




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IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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